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THE PRE-SULLIVAN COMMON LAW WEB OF
PROTECTION AGAINST
POLITICAL DEFAMATION SUITS
James Maxwell Koffler*
New York Times v. Sullivan altered the course of U.S. defamation
laws by demanding that public officials filing libel or slandersuits based
on their official acts meet tests emanatingfrom the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, This framework has favored
defendants in defamation suits brought by public officials and
candidates for public office. Lost in the loud majestic music of the
opinion in Sullivan is the trend evinced in the soft lyrics of lower court
common law decisions in the decades preceding 1964 where judges
ruled against political plaintiffs filing defamation suits. A survey of
hundreds ofjudicial decisionsfrom 1870-1964 shows the existence of an
informal common law web constrainingpolitical libel andslander cases.
Three filaments of that web are highlighted: court decisions limiting
what was defamatory and what were considered special damages; the
qualifiedprivileges of common interest andfair comment; and judicial
modification of damage awards. This Article further argues that lower
courts deciding the weaponized libel suits of the civil rights movement in
the 1960s ignored this common law web and that the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Sullivan was defensible. This Article concludes that
* LL.M., 2018, New York University School of Law; J.D., 2012, Maurice A. Deane School
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developed me to develop this piece. To members of the Legal & Constitutional History Colloquium
at N.Y.U. School of Law, for developing my writing through sharing and discussing yours (and
fereing letting me, in 2014, to present the primordial ooze from which this Article emerged). To
members of the Hofstra Law Review, specifically: Volume Forty for fostering the fashion of the
footnotes that follow, and Volume Forty-Seven for their diligent editing of the footnotes (and text)
that follow. I am grateful: to William E. Nelson for stern encouragement; to Eric M. Freedman for
limitlessly lending his time and intellect; to Dave Gerardi for patient guidance; to Tracy Dunbrook
for kind and critical comments; for the keen insights of Harold S. Forsythe, Barbara Landress, and
Judge Jed S. Rakoff; to willingish readers: Rhoda Binda, Christopher Bogart, Christina Flounders
Conlon, Jeffrey Koffler, Sophie Koffier, and Miriam T. Vincent. Completed in memory of my
grandmother, Carolyn Koffier, who would be proudly mortified by this Article. Any errors, rank
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courts today should apply the common law web based in state law and
adopt the common law web as part of state constitutionalcommon law
to guardagainst any potentialcurtailments of the Sullivanframework.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE FORGOTTEN MAN (IN THE MIRROR)'
3
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2 has a checkered reputation. Many
Americans celebrated and continue to laud the decision as protective of
the national press and the right of individuals (even large groups) to state
4
(maybe chant) rationales for why government swamps need draining.
Many Americans critique the decision, in whole or in part, for a variety
of constitutional and policy reasons: Sullivan depleted the pool of
respectable Americans willing to run for public office; the public figure
doctrine is flawed; the actual malice standard is unworkable and/or gives
the press a license to lie.'

1. MICHAEL JACKSON, Man in the Mirror,on BAD (Epic Records 1988).
2. 376 U.S. 254(1964).
3. See infra notes 4-5 and accompanying text; see also Jeffrey Abramson, Full CourtPress:
Drawing in Media Defenses for Libel and Privacy Cases, 96 OR. L. REV. 19, 20 (2017) ("In this
Article, I reluctantly argue that the free speech promise of New York Times v. Sullivan has been lost
due to the ruling's overextension." (footnote omitted)).
4. See, e.g., John Bruce Lewis & Bruce L. Ottley, New York Times v. Sullivan at 50:
Despite Criticism, the Actual Malice Standard Still Provides "Breathing Space" for
Communications in the Public Space, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2014) (arguing that the actual
malice standard adopted in Sullivan has "proven workable"); Editorial, The UninhibitedPress, 50
Years Later, N.Y. TiNvEs, Mar. 9, 2014, at 10 SR ("Today, our understanding of freedom of the
press comes in large part from the Sullivan case."); Andrew Cohen, Today Is the 50th Anniversary
2014),
9,
(Mar.
ATLANTIC
First Amendment,
of the
(Re-)Birth
the
of
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/03/today-is-the-50th-anniversary-of-the-re-birthof-the-first-amendment/284311; Jonathan Peters, Opinion, The Newspaper Ad That Changed
Everything, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/20/opinions/new-york-times-v-sullivan-impactopinion-peters/index.html (last updated Nov. 20, 2017) (praising Sullivan); Leslie Savan, What's
Going to Save Journalism?, NATION (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/whatsgoing-to-save-journalism (mentioning Sullivan and the actual malice standard). Most praise of
Sullivan by legal scholars is nuanced, with a degree of fault found in the decision according to the
academic's area of expertise. See, e.g., Ashley Messenger, Reflections on New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 50 Years Later, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 423, 446 (2014) ("Although Sullivan did indeed
give speakers great protection when commenting on public officials and is important for that reason,
the underlying logic of the case is somewhat flawed and fails to protect valuable and expressive
speech in all cases."); Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REv. 729, 744-46 (2014)
(criticizing the lack of a robust press clause).
5. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996-97 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (criticizing Sullivan for failing to live up to its promise: "Instead, in the past few years a
remarkable upsurge in libel actions, accompanied by a startling inflation of damage awards, has
threatened to impose a self-censorship on the press which can as effectively inhibit debate and
criticism as would overt governmental regulation that the first amendment most certainly would not
permit"); ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 20507 (1991) (reporting that Richard Nixon warned that Sullivan would diminish the quality of the pool
of political candidates); Abramson, supra note 3, at 35-36, 49-54 (critiquing the public figure
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More recently, libel laws were thrust into the national discourse as
part of the presidential campaign of Donald Trump. At a February 2016
rally, Trump promised his base of forgotten men and women that libel
laws would be "open[ed] up," so that "we can sue [the press] and win
lots of money."'6 Trump then promised reporters covering the rally that
"we're going to have people sue you like you've never got[ten] sued
before." 7 This was just one of many episodic libel proposals he made
during that campaign and his first two years as president. 8
doctrine and the extension of Sullivan to protect the private acts of public officials); Richard A.
Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHt. L. REv. 782, 817-18 (1986) ("Now
that the exigencies of the immediate case and of the segregation crisis that brought it to the fore
have passed, the sensible constitutional conclusion is to abandon the actual malice rule in New York
Times. In its institutional sense, New York Times v. Sullivan was wrongly decided."); Pierre N.
Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan In Its Proper Place, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1287, 1287, 1289-90, 1293-95 (1988) (critiquing the "mislabeled 'actual malice' standard);
Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment", 8 COLUM.-VLA ART & LAW 1, 14, 20-22 (1983) (critiquing
Sullivan for not holding that the First Amendment prohibited libel actions based on criticism of the
official conduct of public officials); cf David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U.
PA. L. REv. 487, 488, 510 (1991) ("The actual malice rule of New York Times v. Sullivan does not
adequately protect the press, so courts have imposed many other constitutional limitations on the
libel action." (footnote omitted)).
6. Hadas Gold, Donald Trump: We're Going to 'Open Up'Libel Laws, POLITICO (Feb. 26,
2016, 2:31 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-media/2016/02/donald-trump-libel-laws-219866
(quoting Donald Trump during a campaign rally in Texas in February 2016).
7. Id.
8. See id. (quoting Donald Trump as saying "I'm going to open up our libel laws so when
they write purposely negative and horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of
money. We're going to open up those libel laws. So when The New York Times writes a hit piece
which is a total disgrace or when The Washington Post, which is there for other reasons, writes a hit
piece, we can sue them and win money instead of having no chance of winning because they're
totally protected," during a political rally in Texas in February 2016); see also Josh Dawsey, Trump
Says Administration Will Take 'Very Strong Look' at Stricter Libel Laws, WASH. POST (Jan. 10,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-administration-will-take-very-stronglook-at-stricter-libel-laws/2018/01/1 0/9a1 f68de-f633- 11 e7-91 af31 ac729add94_story.html?utm term=.
4ld856cbde4f (quoting Donald Trump as calling U.S. libel laws a "sham and a disgrace" at a
televised January 2018 meeting of his Cabinet at the White House); Post Ops. Staff, Opinion, A
Transcript of Donald Trump's Meeting with the Washington Post EditorialBoard, WASH. POST
(Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2016/03/21/a-transcriptof-donald-trumps-meeting-with-the-washington-post-editorial-board/?utmterm=. 17bOebal 7658
(quoting Donald Trump as saying: "I want to make it more fair from the side where I am, because
things are said that are libelous, things are said about me that are so egregious and so wrong, and
right now according to the libel laws I can do almost nothing about it because I'm a well-known
person you know, etc., etc." during an interview with the Washington Post); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER
(Nov.
9,
2016,
3:36
AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/796315640307060738?lang--en ("Such a beautiful and
important evening! The forgotten man and woman will never be forgotten again. We will all come
together as never before .. "). But see Eugene Volokh, Opinion, White House Chief ofStaffReince
Priebus
on
Changes
to
Libel
Law,
WASH.
POST
(May
1,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/05/01/white-house-chief-of-
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Perhaps this esoteric campaign promise has its roots in Trump's
failure to win large verdicts in defamation suits against the press. 9
Regardless of reason, President Trump finds these laws "disgrace[ful],"
0
and believes that someone should do something to fix them.'
Except for chaotic periods in American history (e.g., Red Scares,
declared wars, and the Civil Rights Movement), the heyday of the
political defamation plaintiff did not exist-at least not to the extent that
President Trump appears to desire." U.S. courts did not make a habit of
making it rain for political defamation plaintiffs. The closest one comes
to finding a precedent for the defamation regime that Trump appears to
want is the state courts of the Deep South in the 1960s, where
weaponized libel suits were filed against media outlets and civil rights
activists with the intention of chilling coverage of and participation in
the Civil Rights Movement and threatening to bankrupt national
press outlets.

4
2
staff-reince-priebus-on-changes-to-libel-law/?utm-term=.88730f f22 b (arguing that the lack of
is unserious about
Administration
that
the
Trump
laws
shows
libel
specific proposals to reform
this). Defamation suits also arose as an issue during Donald Trump's campaign when Trump
promised to sue all the women accusing him of various degrees of sexual misconduct. Rebecca
Morin, Trump: Accusers 'Will Be Sued After the Election Is Over', POLrrITCO (Oct. 22, 2016, 1:09
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/trump-accusers-will-be-sued-after-the-election-isPM),
over-230186.
9. See, e.g., Trump v. Chicago Tribune Co., 616 F. Supp. 1434, 1434, 1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(dismissing libel suit against architecture critic for criticizing Trump's idea to build the "tallest
building in the world" on Manhattan island); Trump v. O'Brien, 29 A.3d 1090, 1092-95, 1103 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (affirming summary judgment for defendant in defamation suit filed
against the author and publishers of TRUMPNATION, THE ART OF BEING THE DONALD for
lowballing Trump's net worth); cf Makaeffv. Trump Univ., 715 F.3d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 2013) ("No
one would deny that Donald Trump, the real estate magnate, television personality, author, and
erstwhile presidential candidate, cuts a celebrated, if controversial, public figure."); Roffman v.
Trump, 754 F. Supp. 411, 413, 419-20 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (denying summary judgment for defendantTrump in a defamation suit brought by an "apprais[er] of the Atlantic City, New Jersey casino
industry").
10. See supra note 8. Aside from Sullivan and its progeny, there is not much substantive role
for the federal govemment in defamation law; thus, we can assume that Sullivan is the source of
Trump's ire. See supra note 8. As president, Donald Trump can try to alter U.S. libel laws by
appointing federal judges-district and circuit court judges could prune Sullivan, while U.S.
Supreme Court Justices could overrule Sullivan.
11. See infra Parts II.A.2.b-c, ILI.A.3, IV. The weaponized defamation suits of the Civil
Rights Movement were not about defamation. See infra note 15. Defamation was a vehicle that
southern plaintiffs, courts, and polities hoped would chill the speech of the national press outlets
through reportage on resistance to and effects of segregation and white supremacy.
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This Article is not a story about the First Amendment; 12 though
First Amendment principles provided background music for some preSullivan decisions that ruled against political defamation plaintiffs.
Rather, judges used the lyrics of the common law to curtail the ability of
public officials, candidates, and political figures to file (much less win)
political defamation suits.
This Article is structured as follows. Part HI provides a brief history
of defamation that leads to a presentation of what the elements of and
defenses to a cause of action for defamation were prior to 1964.13 Part IH
details three strands of the common law web that constrained political
defamation suits prior to 1964: narrowing what was defamatory and
what would be accepted as special damages; the qualified privileges of
common interest and fair comment; and judicial scrutiny of damage
awards.14 Part IV presents Alabama's common law of libel at the time
the weaponized political libel suit,15 Sullivan v. New York Times, was
decided (in 1962) and argues that the broad ruling by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1964 reversing Alabama's Supreme Court was (and remains)
justifiable on constitutional grounds. 16 Part V urges state institutions to
enshrine their own versions of the common law web into their state
constitutions, legislation, and/or common law-if they have not done so
17
already-in case Sullivan is curtailed if not overruled.
II. THE STORY OF U.S.

8

DEFAMATION LAWS: A PRE-SULLIVAN PRIMER

Defamation laws were plaintiff-friendlier prior to 1964, particularly
in political cases. Recent scholarship has focused on the history of
defamation in a post-Sullivan world. Valid reasons for this exist: the
importance of the constitutional rules of Sullivan and its progeny, the
temporal distance scholars now enjoy, and 2014's fiftieth anniversary of
12. To the extent that the First Amendment itself applies, it is only because of its twentieth
century incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra note 27; see also infra Part IV
(discussing Sullivan). Fair comment is closely linked with the goals of the First Amendment, yet,
fair comment was a right adopted from British law in the 1800s. See infra Part llI.B.2.a-b. State
courts in the late 1800s, when articulating or adopting the minority view of fair comment, began
citing free speech and press provisions of state constitutions to strengthen the rationales of their
opinions. See infra Part m.B.2.c.
13. See infra PartI.
14. See infra Part 1I.A-C.
15. Weaponized defamation suits are libel or slander suits filed with the aim to chill coverage
of a newsworthy subject or bankrupt a press outlet for other reasons; they are not aimed at
compensating plaintiffs for any damages sustained. See infra note 441.
16. See infra Part TV.
17. See infra Part V.
18.

TAYLOR SwtFT, The Story of Us, on SPEAK NOW (Big Machine Records 2010) ("And the

story of us looks a lot like a tragedy now. The end.").
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Sullivan. However, viewing 1964 as a reset date for defamation does not
convey the rich legal and historical foundations that undergird the tort
and can be seen in U.S. defamation laws as of 2018.
This Part overviews the history and legal structure of the torts of
defamation. Subpart A traces the history of Anglo-American defamation
law. 19 Subpart B provides a skeletal primer on what the elements of and
defenses to a cause of action for defamation were between 1870 and
1964.0 Subpart C concludes that state defamation laws differed around
the edges but not at the core. 1
A. HistoricalPrimer: "You Can'tJust Go Around Slandering
Somebody's Reputation -22
The legal, moral, and religious roots of the tort of defamation are
millennia old .2 3 The underlying concept expanded from defamation as an
offense against God, to an offense against the monarch, the nobleman,
and a person history forgot. In Renaissance England, the Star Chamber
claimed jurisdiction over all defamation, but focused on libels of a
political nature. Slander and petty libel suits were filed in common law
courts, while petty slander fell to religious bodies that lacked power to
award monetary damages. 24 After the 1641 abolition of the Star
Chamber, common law courts gained jurisdiction over libel and slander
but retained the distinction in the metropole, which was then exported to
England's American colonies.

19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part l.B.
See infra Part I.C.
The Real Housewives of Beverly Hills: Don't Cry Over Spilled Wine (Bravo television

broadcast Dec. 19, 2017) (spoken by Lisa Vanderpump); see also Max Berlinger, A 'Real
Housewives' Star Dishes at Tea, N.Y. TIMvtES, Jan. 28, 2018, at SR 6, 7 (discussing Lisa
Vanderpump's flirt with a run for Governor of California).
23. See, e.g., Psalm 101:5 (King James) ("Whoso privily slandereth his neighbour, him will I
cut off: him that hath an high look and a proud heart will not I suffer."); Cristina Carmody Tilley,
Reviving Slander,2011 UTAH L. REv. 1025, 1039-41 (2011) (discussing "communicative injuries"

that could be compensated for or criminally punished during and throughout the Roman Empire and
throughout Western Europe and England during the Middle Ages).
24. See Tilley, supra note 23, at 1042-45; see also David A. Anderson, Reputation,
Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 747, 774 (1984) ("The ecclesiastical courts

took cognizance of slander to protect the soul of the slanderer. Slander was the cousin of
blasphemy, and was proscribed for similar reasons. Libel actions were created primarily as a means
of protecting government from the power of the printing press. Its purpose was evident from its
name: libel derives from the French term for a political tract, which in turn comes from the Latin
word for book." (footnotes omitted)).
25. William L. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839, 841-42 (1960); Tilley, supra
note 23, at 1048-51, 1053-54.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss1/16

6

Koffler: The Pre-Sullivan Common Law Web of Protection against Political D

2018]

THE PRE-SULLIVAN COMMON LAW WEB OFPROTECTION

The Federal Constitution of 1787 did not delegate the power to
promulgate civil laws of defamation to Congress. 26 The ratification of
the Bill of Rights seemed to further clarify that enacting civil defamation
laws was not a federal power: The First Amendment ate away at a
religious foundation as the basis for defamation law;2 7 the Tenth
Amendment confirmed that states retained the power to make their own
laws on defamation.28
Domestic tranquility provided justification for maintaining robust
civil defamation laws. States, seeking to replace duels, encouraged
people to seek monetary damages in courts, rather than blood
satisfaction at ten paces.2 9 Civil defamation laws existed as a means to
26.

See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (enumerating Congress's powers).

27. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishment and free exercise clauses). A qualification is
necessary here as these clauses of the First Amendment were not enforceable against the states until
the twentieth century. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (incorporating the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment into the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) ("It is no longer
open to doubt that the liberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action."); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and
of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are
among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.").
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The power to promulgate defamation laws was not expressly
delegated to the Federal Government nor prohibited to the states, thus was reserved to the states.
29. See JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC 27 (2001) [hereinafter FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR] ("Where political combat and

personal reputation were so intertwined, duels were a constant threat."); see also McNatt v.
Richards, No. 6987, 1983 WL 18013, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 1983) ("I also note that defendant's
offer to waive its counterclaim on the condition that plaintiff accept a challenge of trial by combat to
death is not a form of relief this Court, or any court in this country, would or could authorize.
Dueling is a crime and defendant is therefore cautioned against such further requests for unlawful
relief."). But see GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 84 & 422 n.30 (Vintage Books 2007)

(2006) (detailing how a suit for libel failed to prevent a physical altercation where the defendant
claimed to have subsequently caned his $25,000 out of the plaintiff, though the verdict was
reportedly $12,000); but cf JOANNE B. FREEMAN, THE FIELD OF BLOOD: VIOLENCE INCONGRESS
AND THE ROAD TO CIVIL WAR 89 (2018) [hereinafter FREEMAN, FIELD OF BLOOD] ("When it came
to slander, [Rep. Henry Wise (Whig-VA)] noted, 'The law cannot restrain it-a pistol sometimes
will."'); FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR, supra, at 172 ("[C]aning conveyed the inferior status of the
victim."). For recent scholarship on insults, sectional strife, and party differences that contributed to
a fatal congressional duel, and many threatened political duels in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, see
generally chapter three in FREEMAN, THE FIELD OF BLOOD, supra, at 75-111. For an examination of
political dueling in the Early Republic, see generally chapter four in FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR,
supra, at 159-98 (discussing political dueling and the culture of honor present in the 1790s and
1800s United States through the prism of the illegal 1804 duel where then-Vice President Aaron
Burr killed Alexander Hamilton. Throughout American history, the primary purposes of a political
duel, according to the various codes of honor, was not to achieve bloodshed, but to achieve
"satisfaction" for a perceived transgression and participate in a ritual that reclaimed the reputation
and recognized the social status of the aggrieved party, as only social equals could duel. See id. at
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keep peace or quiet,3 ° and were governed mostly or wholly by the states
until 196431 with two notable federal intrusions: the Sedition Act of
179832 and a nascent power to make federal common law of defamation.
Enacting the Sedition Act of 1798 and prosecuting under its
authority was the deepest federal foray into defamation law. Under that
Act, much criticism of nearly all federal officials became a federal
crime.33 The Act was seen as an attempt to stifle political speech of
critics of the Adams Administration, led by then-Vice President Thomas
Jefferson.3 4 Truth was a complete defense to a Sedition Act
prosecution,3 5 yet truth was often impossible to prove, especially when
the statement was given as an opinion. 36 The Act expired in 1801 and is
generally agreed to have been unconstitutional.37
For over a century, federal courts hearing defamation cases brought
under diversity jurisdiction 38 could create common law. 39 However,
178 (discussing in the context of why Burr, after losing the New York gubernatorial election of
1804, challenged Hamilton to a duel).
30. Viewing civil and criminal defamation laws as a mechanism of social control enforcing
hierarchical status within American societies is likely also correct.
31. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Libel Law and the Preservationof the Republic 1787-1825,
30 CHrY's L.J. 176, 177 (1982) ("[Mlost of the libel law in this period was developed on the state
level."); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84, 292 (1964).
32. Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801).
33. Id. (exempting the Vice President from federal protections under the Sedition Act).
34. Prosecutions were overtly political-against Democratic Republicans. BRUCE A.
RAGSDALE,
FED.
JUDICIAL
CTR.,
THE
SEDITION
ACT
TRIALS
3-4, 5-7 (2005),
https://www. c.gov/sites/default/files/trials/seditionacts.pdf
(discussing the prosecution of
Republican Congressman Matthew Lyon of Vermont and muckraker James Callender).
35. In civil libel suits, truth was not as liberal as it would become in the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.
36. See, e.g., CHARLES SLACK, LIBERTY'S FIRST CRISIS: ADAMS, JEFFERSON, AND THE
MISFITS WHO SAVED FREE SPEECH 149-51 (2015) (discussing Luther Baldwin of Newark, New
Jersey whose liquor-induced lewd comment about wanting a cannon to be fired into John Adams'
arse turned into a prosecution under the Sedition Act).
37. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-77 (1964) (discussing the
constitutionality of the Sedition Act); id. at 298 n.1 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("[T]he Act would
today be declared unconstitutional."); Robert Sack, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan-50-Years
Afterwards, 66 ALA. L. REV. 273, 276 (2014) (arguing that by the time Sullivan was decided in 1964
it had been settled that the Sedition Act violated the First Amendment); Virginia Resolutions, 21
December 1798, Founders Online, NAT'L ARCHIVES,
http://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Madison01-17-02-0128 (last modified June 13, 2018) (arguing inter alia that the
Sedition Act was unconstitutional under the First and Tenth Amendments); see also FLOYD
ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 57-58 (2017) (criticizing the Sedition Act of 1798
as an example of "free speech crumbling in times of crisis .... [which] led to the jailing of more
than twenty newspaper editors and was the single greatest frontal attack on freedom of speech in the
nation's history.").
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (giving federal courts jurisdiction over civil suits involving
parties from different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000).
39. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (holding that state common
law is not binding law in federal court).
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federal courts routinely looked to state law for guidance.4" The power to
create substantive federal common law on defamation ended with the
1938 decision in Erie Railroadv. Tompkins,4 1 holding that federal courts
hearing diversity suits must apply the substantive common law of the
state controlling the litigation.42
When the Court decided Sullivan in 1964, over fifty American
bodies of laws of defamation existed. Each state defined its own
defamation laws, and the substance of those defamation laws went
unsupervised by federal courts.
B. Legal Primer
From 1870 to 1964, the legal principles of the States' governing
defamation were largely similar. Subpart 1 discusses the distinction
between libel and slander.4 3 Subpart 2 breaks down the elements of
defamation.' Subpart 3 discusses the privileges and defenses available
to defendants.45
46
1. Libel and Slander: "Say it? Forget it. Write it? Regret it."

In 1960, William Prosser wrote, "[of] all of the odd pieces of brica-brac upon exhibition in the old curiosity shop of the common law,
surely one of the oddest is the distinction between the twin torts of libel

40. See, e.g., Post Publ'g Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 541-42 (6th Cir. 1893) (adopting the
narrow view of fair comment, Judge Taft quoted approvingly from an Ohio Supreme Court opinion
arguing that if false statements of fact were privileged, it would "drive reputable men from public
positions" (quoting Post Publ'g Co. v. Moloney, 33 N.E. 921, 926 (Ohio 1893)). Where no state law
existed, federal courts appeared to have made common law. Compare Nev. State Journal Publ'g Co.
v. Henderson, 294 F. 60, 62-63 (9th Cir. 1923) (adopting the majority view of fair comment), with
Dix W. Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875, 896-97, 897
n. 106 (1949) (reporting that Nevada had not opined on the issue of whether misstatements of fact
are constitutionally privileged).
41. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938) (holding state substantive common
law binding on federal courts and thus overruling Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1).
42. Id. at 78; see, e.g., Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publ'g Co., 122 F.2d 288, 289 (2d Cir.
1941) (noting that the plaintiff filed suits in multiple jurisdictions and that "[d]ecisions in other
jurisdictions, however, are not only conflicting but are for us inconclusive since they have turned on
the application of the libel law of states other than New York while here we must be governed by
the law of the State of New York" (citing Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. 64)), aft'd, 316 U.S. 642 (1942).
43. See infra Part i.B.1. Compare Prosser, supra note 25, at 848 (noting that Louisiana, given
its history as a civil law jurisdiction, did not distinguish between libel and slander), with Tilley,
supra note 23, app. at 1081 ("[M]ost states continue to adjudicate libel and slander as two distinct
torts....").
44. See infra Part II.B.2.
45. See infra Part Il.B.3.
46. The Real Housewives of New York City: War and P.O.S. (Bravo television broadcast Apr.
25, 2018) (spoken by Dorinda Medley).
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and slander.-4 7 This distinction began as a jurisdictional quirk of
Renaissance England, but was retained to differentiate between methods
of publication. If a method was capable of permanence and/or wide
dissemination it was more akin to libel than slander. While jurisdictions
differed in what they classified as libel or slander, generally the
following rules applied regarding that classification and the impact of
that classification.
Libel was, generally, a written publication of a defamatory
48
statement: letters, books, and newspapers (and, more recently, tweets).
In most states, when libel was alleged damages could be presumed. This
presumption was premised on the belief that written publications
evinced thought, and were capable of permanence and wide
dissemination. 49 Debates over what publications could be classified as
libel started with litigants wrangling in courts for procedural advantages:
libel was friendlier to plaintiffs than slander. These legal disputes often
turned into lobbying efforts by competing special interest groups in state
legislatures aimed at designating messages communicated via new
technologies as either libel or slander for financial purposes, resulting in
legislative edicts on classification unmoored from whether a method of
publication required sustained thought or was capable of permanence
and wide-dissemination. 50
Libel per se was a publication that on its face met the statutory
and/or common law definition of defamatory and required no extrinsic
evidence to prove the sting of its charge. 51 This was inclusive of but not
limited to publications that fell into categories of slander per se. 52 The
47. Prosser, supra note 25, at 839.
48. See, e.g., Adeline A. Allen, Twibel Retweeted: Twitter Libel and the Single Publication
Rule, 15 J. HIGH TECH. L. 63, 68, 80-81 (2014) ("Because tweets are written and not spoken, it is
libel, as opposed to slander, that seems to be the appropriate designation for the type of defamation
that takes place through a tweet."). But see Tilley, supra note 23, at 1074-76 (suggesting that social
media posts of limited exposure be treated as slander).
49. Prosser, supra note 25, at 842-43.
50. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 46 (West 2007) (including oral defamatory statements
captured by radio or film as slander). Compare Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 116
A.2d 440, 443 (Conn. 1955) (holding that reading from a prepared manuscript on the radio was
libel), with Briggs v. Garrett, 2 A. 513, 516-17, 524-25 (Pa. 1886) (affirming dismissal of a libel suit
based on the public reading of a letter).
51. Prosser, supra note 25, at 839-40; see, e.g., CAL. CrV. CODE § 45a (West 2007) ("A libel
which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an
inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face. Defamatory language
not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered
special damage as a proximate result thereof.").
52. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co., 35 N.E.2d 471, 472 (Ohio Ct. App.
1941) (defining libel per se as "[m]atters which would bring him into ridicule, hatred or contempt"
(citations omitted)); Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N.Y. 398, 405-06 (1871) (holding that a libel of
slanderous per se content needs no proof of special damages).
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determination that a publication was libelous per se lay with the trial
judge.53 The classification of a publication as libelous per se frequently
meant that a plaintiff could collect damages without proving
them specially.54
Libel per quod was a defamatory publication requiring extrinsic
evidence to prove the sting of the charge and/or proof of special
damages. The former requirement made the factfinder decide whether
pairing the words in the publication with outside evidence "make the
publication libelous."55 The latter requirement treated libel per quod like
be proven or the suit would
many slander suits56 : a pecuniary loss must
57
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Generally, slander was a defamatory statement communicated
orally by a defendant to a third party.5 8 The main impact of the
distinction between libel and slander was that slander required plaintiffs
to plead and prove special damages.5 9 The rationales for this rule were
that verbal attacks could be made in haste, lacking the thought put into
and the potential permanent form of a written charge.6" Special damages
would be presumed if the charge was slanderous per se.
Slander per se was a charge of substance so certain to injure one's
reputation that damages were legally presumed. Categories of slander
per se vary with cultural changes and across jurisdictions; defining those

53. Baker v. Warner, 231 U.S. 588, 594 (1913) ("Where words are libelous per se the judge
can so instruct the jury, leaving to them only the determination of the amount of damages.").
54. See, e.g., David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and FairComment II:
The United States, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1282, 1293-94 (1942).
55. Baker, 231 U.S. at 594 ("In [defamatory per quod] cases the jury must not only determine
the existence of the extrinsic circumstances, which it is alleged bring to light the concealed
meaning, but they must also determine whether those facts when coupled with the words, make the
publication libelous.").
56. See Prosser, supranote 25, at 840, 848-49.
57. See infra Part ll.A (discussing defamation per se and special damages).
58. Duquesne Distrib. Co. v. Greenbaum, 121 S.W. 1026, 1027 (Ky. 1909) (defining slander
as an "oral utterance of defamatory matter").
59. See Prosser, supra note 25, at 844. Libel and slander suits could invoke different
procedural and substantive rules. Tilley, supra note 23, app. at 1081 ("[Mlost states continue to
adjudicate libel and slander as two distinct torts, each with its own rules of evidence, damages, state
of mind, and even statutes of limitations.").
60. Prosser, supra note 25, at 842-43. Permanence is important: The world might little note
what President Lincoln said at the November 1863 dedication of a Soldier's Cemetery had no
written version been made. However, hasty messages can be permanent. For an example of this, see
Emily Yahr, CMA Awards: Brad Paisley, Carrie Underwood Make Fun of President Trump in
Monologue, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-andentertainment/wp/2017/11/08/cma-awards-brad-paisley-carrie-underwood-make-fun-of-presidenttrump-in-monologue/?utm term=.efl482bae59d (quoting Brad Paisley and Carrie Underwood as
referencing President Trump when singing "maybe next time he'll think before he tweets"
(emphasis omitted)).
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categories continues to remain the dominion of the states.61
Traditionally, four categories of slander per se existed: (1) charging that
a person has a loathsome disease; (2) charges impugning the chastity of
a woman; (3) charging a person with a serious crime; and (4) charges
62
injuring one's trade, business, or profession.
The first category of slander per se was charging that a person has a
loathsome disease. This allegation would subject a person to scorn,
imply moral failure, and cause others to avoid him.6 3 This category has
withstood centuries of American judicial scrutiny and medical science
due to the continued prevalence of venereal diseases. 64
The second category of slander per se was impugning the
chastity of a woman. This charge could cause grievous
harm to a woman's marital prospects.65 The category has since morphed
61. Compare Yonaty v. Mincolla, 945 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (App. Div. 2012) ("Given this
state's well-defined public policy of protection and respect for the civil rights of people who are
lesbian, gay or bisexual, we now overrule our prior case to the contrary and hold that such
statements are not defamatory per se."), with Matherson v. Marchello, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1105
(App. Div. 1984) (noting while holding slanderous per se: "In short, despite the fact that an
increasing number of homosexuals are publicly expressing satisfaction and even pride in their
status, the potential and probable harm of a false charge of homosexuality, in terms of social and
economic impact, cannot be ignored."). Whether courts of other states should come to the same
conclusion argues for states determining what is defamatory per se. For example, see Samantha
Allen, Alabama Governor Says Lesbian Accusation is 'Disgusting Lie', DAILY BEAST (May 17,
2018, 8:13 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/alabama-govemor-says-lesbian-accusation-isdisgusting-lie?ref-home, noting that, "In a state like Alabama, being outed as LGBT during the
middle of a re-election campaign would be potentially catastrophic."
62. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 25, at 844; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 372 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (listing the four slander per se categories). But see Shields v.
Booles, 38 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Ky. 1931) (replacing want of chastity of a woman with "acts which
might tend to disinherit him.").
63. See, e.g., Kaucher v. Blinn, 29 Ohio St. 62, 63-64 (1875) (holding that charging a person
as having any venereal disease is slander per se); Watson v. McCarthy, 2 Ga. 57, 59 (1847) (holding
that saying: "You are a clappy d---d son of a bitch, and have been rotten with the clap this two or
three years," was slander per se as tending to exclude plaintiff from "good society").
64. Nolan v. State of New York, 69 N.Y.S.3d 277, 285 (App. Div. 2018) ("Since it can still be
said that ostracism is a likely effect of a diagnosis of HIV, we hold that the defamatory material here
falls under the traditional 'loathsome disease' category and is defamatory per se. Further, to the
extent that certain medical conditions such as HIV unfortunately continue to subject those who have
them to a degree of societal disapproval and shunning, we decline to entertain the State's argument
that the entire 'loathsome disease' category is archaic and has no place in our jurisprudence."); see
Letter from Eric Paul Leue, Exec. Dir., Free Speech Coal., to Donald Trump, President, U.S., Re:
The Difference Between HPV and HIV (May 18, 2018), https://www.freespeechcoalition.com/
blog/2018/05/18/an-open-letter-to-president-trump-on-the-difference-between-hiv-and-hpv
(detailing differences between STIs in letter prepared by the Adult Film Industry).
65. Lisa R. Pruitt, Her Own Good Name: Two Centuries of Talk About Chastity, 63 MD. L.
REV. 401, 416 (2004). Imputing a want of chastity to a woman or girl remains harmful in the
twenty-first century. See, e.g., TAYLOR SWIFT, BETTER THAN REVENGE (Big Machine Records

2011) ("She's not a saint and she's not what you think; she's an actress, she's better known for the
things that she does on the mattress."). But see Roger Ebert, Review of Easy A (Sept. 25, 2010),
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into ascribing sexual deviance or irregularity to a plaintiff regardless
of gender.66
The third category of slander per se was charging a person with
commission of a serious crime, such as a felony or a crime of moral
turpitude. 67 Alleging that a candidate for public office amassed multiple
traffic violations would not likely be slander per se; alleging that the
candidate paid off a police officer to make multiple traffic tickets
disappear would be slander per se. Judges looked at the words the
defendant spoke to decide whether the charge amounted to a crime, even
if no allegation of a specific criminal act (e.g., bribery, rape) ever
crossed the defendant's lips.68
In Wood v. Plackey, the trial court dismissed a slander suit for
failing to allege special damages.69 Wood alleged that during his
candidacy for town chairman of York, Wisconsin, York's town clerk,
Plackey, told others: "Wood went to Lake the printer and tried to get
Lake to make an illegal change of the names on the ballot so as to get an
advantage at the polls."7
Wisconsin's Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Wood's
complaint, as the alleged acts, if true, meant that Wood violated a
criminal statute carrying a jail term of up to three-years.7 1 The court
stated: "in so far as the slanderous words complained of... charged that
the plaintiff 'tried' or 'endeavored' to have Lake wrongly print the
ballots, they in substance charged plaintiff with advising the commission
of a felony, and thus, in effect,... chargedplaintiffwith the commission
of a felony also."72 The charge of acts that would constitute a felony
https://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/easy-a-2010 (discussing Easy A where the main character lies
to her friend about having lost her virginity, and "in having lost one reputation, she has gained
another. Previously no one noticed her at all ....Now she is imagined to be an experienced and
daring adventuress, and it can be deducted that a great many in the student body envy her
experience").
66. Some states have switched the operative gender. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 46 (West
2007) ("Imputes to him impotence or want of chastity...." (emphasis added)); cf N.D. CENT.
").
CODE § 14-02-04(4) (2014) ("Imputes to the person impotence or want of chastity ....
67. See, e.g., Shields v. Booles, 38 S.W.2d, 677, 680 (Ky. 1931) ("the commission of a crime
involving moral turpitude for which, if true, the accused might be indicted and punished"); cf Bays
v. Hunt, 14 N.W. 785, 786 (Iowa 1882) (holding that one candidate stating to another candidate, "I
believe you will steal" is an opinion about future conduct and not actionable as slander per se).
68. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Rhorer, 42 S.W.2d 892, 892-93, 895 (Ky. 1931) (remanding suit
for retrial on slander per se imputation of graft); see also Devany v. Quill, 64 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735-36
(Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 1946) (charging a candidate as "[t]he agent of Hitler in America" during
declared war with Germany was slander per se, imputing treason and violations of Espionage Act
and Foreign Agent Registration Act).
69. Wood v. Plackey, 232 N.W. 564, 564-65 (Wis. 1930).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 565.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
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forgave the failure to plead special damages because damages were
presumed from the publication's charge.
The fourth category of slander per se pertains to statements
injurious to one's trade, profession, or business. The merchant class
were proponents of English common law courts gaining jurisdiction over
slander, so that monetary damages could be awarded.7 3 Mercantile and
professional concerns were also salient in the American colonies-turnedUnited States. In some political defamation cases, persons working in
the political sphere who were attacked by politicians would bring
defamation suits against politicians for attacking their professional
reputation.74 A typical use of this category of slander per se in political
defamation cases was when an attack on one's candidacy was pled as an
attack on one's professional reputation as an attorney.75
In Pattangall v. Mooers,76 Mooers, a voter in Maine's Third
Congressional District, told other voters in that district that candidate
Pattangall lobbied to pass a workmen's compensation bill while
concomitantly accepting hundreds of dollars to defeat that bill.77
Pattangall, Maine's former Attorney General, sued Mooers, alleging that
the charge damaged his professional reputation as a lawyer.78 A jury
73. Tilley, supra note 23, at 1044-45, 1047.
74. Brailey Odham, candidate for the Democratic nomination for Governor of Florida,
disputed a poll conducted by Joe Abram indicating Odham "appear[ed] to be slipping badly."
Abram v. Odham, 89 So. 2d 334, 335 (Fla. 1956) (en banc). At a political rally, Odham stated: "Joe
Abram is a phony and his poll is a phony." Id. Odham also published a handbill alleging that Abram
offered to produce a poll that had Odham "making a good showing[,]" if Odham paid Abram $1500.
Id. at 338. Abram brought defamation suits against Odham for attacking Abram's profession as a
pollster and against a newspaper for publishing remarks made at Odham's rally. Id. at 335-36. The
Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the dismissal of the suit against the newspaper as the article was
qualifiedly privileged as fair and accurate reportage of Odham's remarks. Id. at 335-36, 338. The
court reversed the dismissal of the complaint against Odham as the allegation in the handbill was a
factual assertion that Abram's poll was phony, and a jury could have found that Odham made the
statements at the rally with malice that defeated any qualified privilege that existed. Id. at 338; cf
Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 333-35, 344 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (dismissing defamation suit filed
by political strategist against then-candidate Donald Trump who tweeted that she begged for a job
and was a "dummy"), affd, 64 N.Y.S.3d 899, 899 (App. Div. 2017) (mem.) (affirming as
nonactionable and lacking evidence tweets disparaged profession); Dan Zak, The Curious Journey
of CarterPage, the Former Trump Adviser Who Can't Stay Out of the Spotlight, WASH. POST (Nov.
16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-curious-journey-of-carter-page-thee7-afe9former-trump-adviser-who-cant-stay-out-of-the-spotlight/2017/11/15/t240cc40-c49e-1
4f60b5a6c4a0 story.htmlutm term-.83d64f290cc9 (reporting on events leading Trump Campaign
Foreign Policy Adviser Carter Page to file a defamation suit).
75. See Pattangall v. Mooers, 94 A. 561, 561-64 (Me. 1915) (slander); see also Otero v.
Ewing, 110 So. 648, 649-50 (La. 1926) (libel); Walsh v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 157 S.W. 326, 327-28
(Mo. 1913) (libel).
76. 94 A. 561 (Me. 1915).
77. Id. at 561-62.
78. Id.
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found for Pattangall, awarding $279.25 in damages. 79 The Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed, noting that the verbal charge was actionable
per se because it attacked the plaintiff's professional reputation as
an attorney.80
These categories were considered to embrace some of the most
damaging charges one could make about another person, political figure
or not. If the trial judge determined the words complained of were
slanderous per se, malice and damages would be presumed as a matter
of law.
2. Elements of a Defamation Claim
From 1870-1964, whether a defamation suit was for libel or
slander, five elements needed to be alleged: (1) the defendant published
to a third party, (2) a statement of fact, (3) "of and concerning the
plaintiff," (4) that was "defamatory," and (5) caused the plaintiff
damages. 8' In practice, many plaintiffs were able to rely on legal
presumptions that shifted the burden to the defendant to disprove
elements that were initially the plaintiff's burden.
The first element was publication to a third party. Publication was
82
any act that disseminated content to persons other than the plaintiff.
The method of publication determined whether the civil action would be
for libel or slander. Re-publication was treated different than
publication: A re-publisher of a defamatory statement was only liable for
the damages that the republication caused; the original publisher was
responsible for all foreseeable damages that the defamatory statement
caused, including damages from republication by others.83
The second element was that the defendant's statement be one of
fact: whether or not the statement made, implied, or was based upon an
assertion that could be proven true or false.84 If the statement was one of

79. Id. at 562.
80. Id. at 562, 566.
81. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,262-64,267 (1964).
82. If a person composes a defamatory letter and bums it before showing it to another person,
the composer of the letter has not published the letter and no libel has occurred. See Sourbier v.
Brown, 123 N.E. 802, 803 (Ind. 1919).
83. See id. at 803-04 (holding re-publisher of defamatory circular liable for damages flowing
from copies he produced, but not for the original publication).
84. A fact is that President Trump tweeted: "The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes,
@NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS, @CNN) is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People!"
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (Feb.
17,
2017,
1:48 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/832708293516632065. Whether The New York Times is

an "enemy of the American People," is an opinion. Id.; see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (discussing fact and opinion).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 16

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47:153

pure opinion, it was not usually actionable.85 If the opinion was based on
a fact or set of facts, the fact(s) relied upon could be subject to the test
above to impose liability on the speaker for the opinion.86 In some
jurisdictions, a false statement of fact8 7or misstatement of fact honestly
believed to be true could be protected.
The third element was that a statement be "of and concerning" the
plaintiff. This requirement, also known as colloquium, placed the burden
on the plaintiff to prove that the audience to the publication would
reasonably understand that the person or persons allegedly defamed
included that plaintiff. For example, the charge, "You're so vain, you
probably think this song is about you," without more, could not
reasonably be understood to be about a specific plaintiff.88 This
requirement limited the realm of potential plaintiffs when a publisher
defamed a political party, a government body, or made oblique reference
to an unnamed person or group of people.89 Although courts could, and
at times did, liberally construe colloquium,9 ° in political suits colloquium
usually insulated critics of institutions. 9 Yet, groups such as a slate of
candidates, a legislative committee, or a town council could be small

85. See, e.g., Walsh v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 157 S.W. 326, 329 (Mo. 1913) (holding that an
editorial stating that a candidate had no proper motive for running for circuit attorney was an
opinion and not defamatory).
86. See infra Part m.B.2 (discussing the defense of fair comment).
87. See infra Part I.B.2.c (discussing minority view of fair comment).
88. See CARLY SIMON, You're So Vain, on NO SECRETS (Elektra Entm't 1972). But see
EMINEM (FEAT. ALICIA KEYS), LIKE HOME (Aftermath Records 2017) ("Someone get this Aryan a
sheet. Time to bury him, so tell him to prepare to get impeached.... This chump barely even sleeps.
All he does is watch Fox News like a parrot and repeats. While he looks like a canary with a beak.
Why you think he banned transgenders from the military with a tweet?").
89. See, e.g., Noral v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 104 P.2d 860, 861-62, 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940)
(affirming dismissal of libel suit where no "ascertainable person" was identified by a newspaper
reporting that officials of the Workers' Alliance of California "divert their membership dues to
further Communist agitation under direct order from the Third Internationale headquarters in
Russia").
90. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 43-44, 48 (Ala. 1962) (allowing the
jury to decide whether the terms "police" and "Southern violators" applied to Commissioner
Sullivan), rev'd, 376 U.S. 254, 288, 292 (1964).
91. See, e.g., Ewell v. Boutwell, 121 S.E. 912, 912-14, 916 (Va. 1924) (affirming grant of
defendant's demurrer in libel suit because the words did not "point directly to the plaintiff
individually, nor to him as a member of a group or class"). Ewell was a member of the General
Assembly running for reelection on the "one issue" of his bill to reform state pilotage laws. Id. at
912-13 (emphasis omitted). The Virginia Pilots Association's newspaper published an
advertisement during Ewell's campaign claiming that "New York Money [was] Against the Pilots"
and funded efforts to pass the "Ewell Bill," which would yield the "Destruction of the Pilots and
Wholesale Smuggling of Whisky and Dope." Id. at 913-14. Despite the use of Ewell's name in
reference to his bill and Ewell's membership in Virginia's General Assembly, the court ruled that
the ad did not identify Ewell individually as to be of and concerning him. See id at 916.
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enough to provide causes of action for any or all members of that body,
group, or class.92
The fourth element is that the statement be defamatory. Most states
had broad definitions of what was defamatory, including but not limited
to: exposing another to shame, hatred, contempt, aversion, ridicule,
obloquy, or causing a loss of confidence among right-thinking persons. 93
The final element was damages. Assessing monetary damages in
defamation cases with any sense of accuracy is impossible. 94 Defamation
is a trespass against one's intangible reputation, and damages are not as
readily assessable as with other torts. 95 Medical bills are quantifiable and
diminished value of real property is assessable, while damage to a
person's reputation is amorphous. Complicating the quantification
problem is the fact that quite often no amount of monetary damages
could recompense a plaintiff for public loss of face or a persistent
96
pernicious rumor.
There were three types of damages in defamation cases: special,
general, and punitive. In suits alleging libel or slander per se, damages

92. See, e.g., Wofford v. Meeks, 30 So. 625, 625-26, 628 (Ala. 1901) (holding article
concerning the Commissioners of Etowah County gave a libel cause of action to all the
Commissioners individually).
93. See, e.g., Tonini v. Cevasco, 46 P. 103, 104-05 (Cal. 1896) ("Our Code defines 'libel' as
follows: 'Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, [printing,] pictures, effigy or other
fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy,
or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his
occupation.' This definition is very broad and includes almost any language which upon its face has
a natural tendency to injure a man's reputation either generally, or with respect to his occupation."
(quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1872)); see also Byram v. Aikin, 67 N.W. 807, 808 (Minn.
1896) (reversing trial court's grant of demurral in libel suit based on defendant's article charging
that the plaintiff befriended and liquored up a third party out of selfish political motives: "It is
perfectly plain that the writer, from start to finish, intended to charge the plaintiff with conduct that
was calculated, not only to expose him to ridicule, but also to beget contempt for, and an evil
opinion of, him, in the minds of all right-thinking people.").
94. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Item Co., 34 So. 2d 886, 895,96 (La. 1948) (reversing grant of
defendant's motion to dismiss and remanding the case with instructions to award the plaintiff
$7500, while the three-justice panel disagreed about whether to award the plaintiff $25,000, $7500,
or nothing).
95. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Social Foundationsof Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution,74 CALIF. L. REv. 691, 693-99 (1986) (discussing reputation as property).
96. See Paulette Perhach, It's Cash. But It Feels Tainted, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 2018, at F7
(grappling with the question of "How should people handle financial gain, a supposed symbol of
freedom and power, when it derives from events that made them feel trapped or powerless?"),
Relatedly, the inability to quantify reputational damage has led to outrageous claims for damages
evincing hope that "All of this pain and me cursing your name would just turn into dollar signs."
MAREN MoRus, Rich, on HERO (Columbia Nashville Records 2016). Some litigants view a large
damage claim as indicating their conviction in the merits of their case.
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many
were presumed; implicit in presumed damages is a recognition that
97
damages.
of
proof
concrete
provide
to
unable
be
would
plaintiffs
Special damages were pecuniary losses traceable to the defamatory
publication.9 8 In suits for defamation per quod special damages were
required to be pled and proved. Special damages included: lost wages,
lost salary, and lost business deals. Political defamation plaintiffs
generally could not claim lost emoluments from an elected office, nor
99
could they claim that their candidacy was a business or profession.
° If
Failing to plead special damages, if required, led to dismissal."
special damages were presumed or proven, general and punitive
damages could be awarded.
General damages included pecuniary and non-pecuniary harms the
plaintiff incurred traceable to the defendant's defamatory publication.
General damages included lost salary, lost business, loss of good-will in
the community, and physical and emotional distress.' 0 1
Punitive damages were "awarded [in tort cases] only when the
defendant's behavior resulted from an evil state of mind, such as spite,
97. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 764 ("If judges believe there are many cases of serious
but unprovable harm to reputation, they are not likely to abandon the presumed harm rule."). But cf
Trump v. O'Brien, 29 A.3d 1090, 1099-100, 1102 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (noting that
"under generally accepted accounting principles, reputation is not considered a part of a person's net
worth").
98. See Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Death of Slander, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 17, 22-25
(2011). An interesting modem argument might be made if a plaintiff alleged special damages for the
cost of removing a false and defamatory charge from the intemet. Scrubbing the intemet requires
great skill, money, and connection to the tech world. See JON RONSON, SO YOU'VE BEEN PUBLICLY
SHAMED 263-68 (2015) (describing application of an algorithm that overwhelms search engines
with non-offensive hits about a person to hide damaging content).
99. See infra Part II.A. The term "professional candidate" is used as a pejorative to describe
perennial losing candidates for office. See Ed Mazza, GOP Congressional Hopeful Dan Bongino
Launches Profanity-Laced Tirade Against Politico Reporter, HUFF. POST (Aug. 23, 2016, 1:32
AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/dan-bongino-tirade us 57bb9c66e4bOOd9c3al9bbd9
(during a heated exchange with Dan Bongino-a then-candidate for Congress-Politicoreporter
Marc Caputo called Bongino a "professional political candidate who loses"); cf Lukaszewicz v.
Dziadulewicz, 225 N.W. 172, 173 (Wis. 1929) (noting while granting defendant's demurral in libel
suit: "It appears that he had been a candidate for this same office on numerous occasions, and the
article criticizes his persistent candidacy and commends the good judgment of the voters of the
Fourteenth ward for his defeat upon prior occasions."). The term professional candidate may be ripe
for reexamination. See Ben Geier, 5 Ways Donald Trump Is Making Money Off His Own Campaign,
FORTUNE (Aug. 24, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/24/donald-trump-campaign (detailing how a
candidate owned business profited from a presidential campaign).
100. Lynch v. Lyons, 20 N.E.2d 953, 954, 955 (Mass. 1939) (dismissing suit against mayoral
candidate for failure to plead special damages when publication was not slanderous per se); see
infra Part IIl.A. (discussing special damages).
App. Ct.
101. See, e.g., Van Norman v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 175 N.E.2d 805, 808, 813 (Ill.
1961) (permitting wife and son to testify as to the changes they observed in plaintiff's mental and
emotional state after publication of allegedly libelous articles mentioning a subsequently dismissed
charge of assault with a deadly weapon filed against the plaintiff in 1952).
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ill-will, or recldessness"-malice. 10 2 These damages were not to
compensate a plaintiff for his injury but to punish that defendant and
deter others from committing similar torts. °3 If a state limited the
availability of punitive damages, a jury could return a large general
damage award that could go undisturbed by courts reviewing the award
due to the inherent inability to quantify reputational harm.
State laws or court rules often required that the existence of special
damages and the amounts awarded for general and punitive damages be
reported separately, to facilitate judicial review."° If parts or all of the
award were illegal or improper, a trial or appellate court could eliminate
a category of damages or otherwise modify the award.1" 5 Failing to
separately report the amount of each type of damage hindered judicial
review: an award could be viewed as resting entirely on punishing the
defendant's conduct rather than compensating the plaintiff s injuries.' 06
3. Defenses and Privileges
Prior to 1964, at least three types of affirmative defenses
existed in defamation suits: 107 truth, absolute privilege, and qualified or
conditional privilege.
When Herbert Wechsler, attorney for The New York Times Co. in
Sullivan, began researching libel law in the early 1960s he was
"surprised" that many jurisdictions presumed falsity.0 8 Not only was
falsity presumed, but the defense of truth was often unreliable, risky, and
only invoked in limited cases and to a limited extent.
Attempting to justify a defamatory publication by proving truth
could backfire in many ways. In some jurisdictions, the defense could be
102. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV.L. REv. 517, 517 (1957).
103. In political defamation cases, the rationale for imposing punitive damages could be that if
a well-funded political candidate or operative used his vast amounts of money to defame a political
opponent, a large punitive damage award would deter that defendant from continuing to defame
political opponents, and chill others who would commit similar torts. Cf TAYLOR SWIFT, I DID
SOMETHING BAD (Big Machine Records 2017) ("They say I did something bad; Then why's it feel
so good? ...And I'd do it over and over and over again if I could.").
104. See John M. Leventhal & Thomas A. Dickerson, Punitive Damages: Public Wrong or
Egregious Conduct?: A Survey of New York Law, 76 ALB. L. REv. 961, 962-66 (2013); infra Part

11.C.
105.

See infra Part III.C (discussing judicial scrutiny of damage awards in political defamation

cases).
106. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284 (1964) ("Since the trial judge did not
instruct the jury to differentiate between general and punitive damages, it may be that the verdict
was wholly an award of one or the other. But it is impossible to know, in view of the general verdict
returned.").
107. Defendants could and did file motions to dismiss and answer with general and/or specific
denials.
108. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 105-07.
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used as an admission of publication. °9 In some jurisdictions, proving
truth was treated like republication of a defamatory statement, which
could then be used by a jury to infer a defendant's malicious intent
and/or motivate the jury to increase the damage award. l 0 In some
jurisdictions, asserting truth as a defense required defending the exact
words used in the original publication; thus, a defendant proving a
plaintiff a horse thief at trial would be insufficient if the defendant's
charge at issue was that the plaintiff stole cattle."'
Many states adopted an alternative to proving truth, allowing
defendants to introduce evidence "tending but failing to prove the truth"
of the charge to negate malice and mitigate damages." 2 Many courts
also grew uneasy about the presumption of falsity and found ways to
ameliorate, if not negate, its effects.113 Some courts would temper this
presumption by reading into an applicable statute a requirement that a
plaintiff provide some evidence of falsity. "'
Federal and state constitutions, statutes, and common law
privileged many defamatory statements. Constitutional protections
immunized the speech and debate of legislators.1 15 Statutes or common
law precedent protected statements made by witnesses in legislative 1or16
judicial proceedings, statements of parties in a judicial proceeding, '
109. Freedman, supra note 31, at 182-83.
110. Seeid at 180-83.
111. Id. at 182-83 (citing Andrews v. Vanduzer, 11 Johns. 38, 38-39 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814)).
112. See, e.g., Johnson Publ'g Co. v. Davis, 124 So. 2d 441, 445, 450, 453, 461 (Ala. 1960)
(quoting Crane v. N.Y. World Telegram Corp., 126 N.E.2d 753, 757 (N.Y. 1955)) (holding that
evidence tending to prove truth mitigated damages from $67,500 to $45,000 in libel suit). Of course,
if a defendant introduced convincing evidence of reason to believe the truth of the statement in
mitigation of damages or to rebut the presumption of malice, the effect could be that the plaintiff
would be awarded nominal damages, if any.
113. See, e.g., Cooper v. Romney, 141 P. 289, 291-92 (Mont. 1914).
114. See, e.g., id. (reading state statutes governing libel per se and qualified privileges to put
the burden on the plaintiff to provide some evidence of the falsity of the charge of graft). For
decades, states differed with respect to whether plaintiffs (as a class or individually) had to plead
and provide evidence that the statement was false or the defendant had to plead and prove truth as a
defense. The U.S. Supreme Court decided that the former was required by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Phila Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986).
115. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6; see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 117, 123,
134-36 (1979) (holding Speech or Debate Clause did not immunize Senator Proxmire's mailers
publicizing his "Golden Fleece Award"). The Court noted that the Senator was free to speak his
mind on the Senate floor if he wished to avoid answering "in any other place." Hutchinson, 443
U.S. at 123. But see FREEMAN, THE FIELD OF BLOOD, supra note 29, at 93 (noting that the privilege
of Speech or Debate did not immunize congressmen from street violence, threats, and challenges to
duel on and off the House or Senate floors for affairs of honor catalyzed by comments made on
either floor).
116. Riesman, supra note 54, at 1286-87, cf Sibley v. Obama, 866 F. Supp. 2d 17, 19, 23
(D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing constitutional challenge to Barack Obama's eligibility to nm for or serve
as President of the United States because he was not a natural bom citizen and alleging fraud
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and statements made by government officials in performance of official
duties. 17 So long as publication occurred in one of these forums and
nowhere else, the speaker would have an absolute privilege and accurate
reports of what was said in those forums could be published by media
outlets that were likely shielded by a qualified privilege. 11
Qualified privileges were designed to facilitate communication of
facts and ideas. Economic and political rationales supported various
qualified privileges, but courts had a self-interest in maintaining welldefined qualified privileges as they chilled defamation lawsuits. The two
qualified privileges focused on in this Article are common interest and
fair comment.119 The defendant bore the burden of proving the existence
of the privilege, while the plaintiff could defeat the privilege by proving
120
that the defendant acted with the requisite type of malice.
C. Conclusion
Through 1964, American civil laws of defamation were governed
almost exclusively by the states. States largely shared similar elements
of libel and slander, the distinction between defamation per se and per
quod, and privileges and defenses. Defamation laws were plaintifffriendlier prior to 1964 than they are now, particularly in political cases.
Part III details how judges, nevertheless, frequently trapped political
defamation suits in an expanding web of constraining precedents. 121
III. THE COMMON LAW WEB CONSTRAINING
POLITICAL DEFAMATION SUITS

Judges claim to strive to avoid the political thicket; yet courts have
generally been the only institutions with jurisdiction to hear defamation
suits, including ones filed by or against political figures. 122 The paradox
of judges needing to rule on defamation suits stemming from the

regarding his birth certificate).
117. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-70, 574 (1959) (holding that statements made by
Executive Officials within the scope of their work are absolutely privileged).
118. See Riesman, supra note 54, at 1286-87. Section 315 of The Federal Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1934), foreclosed many suits against radio and television broadcasters in
the mid-twentieth century. See, e.g., Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Union of Am. v. WDAY Inc.,
360 U.S. 525, 526-27, 535 (1959) (holding broadcaster immune from suits for defamatory
statements made by candidates for public office when made on air).
119. See infra Part ILI.B (discussing common interest and fair comment privileges).
120. See infra Part IH.B (discussing qualified privileges).
121. See infra Part ll.
122. See supraPart H.A.
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political process many sought to avoid, may have contributed to judges
spinning threads that would become parts of the common law web.
This Part focuses on three strands of this web: narrowed definitions
of defamatory and special damages, 2 3 the common interest privilege and
25
defense of fair comment, 2 4 and judicial modification of damages.'
This structure reflects the timing in litigation that each potential antipolitical plaintiff limitation was introduced.'2 6 A plaintiff was required
to allege in her complaint the element that a publication was defamatory
and often that it caused special damages. If a plaintiff perfected her
complaint, the defendant could claim in his answer a privilege of
common interest and/or defense of fair comment. If the plaintiff won at
trial, any damage award was monitored by trial and appellate judges.
Taken together, these filaments formed an imperfect yet comprehensive
common law web of protection against political defamation suits.
A. DefiningDefamation Down: Defamatory and Special Damages
By the 1940s, leading scholarship on what this Article terms
political defamation noted that courts limited what was defamatory and
what was accepted as proof of special damages in cases involving
political candidates and public officials.' 27 This Part focuses on the
development of the anti-political plaintiff trend in one state before
presenting the national trend. 2 8 Subpart 1 looks at the development of
those rules in Kentucky. 2 9 Subpart 2 expands the analysis to show that
rules narrowing what was defamatory and what could be claimed as
special damages were a national norm. 30
1. Kentucky Common Law
Kentucky's Court of Appeals dismissed political defamation suits
for failing to state a claim in cases where the plaintiff acted upon a
mistaken belief that they pled defamation per se, and/or alleged special
damages in a suit per quod. 13' The following cases highlight common
123. See infra Part M.A.
124. See infra Part II.B.
125. See infra Part III.C.
126. Not all courts would use each of these threads to limit political defamation suits.
127. See, e.g., Noel, supra note 40, at 900-01 (discussing "Use of the Doctrine of Libel Per Se
to Restrict Liability" (emphasis added)); Riesman, supra note 54, at 1293-98.
128. See supra note 127.
129. See infra Part fI.A.1. Kentucky was focused on, in part, because it had only one
appellate-level court until 1975.
130. See infra Part II.A.2.
131. See, e.g., Taylor v. Moseley, 186 S.W. 634, 636-37 (Ky. 1916); Field v. Colson, 20 S.W.
264, 264-65 (Ky. 1892).
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law rules, built over decades, which made it difficult for many political
plaintiffs in Kentucky courts to maintain a cause of action for
defamation that occurred during a political campaign.
In 1892, the Court of Appeals faced the question of whether a lost
candidacy for political office was a compensable injury. 13 2 Henry Field
ran for the Kentucky State Legislature against "one Howard," when
Field "abandoned the contest." '3 3 Field ran again for that legislative seat
facing Mr. Colson. Gillis Colson, "an active partisan" in his brother's
campaign, alleged that Field quit the earlier race to accept a $300 bribe
from Howard (Field's former opponent).3 3 After Field's defeat, Field
sued Gillis Colson (the candidate's brother) for slander alleging that
Colson's charge that Field accepted a bribe to abandon the race damaged
Field's reputation and cost him the "emoluments of the office."13' At
trial, a jury found for Colson.' 36 Field appealed.' 3 7
The court first needed to decide whether the publication was
slanderous per se. If so, damages would be presumed; if not, special
damages needed to have been alleged in the court below. In Field, the
categories of slander per se available were imputing the commission of a
crime and injuring one's professional reputation.' 38 The court rejected
both theories. 3 9
The court noted that accepting a bribe to quit a political race would
not "constitute an indictable offense.""14 The court held that Field's
profession was not attacked, "unless his candidacy can be so
regarded[.]"'' Candidacies for public office generally were not held to
132. Field,20 S.W. at 264-65.
133. Id. at 264. Howard's first name is omitted. See id.
134. Id. at 264-65.
135. Id.
136. Id.at 265.
137. The trial court instructed the jury that if Colson's words were the reason for Field's defeat
the jury could award Field "damages he sustained by the loss of said office." Id. If the trial court
construed these damages as special damages, the Court of Appeals did not clearly state that the
instruction was incorrect. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. Id. In a suit for slander where the meaning of the word "rob" was unclear, Kentucky's
Court of Appeals reversed a $500 verdict for the plaintiff and remanded the case for a new trial.
Deitchman v. Bowles, 179 S.W. 249, 249-50 (Ky. 1915). The defendant, who was running against
the plaintiff for Trustee of the Village of Highland Park, said at a speech: "This man [the plaintiff] is
a great booster of Highland Park. He robbed his sister-in-law of three hundred dollars, and caused
her to have to send her children to an orphans' home." Id. at 249. The court remanded for jury
determination whether the passage considered in the context it was made was "reasonably
calculated to cause the persons who heard it to... understand" that the defendant was charging the
plaintiff with the crime of robbery as opposed to using the word "rob" in a colloquial sense which
would not have been slanderous per se. Id. at 250.
141. Field, 20 S.W. at 265.
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be professions, 142 and Field could not have claimed elected office as his
profession as he never previously served in any elected office. Since the
words were not slanderous per se, Field was required to have pled
special damages in the court below.
Field alleged in his complaint that Colson's words cost him the
salary of the state legislative seat for which he was running for. 14 3 The
court did not view this claim of prospects of a salary as a special damage
or even a compensable harm.'44 The court held that "even if [the words
were] actionable by averring special damage, the damage alleged is too
remote, uncertain, and speculative." 145 While the court left open the
possibility that some political candidate might be able to claim a lost
salary from a political office that they failed to win election to as special
damage, the court held that Henry Field, who had never served in a
political office, could not. 146
The two-page opinion in Field, void of citation, became the
foundation for a series of anti-political plaintiff rulings from the Court of
Appeals. Fieldimplied that courts should read slander per se categories
narrowly in political defamation cases and that special damages did not
include prospective emoluments from a political office the plaintiff lost
at the ballot box.
In Taylor v. Moseley, 147 the Court of Appeals considered whether
an incumbent could claim as special damage the salary he would have
earned had he been re-nominated and reelected to political office. 148 In
1913, E.P. Taylor ran for re-nomination in the Democratic primary for
his job as Daviess County Clerk.149 During the campaign, rumors
circulated that Taylor made anti-Catholic remarks. Two weeks before
the primary election, Taylor was speaking at a political event where he
denounced the rumors as slanderous. i0 At the event, Taylor refused to
cede any time to a Democratic candidate for state legislature, Mr.
Mullican, who claimed possession of an affidavit written by C.J.
Moseley detailing one conversation where Taylor allegedly made
142. See supra note 99 (discussing the use of "professional candidate" as a pejorative term for
a perennial loser).
143. Field, 20 S.W.at 265.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 186 S.W.634 (Ky. 1916).
148. Id. at 635.
149. Democratic nominations for public office in the post-Reconstruction Era throughout the
former border and Confederate states were tantamount to general election victories. See Otero v.
Ewing, 110 So. 648, 650 (La. 1926) ("[W]hile a democratic nomination in this state is equivalent to
an election, still, the rule is not without exception.").
150. Taylor, 186 S.W. at 634-35.
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disparaging remarks about Catholic voters.151 The day before the
primary, Moseley composed a second affidavit charging that Taylor
affidavit was shown to "certain
made anti-Catholic remarks; this' 15latter
2
election."
the
of
day
the
voters on
Moseley's affidavits recounted a conversation between Moseley
and Taylor, two years prior, regarding whether J.H. Elder or R.M. Stuart
should be the Democratic nominee for a state legislative seat.153 Moseley
thought that Catholic voters would appreciate Elder on the ticket as
Stuart was related to Kentucky's Governor who was then being accused
54
of using a political rival's Catholicism to force the rival from the race. 1
Taylor allegedly stated that he was considering a run for that seat
himself but, "he had been pandering to Catholics any way as long as he
was going to. He further stated that if he did run again, however, he
could give the priests $10 for their picnics and they would-see to it that
he got all the votes."' 55
Moseley's affidavits were not published in newspapers; however,
Taylor composed his own affidavit that was published in the morning
papers on primary day.'56 Taylor's affidavit called Moseley's second
affidavit a late attack on Taylor's candidacy, "prepared by crafty
politicians with the designing and malicious purpose of defeating
[Taylor] for the office of county clerk. ' 15 7 Newspapers published
Taylor's affidavit along with a reply by Moseley. 5 8 Neither Taylor's
affidavit nor Moseley's reply discussed the allegation that Taylor made
anti-Catholic remarks.
to0
Taylor lost the Democratic primary by forty-three votes (2675 16
2632).15 9 Taylor sued Moseley for libel claiming $25,000 in damages.

The complaint alleged that Taylor was the elected County Clerk with
good prospects for re-nomination and re-election when the second
Moseley affidavit was published and disseminated with the design to
lower Taylor's reputation in the community, specifically among the
151. Id. at 635.
152. Id.
153.
154.
155.

Id. (quoting affidavit of C.J. Moseley).
Id. (quoting affidavit of C.J. Moseley).
Id. (quoting affidavit of C.J. Moseley).

156. Id.
157. Id.(quoting affidavit of E.P. Taylor).
158. Id.(quoting public statement by C.J. Moseley). Moseley's reply contained a collateral
attack on Taylor's veracity, arguing that because Taylor denied that he was disarmed by the Sheriff
at a meeting of the fiscal court, Moseley was "not surprised that he should deny the truth of the facts
[the alleged anti-Catholic remarks] in my affidavit." Id.
159. See id. (stating in the opinion that Weir "obtain[ed] a majority of 43 out of a total vote of
5,307").
160. Id.
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1500 "legal Democratic voters in the county that belonged to the
Catholic church... ."161 Taylor alleged that had the affidavit not been
maliciously published and disseminated by Moseley, Taylor would have
received the votes of more Catholics, winning the primary and general
elections, thus keeping his job and salary.162 Taylor claimed lost
emoluments from the office of County Clerk totaling $5000 per year as
special damages.' 63 The trial judge struck these allegations, and a jury
returned a verdict for Moseley.' 64
Much of the Court of Appeals' focus was on Taylor's contention
that the trial court erred in striking the allegation of "special damages
based upon the loss of the office."' 165 The question was framed as
whether an incumbent candidate for re-nomination could claim the
emoluments from an office that he lost in a primary election as special
damages. The court, relying on Field, held: "We think the trial court was
right in holding that special damages for the loss of the office had no
proper place in this case, for the reason that the damages
specially alleged were too remote and speculative to justify
1' 66
serious consideration.'
The court noted: "We have been cited to no case in which it has
been held that failure of election to an office could be shown to
authorize a finding of special damages. The loss of the office cannot be
said to be the natural, immediate, and legal consequence of the
[defamatory] charge and due exclusively to it.' 167 The court seemed to
fault Taylor for drawing attention to Moseley's charges by running his
affidavit in the morning papers the day of the election. 68 The court
seemed to view Taylor as partly responsible for his electoral loss and the
169
special damages claimed.
Taylor affirmed Field and extended its applicability from general to
primary elections, and from challengers to incumbents who once earned
the salary claimed as special damage. Although the court noted that
Taylor cited no case supporting the position that the loss of political

161. Id. at 636.
162. Id. This assertion that the allegedly libelous publication was a systematic effort to destroy
Taylor's reputation among Catholics is credible. At trial, the person who prompted Moseley to draft
his affidavits testified that he gave the two copies of Moseley's affidavit to Catholic voters in
Daviess County, one of whom was a Catholic priest. Id
163. Id.
164. Id. at 635.
165. Id. at 635-37.
166. Id. at 637 (emphasis added) (citing Field v. Colson, 20 S.W. 264, 264-65 (Ky. 1892)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 635, 637.
169. Id. at 637.
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179

office was a pecuniary loss, it was a more complex case than Field.Field
had never been a state legislator; whereas Taylor claimed to receive
$5000 per year for his work as County Clerk, which would have been a
sizable source of income, akin to the "loss of profitable employment" the
court noted was "sufficient to show special damages." 170
A secondary rule of the case involved the alleged libel that Taylor
was anti-Catholic. The court held that the publication was not libelous
per se, with the implicit holding that stating that a person made bigoted
remarks (with the inference that he is a bigot) is not defamatory
171
per se.
In another case, B.F. Shields and W.W. Booles both ran for the
Democratic nomination for a state senate seat in 1929.172 During the
primary, a false statement on the front of a local paper alleged that in
1920, then-Representative Shields voted against repealing a pari-mutuel
law and "in favor of legalized gambling," continuing that Booles "never
cast a vote in favor of the pari-mutuels law." 173 Shields lost the primary
then sued Booles for libel and slander.
The libel cause of action was based on the charge published on the
newspaper. The slander allegations were opaque. Shields alleged that the
Booles campaign conspired with Kentucky's gaming industry to fund a
whisper campaign distorting the public positions and voting records of
both candidates on the issue of gaming laws.1 74 Shields's complaint
alleged no special damages. The circuit court dismissed the action;
Shields appealed.

175

The Court of Appeals considered whether "falsely charging that a
candidate for office is misrepresenting his official acts and does not
believe in the principles he openly espouses [is] ...actionable per
se ....',176 Because Shields did not plead special damages in his
170. See id. at 636-37 (citing Field,20 S.W.at 265).
171. Id. at 635-37. In this respect, Taylor is similar to the Syndicate cases, where it was
reported that Rep. Martin Sweeney opposed a judicial nomination because the nominee was a
foreign-born Jew. See infra Part Im.A.2.c (discussing Syndicate cases).
172. Shields v. Booles, 38 S.W.2d 677, 677 (Ky. 1931).
173. Id. at 678. Pari-mutuel is defined as "a betting pool in which those who bet on competitors
finishing in the first three places share the total amount bet minus a percentage for the
https://www.merriamMERRIAM-WEBSTER,
Pari-mutuel,
management."
webster.com/dictionary/pari-mutuel (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
174. See Shields, 38 S.W.2d at 678 (quoting Petitioner's amended complaint). The complaint
also alleged that this network paid cash bribes to secure voter support for Booles; however, the
court, assuming defendant's voters were bribed, determined that such bribes would not be an injury
to the plaintiff's reputation. Id. at 678-79.
175. Id. at 678.
176. Id. at 679. On appeal, Shields argued that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint
because he stated a cause of action for tortious conspiracy to deprive him of an electoral victory
through a defamatory campaign that effectively deprived him of the right to run for office. Id. at
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complaint, 177 if the court answered this question in the negative,
dismissal of the slander claim would be required.
Under Kentucky law, a statement imputing "unfitness to perform
the duties of an office" was slanderous per se.171 While the precise words
used in the whisper campaign were not before the court, the substance
was the false charge that Shields voted against repealing the pari-mutuel
law in 1920. The court held that this statement if conveyed orally would
not have been slanderous per se as voting against the repeal of a gaming
law does not imply that Shields was unable or unfit to perform the duties
79
of a state legislator.1
To be libelous per se, a publication, "must be of such a nature that
the court can presume as a matter of law that [the words] do tend to
disgrace and degrade the person, or to hold him up to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned and avoided."' 8 °
That the defendants knowingly lied about the plaintiff's voting record
did not make the lie defamatory. The court noted that legislators and
citizens of well-regard existed on both sides of the gaming issue and that
"[the false] statement had no inherent tendency to affect his character or
reputation, since such a vote was within the province of any
representative confronted with the problem."1 8'
The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint,' 82 and by
focusing on defamation's aim of protecting an individual's reputation,
the court avoided confronting the political salience of lying about a
politician's record. Shields held that "misrepresentation [of how
legislators vote on a measure], however reprehensible, is not libelous per
se. ' 183 This decision is logical but could be criticized for giving political
18 4
actors a limited license to lie.
678-79.
177. Id. at 680 ("Since no special damages of a recoverable nature are alleged, the issue is
reduced to a determination of the character of the spoken and written words alleged as constituting
defamatory charges actionable per se.").
178. Id. This was an extension of the category of slander per se applicable to professional
reputation explained in Part II. The category of imputation of criminal conduct would not have fit
plaintiffs case, and as the charges included in judicial documents are absolutely privileged, the
defendants in this case could not sue Shields for imputing the crime of bribery to them in his
amended complaint. Id.at 681.
179. Id. at 680-82. In fact, voting either yea or nay showed capability to perform the duties of a
state legislator.
180. Id.at681.
181. Id.at682.
182. Id. at678,683.
183. Id. at683.
184. A Kentucky statute allowed for imposing a penalty against persons spreading false rumors
against candidates for public office "of a slanderous or harmful nature," but that statute did not
expand a plaintiff's ability to sue for defamation nor suspend the requirement of pleading special
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These cases evince an anti-political plaintiff trend in Kentucky's
common law of defamation. Field held that plaintiffs could not claim
lost emoluments from a failed candidacy for public office as special
damages.185 Taylor extended the rule in Field to candidates in primary
elections and to incumbents claiming lost emoluments due to failure to
be re-nominated.18 6 Shields held that lying about a candidate's voting
record is not defamatory per se. 187 These rules constrained the ability of
political plaintiffs to plead a cause of action for defamation in Kentucky,
which was an anti-political plaintiff trend that extended beyond the
Bluegrass State.
2. National Trends Narrowing Defamatory and Special Damages
Narrowing what was defamatory and what were special damages,
were anti-political plaintiff trends not confined to Kentucky. Federal and
state courts nationwide articulated similar rules prior to 1964.188 This
Subpart looks at decisions, outside Kentucky, that illuminate these antipolitical plaintiff filaments of the common law web. 18 9
a. Garbled Statements
In Manasco v. Walley, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, deciding
a suit based on a statute giving a limited private right of action for
defamation, viewed favorably Kentucky's Court of Appeals decision

damages. Id. at 681. The court noted that though the Commonwealth might have cause to
investigate the Booles campaign for criminal acts, that did not confer a private right of recovery for
Shields in a civil defamation suit for damages. Id.at 679.
185. Field v. Colson, 20 S.W. 264,265 (Ky. 1892).
186. Taylor v. Moseley, 186 S.W. 634, 634-35, 636-37 (Ky. 1916).
187. Shields, 38 S.W.2d at 680-82. This type of lie is fake news. See David 0. Klein & Joshua
R. Wueller, Fake News: A Legal Perspective, J. INTERNET L., Apr. 2017, at 1, 6-7 (defining fake
news as the "publication of intentionally or knowingly false statements of fact" and discussing
defamation in this context). Fake News has taken on other meanings. E.g., Donald J. Trump
AM),
4:38
2018,
9,
(May
TWITTER
(@realDonaldTrump),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/832708293516632065 ("The Fake News is working
overtime. Just reported that, despite the tremendous success we are having with the economy & all
things else, 91% of the Network News about me is negative (Fake). Why do we work so hard in
working with the media when it is corrupt? Take away credentials?"); cf Natalie Jarvey, SXSW:
CNN's Jake Tapper Says His Son Has Adapted "'FakeNews" Line From Trump, HOLLYWOOD REP.
(Mar. 10, 2017, 3:45 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/sxsw-cnns-jake-tapper-sayshis-son-has-adapted-fake-news-line-trump-985318 ("Tapper noted that even his 7-year-old son has
picked up on the phenomenon, explaining with a laugh that he 'now does an impression where
whenever I'm bothering him he says, "fake news."').
188. See, e.g., Manasco v. Walley, 63 So. 2d 91, 96 (Miss. 1953); Vinson v. O'Malley, 220 P.
393, 394, 395-97 (Ariz. 1923) (holding that verbal abuse of public officials is not generally
slanderous per se).
189. See infra Part III.A.2.a-c.
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that mischaracterizing a legislator's voting record is not defamatory per
se. 19 ° Unlike Shields, where the defendant allegedly lied about the
plaintiffs vote, 9 ' Manasco involved an arguably ill-informed editorial
in a local paper criticizing a legislator's vote on a particular measure.192
The Greene County Herald published an editorial criticizing State
Representative Ben Walley for a vote in favor of a highway bill.' 93 The
editorial warned that the bill would hinder efforts to have the state repair
local sections of the state highway system by taking them off a "priority
194
list" (that did not exist).
During the Democratic primary while running for re-nomination to
his legislative seat, Walley filed a libel suit based on a Mississippi
statute that created a cause of action for charges "reflect[ing] upon the
honesty or integrity or moral character of [a] candidate."' 195 Walley
alleged that the editorial's charges were false and damaging to his
reputation for honesty and morality, that the newspaper denied him
space to reply, and that he incurred pecuniary harms for time spent away
from his law practice and the cost of printing handbills to correct the
false impressions left by the editorial. 196 Walley sued for $25,000.197 The
jury found for Walley; 198 Manasco appealed.
Mississippi's Supreme Court reversed the judgment.' 99 The court
held that the statute was inapplicable because, assuming the bill did take
a local road off of a priority list (which was false), that did not "reflect"
on Walley's "honesty, integrity, or moral character"-the statute's

190. Manasco, 63 So. 2d at 93-95 (citing Shields, 38 S.W.2d at 681-82). Though the cause of
action in Manasco was based on a statute, the decision ventured into common law defamation. See
id. at 94-96.
191. 38 S.W.2d at 678.
192. 63 So. 2d at 92. Reporters and historians would note that "the state ofjoumalism was not
highly developed" in Mississippi. See ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 29, at 272, 277.
193. Manasco, 63 So. 2d at 92.
194. Id.
195. Id.at 92, 94-95; see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-877 (2018) (imposing a $500 penalty
or damages proven in excess, if a newspaper fails to publish a reply to an editorial circulating in the
state during a campaign that reflects upon the "honesty or integrity or moral character of any
candidate [for public office]," giving that statutory right to candidates and former candidates). The
court held that it was the legislature's purpose to limit the statute's applicability to defamatory
publications bearing on these qualities. Manasco, 63 So. 2d at 94-95. While the opinion could have
been one of only statutory interpretation, a fair reading of the opinion is that it used common law
precedent and created some limited common law precedent.
196. Manasco, 63 So. 2d at 92, 93-94. Walley, pursuant to statute, asked the publisher to run a
reply. Id.at 92, 94-95. Only after the publisher declined to publish the reply did Walley begin his
on-the-ground efforts to correct the record and file suit. Id.at 92, 93-94.
197. Id.at 92.
198. Id. at 94.
199. Id.at 96.
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operative words.2"° Though the defendant was impolite to refuse Walley
space to respond, a reply was not required by the statute as the editorial
'20 1
did not reflect upon Walley's "honesty, integrity, or moral character.
If the editorial cast a false light on Walley's legislative record, that
resulted from disagreement about what the bill did, not a charge
of dishonesty.
The opinion in Walley held, under the auspices of the operative
statute, that the editorial was ignorant, but not defamatory.2 2 It was
negligent of facts, but not defamatory.2 3 It was riddled with "garbled
statements," but not defamatory. 2" In short, this defendant badly and
wrongly described the terms of legislation and then accused the
legislator of voting against local interests by supporting the bill as
erroneously described; though the editorial was false (and the charge that
the vote harmed local interest at least questionable), insofar as it was
comprehensible, it did not charge Walley with dishonesty.2 5
Though the court decided Manasco on the grounds that the editorial
did not reflect upon Walley's "honesty, integrity, or moral character"
and that the editorial was too garbled to be defamatory,20 6 the court was
skeptical of Walley's proof of damages. Walley alleged that he incurred
"heavy expenses" printing handbills responding to the editorial and
necessitated that Walley spend time traveling his district refuting the
editorial, rather than devoting that time to his private law practice.2 °7 The
court noted that the highway bill was a matter of public concern, and
Walley's actions were ones that incumbent candidates would make to
publicly defend their votes. 20 8 A reader can infer from the court's
opinion that the justices viewed the types of damages alleged, as
expenses that any competent politician would have incurred in
the course of a campaign, whether or not an erroneous editorial was
ever written.20 9
200. Id. at 94-95.
201. Id.
202. Id.at 95.
203. Id.
204. Id.at 94, 95 ("The editorial complained of. . . shows very clearly that the writer of the
editorial had only an imperfect understanding of the program of highway legislation [which was
voted for by the plaintiff and adopted by the legislature] ....
").The court was confined in its
decision to the mandate of the statute; however, the court appeared to view the statute as authorizing
employment of common law defamation. See id.
at 95, 96.
205. See id. at 95-96.
206. Id. at 94, 95.
207. Id. at 93-94.
208. See id.at 95-96.
209. See id.at 94-96. The Supreme Court of Mississippi was elected; thus, one could argue that
the justices were qualified to assess what a competent politician would spend money on in the
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This case illuminates a few principles about political defamation,
even if qualified as a decision under the limited operability of the statute.
The lucidity of a publication impacts whether the publication can be
understood as defamatory or understood at all. False statements about a
candidate's voting record and policy stances are not defamatory per se.
Lastly, the court, in dicta, appeared to disfavor attempts to transmogrify
routine campaign expenditures into damages.2 1 °
b. Safe Words: Unfit, Unqualified, and Pejoratives
Prior to 1964, many state and federal courts ruled that certain
descriptions of candidates were not defamatory per se or not otherwise
actionable as defamation.211 The less specific a charge was the less
actionable it was, and the distinction between libel and slander per se
could provide an added layer of protection for defendants speaking
pejoratively about political figures.2 12
The most basic charge against candidates was that they were unfit
or unqualified for the office they sought.213 Courts routinely held such
charges as not defamatory or otherwise not actionable.21 4 Judicial
opinions often stated that by offering oneself for public office, a person
became a public man, submitting questions about his fitness and
qualifications for office to the press and the public. 215 Thus opinions
course of a campaign.
210. Seeid. at 93-96.
211. See, e.g., Noel, supra note 40, at 896-900, 901-02.
212. See, e.g., Deitchman v. Bowles, 179 S.W. 249, 250 (Ky. 1915) (remanding for jury
determination whether "rob" was meant to convey a commission of that crime); ef Nelson v.
Musgrave, 10 Mo. 648, 648-49 (1847) (holding that the charge that the plaintiff was "thought no
more of than a counterfeiter [and] a horse-thief' was libelous per se, but suggesting that it would not
have been slander per se had it been uttered). If slander and libel were condensed to one tort of
defamation, and the rules of libel were adopted for all defamation suits, many of the suits noted
below could have been decided differently, with plaintiff-friendlier laws and judgments.
213. Claiming that a candidate was unfit or unqualified for office was distinct from the
actionable per se charge that a current public official was unfit to discharge the duties of office. See
Shields v. Booles, 38 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Ky. 1931).
214. See, e.g., Knapp v. Post Printing & Publ'g Co., 144 P.2d 981, 983, 985 (Colo. 1943)
(holding not libelous per se the opinion that Knapp was "Not Qualified" for Governor); Otero v.
Ewing, 110 So. 648, 649, 651-52 (La. 1926) (holding not libelous the charge that the plaintiff
"possessed neither the ability, nor the qualifications, for said judgeship"); Walsh v. Pulitzer Publ'g
Co., 157 S.W. 326, 328, 330 (Mo. 1913) ("Walsh, a man manifestly unfit, will receive the
nomination.... He has no qualifications for the place." (emphasis added)); Gilbert v. Field, 3 Cai.
329f, 329g-30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (holding charge of "unfit and unqualified" not slanderous).
215. Briggs v. Garrett, 2 A. 513, 518 (Pa. 1886) ("When Judge Briggs accepted the nomination
as a candidate for re-election to the judicial station which he then filled, he threw out a challenge to
the entire body of voters of the county of Philadelphia to canvass his qualifications and fitness for
that position."); see Walsh, 157 S.W. at 330 ("[lit is the right and duty of a newspaper to discuss his
fitness for the place he seeks in such a manner as to present the full facts to the electors .... ").
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about the candidate's qualifications and fitness for office were solicited
by candidates themselves, and negative answers were protected by
various qualified privileges as well as courts holding that the charge was
not actionable in the first place.
In 1821, the Supreme Court of South Carolina noted in dicta, "that
actions for words spoken in heat, ought not to be encouraged .... 16
Thus, gratuitous insults constituting verbal abuse, and offensive
pejoratives were not defamatory themselves; 217 although, a defendant's
prior verbal abuse of and hurling of pejoratives at the plaintiff could be
evidence of malice that defeated a qualified privilege or justified a
punitive damage award.2 18
216. Atkinson v. Hartley, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 203,205 (1821); see also Vinson v. O'Malley,
220 P. 393, 394 (Ariz. 1923) (holding that verbal abuse of public officials is not generally
slanderous per se).
217. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158, 169, 191-92, 229 (1878) (holding "confessed
ignoramus" not libelous per se while affirming $8000 verdict on other grounds); Hoar v. Ward, 47
Vt. 657, 661-62, 665-66 (1875) (discussing how the term "bastard" implies fault to the parents of
the "bastard" not the child); Atkinson, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) at 203-05 (holding not actionable the
charge "you [are a] damned mulatto looking son of a bitch" uttered in the heat of passion (emphasis
omitted)); see also Rawlins v. McKee, 327 S.W.2d 633, 635-36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (holding
"radical" not libelous per se); Torres v. Huner, 135 N.Y.S. 332, 333-34 (App. Div. 1912) (holding
"God damn son of a bitch" not slanderous per se). But see Belknap v. Ball, 47 N.W. 674, 674-75,
676 (Mich. 1890) (remanding for trial suit filed in which the defendant through writing in the
plaintiffs name insinuated that the plaintiff was too ignorant to be a Congressman, a charge that
was libelous per se). Writings and drawings unflatteringly comparing a person to an animal could be
libelous per se. See, e.g., Moley v. Barager, 45 N.W. 1082, 1082 (Wis. 1890) (holding drawing of
plaintiff as a jackass was libelous per se); Solverson v. Peterson, 25 N.W. 14, 14-15 (Wis. 1885)
(holding libelous per se the comparison of the plaintiff to a swine); cf John C. Knechtle, When to
Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN. ST. L. REv. 539, 568 (2006) (briefly mentioning the 2005 Strauss
Caricature Decision in which the German Constitutional Court held that a magazine publishing
cartoons depicting a political figure as a pig deprived that person of human dignity). The values of
honor and human dignity recognized in some European courts are distinct from reputational value
litigated about in defamation suits in American courts. See James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility
and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279, 1287-312 (2000) (describing differences between
European and American tort laws and the absence of a law of insult and regard for the concept of
honor in the American bodies of law); FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR, supra note 29, at xx to xxii
(discussing how "Honor was reputation with a moral dimension and an elite cast[,]" while noting
that the concept could seem contrary to principles of a nascent egalitarian democratic-republic in the
Early Republic); cf FREEMAN, THE FtELD OF BLOOD, supra note 29, at 71, 86, 88-89, 322 & n.49
(describing conflicting and irreconcilable concepts of honor in mid-Nineteenth Century America,
with Southerners more amenable to public defenses of honor featuring violence, while Northerners
would defend honor through wars of words and public shaming); see also FREEMAN, AFFARS OF
HONOR, supra note 29, at 168-69 (noting that Northerners and Southerners were familiar with codes
of honor in the Early Republic but dealt with affairs of honor differently, with Northerners less
inclined to let an affair culminate in a duel).
218. See, e.g., Hammersten v. Reiling, 115 N.W.2d 259, 264-65 (Minn. 1962); cf FREEMAN,
AFFAIRS OF HONOR, supra note 29, at 67, 73 (noting that in the Early Republic, "Effective
purveyors of gossip [inclusive of slander] obeyed [the] rule: show no malice while gossiping.
Conspicuous hostility was bad politics, making the accuser seem petty and indiscreet, and reducing
the credibility of the claim"). For an examination of the art of political gossip, see generally chapter
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The real peril for critics of candidates was when they made more
specific charges than unfit or unqualified, or ventured into giving the
factual bases behind not actionable conclusory statements. Thus,
defendants found themselves in trouble when they made charges capable
2 19
with
of being construed as charging the plaintiff with a crime,
22 ° or being a member of a
committing criminal or civil221defamation,
temporally disfavored group.
c. Syndicate Cases: The Congressman and the Foreign-Born Jew 222
The Pearson and Allen Syndicate cases ("Syndicate cases")
highlight the national trends of narrowing what was defamatory and
using the requirement of special damages to dismiss defamation per
quod suits. Most Syndicate cases were decided in the early 1940s, after
the decision in Erie, and showcase the broad similarities and subtle
223
variances of the substantive law of defamation among jurisdictions.
The Syndicate cases were scores of libel suits filed by Ohio
Congressman Martin Sweeney against the publishers of a syndicated
column authored by Drew Pearson and Robert Allen. The article at issue
reported that Sweeney, doing the congressional bidding for Father
two (Slander, Poison Whispers, and Fame: The Art of Political Gossip) in id at 62-104 (looking at
the informal rules of political gossip in the Early Republic).
219. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing criminal act slander per se); see
also Gilbert, 3 Cai. at 329g-30 (holding charge of drunken behavior not slanderous as not charging
public intoxication).
220. McKillip v. Grays Harbor Publ'g Co., 171 P. 1026, 1027-28 (Wash. 1918) (holding
libelous per se to accuse a political opponent of "[engaging in] a campaign of slander and lies"
under a state libel law); see also Jenkins v. Taylor, 4 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) ("It
has been repeatedly held that to falsely charge one with uttering a slander or publishing a libel is in
itself libelous per se."); cf Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442, 444-46, 449 (Sup. Ct. 2018)
(denying motion to dismiss a slander suit against Donald Trump for charges he made at political
rallies and presidential debate that the women accusing Trump of sexual assault were liars sent by
his opponent to hurt his campaign: "at a Pennsylvania rally, defendant declared: 'Every woman lied
when they came forward to hurt my campaign, total fabrication. The events never happened. Never.
All of these liars will be sued after the election is over."' (citation omitted)).
221. See, e.g., MacLeod v. Tribune Publ'g Co., 343 P.2d 36, 40-42 (Cal. 1959) ("Whatever the
rule may have been when anti-communist sentiment was less crystalized than it is today, it is now
settled that a charge of membership in the Communist Party or communist affiliation or sympathy is
libelous on its face." (citations omitted)).
222. See infra note 223.
223. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publ'g Co., 122 F.2d 288, 290-91 (2d Cir. 1941)
(reversing dismissal), aff'd, 316 U.S. 642 (1942); Sweeney v. Phila. Record Co., 126 F.2d 53, 54-55
(3d Cir. 1942) (affirming dismissals); Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 457-59 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(affirming dismissal); Sweeney v. Capital News Publ'g Co., 37 F. Supp. 355, 356-57 (S.D. Idaho
1941) (granting dismissal); Sweeney v. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co., 34 N.E.2d 764, 764 (Ohio 1941)
(per curiam) (dismissing appeal); Sweeney v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 147 S.W.2d 406, 406, 407
(Tenn. 1941) (affirming dismissal); Sweeney v. Caller-Times Publ'g Co., 41 F. Supp. 163, 165-69
(S.D. Tex. 1941) (granting dismissal).
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Coughlin,224 opposed the nomination for federal district judge of
Emerich Freed because Freed was a foreign-born Jew.225 Sweeney
argued that the article intended to convey that "[Sweeney] was guilty of
un-American racial prejudice against persons of Jewish origin and guilty
of conduct unbecoming a public officer and to hold this plaintiff in
contempt in the eyes of his constituents [as a Congressman] and his
clients [as a lawyer]." 226 Sweeney did not provide any extrinsic evidence
proving innuendo 227 nor allege special damages. 228 One researcher put
the amount of damages Sweeney cumulatively prayed for at $7.5
million.2 29 Sweeney argued that the article was libelous per se because
the article injured his reputation as a lawyer, injured his reputation as a
congressman, and lowered his standing in public esteem.2 3 °
The Ohio Court of Appeals considered whether the article defamed
Sweeney as an attorney. Under Ohio law, an attack on one's professional
reputation was libelous per se, resulting in a presumption of damages.23 1
The court held that the article did not refer to, much less attack, Sweeney
in his capacity as a member of the Ohio Bar, only in his capacity as a
politician and congressman.232 Similar reasoning was employed by other

224. Father Coughlin was an anti-Semitic Catholic Priest who was popular on the radio in the
1930s and 1940s. See, e.g., Linette Lopez, Here's What Happened the Last Time America Had a
Steve Bannon, Bus. INSIDER (Nov. 20, 2017, 12:55 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/stevebannon-father-charles-coughlin-2017-11 (describing Father Charles Coughlin's political power,
anti-Semitism, and mastery of new media). But see Newspaper Printing Corp., 147 S.W.2d at 407
("We can not take judicial notice of derelictions on the part of Father Coughlin, if he has been guilty
of such.").
225. See, e.g., Noel, supra note 40, at 882 ("Representative Sweeney brought seventy-five or
more actions against Pearson and Allen, their syndicate, and the papers carrying the column
throughout the country."). Many of these cases were dismissed. See, e.g., Riesman, supra note 54, at
1298 n.67 ("It appears that more than thirty cases were dismissed, mostly for lack of prosecution; at
least five were settled.").
226. See, e.g., NewspaperPrintingCorp., 147 S.W.2d at 406-07.
227. See, e.g., Capital News Publ'g Co., 37 F. Supp. at 357 ("We cannot, under the law of
libel, insert into the article words or innuendoes as to who Father Coughlin is and his animus, if any
he has, against a Jew, because it is too well settled that when one rests his case, as here, solely upon
the contention that a recovery is to be had because the article is libelous per se, the court must look
to the words in the article, and their tendency, and cannot go beyond that and apply other words by
innuendo to support the conclusion that the article is libelous per se. The literal meaning of the term
'per se' is: 'by itself or 'in itself.'); see also Newspaper PrintingCorp., 147 S.W.2d at 406, 407.
228. See, e.g., Schenectady, 122 F.2d at 289 ("No special damages were alleged .. ");
CapitalNews Publ'g Co., 37 F. Supp. at 355-56 ("No special damages are alleged .. "); Sweeney
v. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co., 35 N.E.2d 471, 477 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941) ("The petition does not
plead special damage[s] .... "); Newspaper Printing Corp., 147 S.W.2d at 406 ("The declaration
contains no innuendo and avers no special damages.").
229. Noel, supra note 40, at 882 n.42.
230. See Newspaper PrintingCorp., 147 S.W.2d at 406-07.
231. See Beacon JournalPubl 'g Co., 35 N.E.2d at 472.
232. Id. at 473.
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courts holding the article did not libel Sweeney's professional reputation
as a lawyer.23 3
Sweeney's argument that the article damaged his reputation as a
congressman was also dismissed by numerous courts. Members of
Congress have both official duties and political responsibilities. As seen
or
in Shields and Manasco, lying about how a legislator voted on a bill 234
wrongly describing what they voted for was not usually defamatory.
The Southern District of Texas in its Syndicate case echoed those
principles when applying Texas common law asserting: "It is never libel
to charge that one is opposed to, or in favor of, legislation on which the
citizenship of the state may take opposite views," and it would be
difficult to prove what factor motivated a legislator to vote a particular
way. 235 Tennessee's Supreme Court argued that Sweeney could not
claim damage in his capacity as a member of the House, as Sweeney had
no formal role in the "appointment or confirmation" of federal judges.236
233. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Caller-Times Publ'g Co., 41 F. Supp. 163, 165-67 (S.D. Tex. 1941)
(quoting Beacon JournalPubl'g Co., 35 N.E.2d at 479 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941)); see also Sweeney v.
Phila. Record Co., 126 F.2d 53, 54 (3rd Cir. 1942); ("Under the law of Pennsylvania the words
published do not constitute a libel per se upon a member of the bar."); Schenectady, 122 F.2d at
289-90 ("We are not concerned, however, with any libel upon the plaintiff as a lawyer since no
reference was made in the publication to that profession of his."); cf Pattangall v. Mooers, 94 A.
561, 561-62, 566 (Me. 1915) (affirming verdict for plaintiff for slander per se attacking reputation
as an attorney during congressional campaign).
234. See supra notes 182-84, 202-05 and accompanying text (discussing Shields v. Booles and
Manasco v. Walley).
235. Caller-Times Publ'g Co., 41 F. Supp. at 167-68 (citing Brown v. Hous. Printing Co., 255
S.W. 254, 255-56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923)). The District Court discussed the public official rule,
which required that for a publication to be libelous per se when discussing the acts of a public
officer, the charge must be such that it would warrant removal from office. Id. at 167. In Jenkins v.
Taylor, Texas's Court of Appeals appeared to suspend that rule when applied to the members of the
State Legislature where removal was a political question. 4 S.W. 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)
(holding that the public official rule did not bar recovery for a candidate for the legislature and
indicating that recovery might be had where a legislator might be subject to disciplinary action).
Sweeney, similarly, could only be removed from Congress by political processes of expulsion or
losing an election.
236. Sweeney v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 147 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tenn. 1941) ("A member of
the House of Representatives has no part in the selection of a federal judge, either by way of
appointment or confirmation. The most that he can do is to recommend. It appears that the plaintiff
is a Democrat. If for reasons purely political he opposed the appointment of a foreign-bom citizen,
or a Jew, or a Catholic, or a Protestant to the federal bench, such action would not indicate personal,
professional, or official delinquency."); see also Phila.Record Co., 126 F.2d at 54-55 (finding that
Sweeney had "no duty to perform in recommending candidates for federal judicial appointments");
Caller-TimesPubl'g Co., 41 F. Supp. at 167 (finding that Sweeney had "no duty in connection with
the appointment of [district court judges]"). Sweeney would have had a stronger argument if he
were a U.S. Senator voting on confirmation of federal judges; there, he could have argued the article
alleged that he was violating the Constitution's prohibition on religious tests for federal officials
when exercising advice and consent. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. VI, cl. 3; see CallerTimes Publ'gCo., 41 F. Supp. at 167.
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Finally, most states had a capacious statutory or common law
definition of libel per se. Ohio's provision was simple: "Matters which
would bring him into ridicule, hatred or contempt."23' 7 New York's
definition included "words which tend to expose one to public hatred,
shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion,
ostracism, degradation, or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one
in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive one of their
238
confidence and friendly intercourse in society.The article was found not to be libelous per se under the laws of
many states, including Ohio. The Court of Appeals wrote: "We merely
hold that to publish of a man that his opposition to a proposed appointee
for office is based on religious grounds and the fact that the candidate is
of foreign birth, is not libelous as a matter of law-i.e., per se. '"239
The only court in a published opinion to fmd the article libelous per
se was a panel of the Second Circuit; reversing the grant of a motion to
dismiss by the Northern District of New York. 240 The divided panel held
that charging that Sweeney opposed a judicial nominee for being a
foreign-born Jew would cause "a noticeable part of many who read [the
article] ... to hate, despise, scorn or be contemptuous of the person
241
concerning whom the false statements have been published.,
Judge Chase's majority opinion noted that while decisions of other
courts were "conflicting," under Erie the case was governed by the
substantive law of New York.24 2 Chase framed the question presented as
whether "right-thinking people" would deem Sweeney "unworthy of
public trust and confidence" and hold him in contempt for his alleged
bigotry.243 Chase, joined by Judge Learned Hand, held that Sweeney
adequately pled libel per se because, "those who hate intolerance are
prone to regard the person who believes in and practices acts of
intolerance with aversion and contempt.",21 Chase appeared influenced

237. Beacon JournalPubl'g Co., 35 N.E.2d at 472.
238. Schenectady, 122 F.2d at 290 (quoting Kimmerle v. N.Y. Evening Journal, Inc., 186 N.E.
217, 218 (N.Y. 1933)).
239. Beacon JournalPubl'g Co., 35 N.E.2d at 474, appeal dismissed, 34 N.E.2d 764 (Ohio
1941).
240. See Schenectady, 122 F.2d at 289-91.
241. Idat290.
242. Id. at 289. Chase emphasizes this point, perhaps, in response to Clark's dissent which
noted that only two unreported opinions of the Northern District of Illinois agreed with the majority.
Id.at 291 (Clark, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 290 (citing inter alia RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 559 & cmt. e (AM. LAW
INST. 1938)).

244. Id. Chase's opinion implies that "right-thinking people" are those who would hold bigots
in contempt. See id.
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by the rise of fascism and the link that readers might draw from 45the
publication between Sweeney and then-German leader Adolf Hitler.
Judge Clark, in dissent, was unpersuaded. Though Clark believed
that the dismissals of Syndicate cases by other courts were
"persuasive,"2'46 Clark argued that the article was not libelous per se
under New York law.247 New York precedents only addressed what was
libelous per se in the context of commenting upon the official acts of
public officials accused of corruption or incompetence, not the bigotry at
the crux of this case.24 8
Clark was alarmed by the "disturbing" nature of the law the
majority applied, because, by holding the article libelous per se, falsity
was presumed. 249 He believed the majority's position was "naive" for
creating a fictitious world where the law could presume allegations of
bigotry as false.2 50 This logic, Clark warned, suggested that, "what ought
to be is, and that whoever suggests the contrary is a slanderer; for if we
do so, we shut off all healthy criticism of prejudice, and allow bigotry
full scope to act with impunity. ' 251 This doctrine was "dangerous" as
any newspaper expressing a political opinion would be open to suit as
"an appreciable number of readers [would] hate or hold in contempt the
public official commented on," for different political, religious, or
racial views. 2
245. See id. at 290-91 ("And in these times when it is universal knowledge that one foreign
dictator gained his power by practices which included largescale, unreasonable Jewish persecutions
which have played an important part in making his name an anathema in many parts of this country
the publication of statements such as those alleged may well gain for the person falsely accused the
scorn and contempt of the right-thinking in appreciable numbers."). A panel for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit ruling on Pennsylvania law found the Syndicate article not libelous
per se with an interesting rationale deserving of full context. See Sweeney v. Phila. Record Co., 126
F.2d 53, 55 (3d. Cir 1942) ("At the most the appellant is charged with being a bigoted person who,
actuated by a prejudice of an unpleasant and undesirable kind, opposed a foreign-born Jew for a
judicial appointment. Let us assume that it was stated in the alleged libel that the plaintiff opposed
the appointment of a candidate simply because he was an Eskimo born above the Arctic Circle. We
think that this example makes obvious the absurdity of the plaintiffs position. Eskimos are not
being persecuted. Jews are being widely persecuted. We think that it is the connotation of
persecution, which when carried into the matter published concerning the plaintiff, gives it the
fallacious aspect of being libelous per se. The libel does not allege that Congressman Sweeney
persecutes foreign-born Jews. It states nothing more than that he opposes one for an important
federal office on the grounds stated.").
246. Schenectady, 122 F.2d at 291 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing state and federal opinions
dismissing Sweeney's suits).
247. Id. at 291 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("The decision herein seems to me not in accordance with
New York law ... ").
248. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
249. See id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
250. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
251. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 291-92 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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Clark would have required proof of special damages to protect
political discourse. 2 "3 This dissent was similar to the opinion of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which held: "it is not actionable to
publish erroneous and injurious statements of fact and injurious
comment or opinion regarding the political conduct and views of public
officials, so long as no charge of crime, corruption, gross immorality or
gross incompetence is made and no special damage results. 2 54
Clark had mixed views on the effectiveness of defenses to libel in
this case. The tenor of Clark's dissent suggests that he expected that the
district court upon remand would find that the defense of fair comment
protected the newspaper. 5 Conversely, Clark found cold comfort in the
regard himself as not
defense of truth, as the "public official will always
256
enough.,
sincerely
testify,
so
will
and
bigoted,
3. Conclusion
Kentucky exemplified a trend that discouraged political plaintiffs.
The doctrine that losing candidates could not claim lost emoluments
from the office sought as special damages likely chilled potential
political plaintiffs from filing defamation suits. By denying a right to
recover in cases where a defendant lied about a politician's voting record
or policy position, judges deprived political plaintiffs of defamation
causes of action that could not have been privileged.257
253. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting) (arguing that special damages be required where the charge is
not one of "definite impropriety in office"). Clark does not expound upon what might be proof of
special damages in Sweeney's case.
254. Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (emphasis added). The D.C.
Circuit noted that had Sweeney alleged that the statements in the article caused him economic
damages by the loss of business as an attorney or that he lost his seat in Congress, he "might be
entitled to relief." Id. But see supra Part III.A. 1-2 (discussing cases holding that lost emoluments
from failure to be elected to political office are not special damages).
255. See Schenectady, 122 F.2d at 291-92 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("The decision herein seems to
me not in accordance with New York law, where the right of comment on a public official has been
safeguarded ... " (emphasis added)).
256. See id. at 292 (Clark, J., dissenting) (implying that juries assessing the truth of a statement
that a politician was bigoted might either believe the politician when he denies the charge, or the
jury would agree with the bigotry and accept the politician's denial with a wink and a nod); see also
Anne Gearan, Trump Says 'I'm Not a Racist' and Denies 'Shithole Countries'Remark,WASH. POST
2
(Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/ 018/01/14/trump-says-imthat
(reporting
not-a-racist-and-denies-shithole-countries-remark/?utmterm=.625ee5dc30b7
President Donald Trump, facing accusations of racism, including allegedly stating a preference that
immigrants be from Norway rather than poor nations that are home to persons of color, replied to
the accusation by stating to reporters: "I'm the least racist person you have ever interviewed.").
257. A legislator voting yes or no on a given bill is a fact. Ifa defendant knowingly lies about a
plaintiffs specific vote, no privilege protects that falsity; rather, it is the view that upright citizens
can be on both sides of legislative measures that makes it not libelous per se to misrepresent or
incorrectly state a legislator's voting history, which effectively denies a legal remedy to the plaintiff
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By the mid-twentieth century, narrow interpretations of what was
considered "defamatory" posed a hurdle to plaintiffs alleging defamation
per se nationwide. By paring down what special damages could consist
of to prove defamation per quod, the courts could and did dismiss many
political defamation suits. In the Syndicate cases, it was implied by
numerous courts that even if the article was libelous per se, the article
would have been privileged.5 8 It is to the qualified privileges of
common interest and fair comment that this Article now turns.2 59
B. QualifiedPrivilege: Common Interest and FairComment
Complaints for defamation surviving attacks on the prima facie
case were subject to affirmative defenses, usually pled in the defendant's
answer. 26 ° Subpart 1 discusses the common interest privilege, routinely
invoked by citizen defendants communicating statements of fact.26'
Subpart 2 details the defense of fair comment, routinely invoked by
media defendants writing on newsworthy issues.262 Subpart 3 concludes
that qualified privileges were an important part of the common law web
against political defamation suits in all jurisdictions, though the power of
each privilege varied among the jurisdictions.2 63
If a court deemed a publication qualifiedly privileged under
common interest or fair comment, the legal presumption of malice
would be suspended and the plaintiff would have to prove malice as a
matter of fact. Most jurisdictions held that the desire to defeat a
candidate for office, without more, was insufficient to prove malice.2 64
for the lie. See Shields v. Booles, 38 S.W.2d 677, 681-83 (Ky. 1931); see also Sweeney v. CallerTimes Publ'g Co., 41 F. Supp. 163, 167-68 (S.D. Tex. 1941) (suggesting it is not libelous); cf supra
note 187 and accompanying text (discussing fake news).
258. See Sweeney v. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co., 35 N.E.2d 471, 472-74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941);
see also Schenectady, 122 F.2d at 291 (Clark, J., dissenting) (implying that the article would be
privileged as "comment on a public official").
259. See infra Part Ih.B.
260. Depending on the jurisdiction, a defendant might include in the answer: a demurrer, plea
of the general issue (a denial), or plea of justification (truth); and/or assert a qualified privilege,
including common interest, fair comment, and neutral reportage. For an example of neutral
reportage, see Abram v. Odham, 89 So. 2d 334, 337 (Fla. 1956) (describing a news story as "a
routine report of what went on at a political rally in the midst of a heated gubernatorial campaign in
which there was wide public interest, and apparently quoted only the milder portions of the
defendant [candidate]'s remarks concerning the plaintiff[,]" and holding that where the newspaper
running the story did not evince "express malice," the qualified privilege of neutral reportage was
not defeated).
261. See infra PartlI.B.1.
262. See infra Part IH.B.2.
263. See infra Part II.B.3.
264. See, e.g., Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 277 N.W. 264, 268 (Minn. 1938) ("Malice cannot
be established by merely showing defendants' purpose was to prevent plaintiff's election."); Egan v.
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Thus, a political plaintiff needed to provide evidence that the defendant
was motivated by personal animus, or, in some jurisdictions, that the
defendant lacked a good-faith honest belief in the truth of the allegedly
defamatory statement.
1. Common Interest Privilege
Common interest is an expansive privilege that reaches far beyond
cases of political import.265 This Subpart looks at application of this
privilege to communications among voters and among persons having an
interest in the governance of a municipality or state.
In 1877, in Mott v. Dawson, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
uttered words that were slanderous per se.266 Mott was running for
County Board of Supervisors when Dawson told other voters "shortly
before" the election that Mott had fraudulently sold cattle.267 This
charge could be understood as constituting the crime of "cheating by
'
false pretenses." 268
Iowa's Supreme Court affirmed a verdict for the defendant on the
grounds that the charge conveyed between voters in the district was
privileged.269 The court held, "if the words were spoken by defendant
without malice, in good faith, believing them to be true, and having
reasonable cause as a prudent, careful man to so believe, and with the
honest purpose of protecting the public from plaintiff's supposed
dishonesty, the defendant is not liable."27 Common interest among
voters was limited in that it applied to persons with a vote in the
upcoming election involving the candidate who was supposedly
defamed, but expansive in that it protected assertions of fact and not
mere comment.27 1
Dotson, 155 N.W. 783, 788 (S.D. 1915) (same).
265. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Eno, 81 N.Y. 116, 124 (1880) ("The occasion that makes a
communication privileged is when one has an interest in a matter, or a duty in regard to it, or there
is a propriety in utterance, and he makes a statement in good faith to another who has a like interest
or duty, or to whom a like propriety attaches to hear the utterance."). Common interest protected
potentially defamatory statements made in good faith and believed to be true among persons
needing a free-flow of information. See Johnson v. Gerasimos, 225 N.W. 636, 636, 638 (Mich.
1929) (holding statements made by employee of a corporation (defendant) to the corporation's
auditor raising concerns that the plaintiff was embezzling corporate money was privileged under
common interest).
266. 46 Iowa 533, 533-34 (1877).
267. Id. at 533, 537.
268. Id. at 534-35.
269. Id. at 533, 537.
270. Id. at 537.
271. If the alleged defamatory charge was published to voters outside that electorate, the
plaintiff could try to defeat the qualified privilege by alleging malice from excessive publication.
See Johnson Publ'g Co. v. Davis, 124 So. 2d 441, 449-50 (Ala. 1960) (admitting circulation
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The common interest in "good governance" was more expansive
than the common interest among voters because the privilege enlarged
the sphere of protection to a greater number of defendants than voters
residing in a specific electoral district. A defendant could raise the "good
governance" common interest privilege if he had some defined interest
that would be affected by the governance of the entity holding the
election. Weinstein v. Rhorer showcases the breadth of what this
privilege could protect. 2
Herman Weinstein, a former resident of Middlesboro, Kentucky,
opposed Arthur Rhorer for reelection as Middlesboro's prosecuting
attorney. Although Weinstein had moved to Cincinnati, Ohio, he
retained ownership of "considerable" properties in Middlesboro
(including one building where Arthur Rhorer had been a tenant for about
nineteen years). 7 3 Prior to the election, Weinstein made negative
remarks about Rhorer's candidacy to Middlesboro residents.
Rhorer sued Weinstein for slander, praying for $2900 in
damages.274 According to Rhorer, a sample of the charges Weinstein
made included: "You can't afford to vote for Arthur Rhorer.... He is a
"[Rhorer]
is
whore-hopper, a drunkard and a grafter[;]"
dishonest... [;]" "Arthur Rhorer... works for such a small salary he
had to graft. ' 271 In his answer, Weinstein pled truth and qualified
privilege.27 6 The trial court granted a demurrer to Weinstein's answer,
disallowing both defenses.27 7 The jury awarded Rhorer $1500 ($750 in
punitive damages); Weinstein appealed.2 78
Kentucky's Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded
the case.279 The court held that the only charge sufficiently pled by
Rhorer was the slanderous per se charge of graft; Rhorer failed to
sufficiently plead that the non-slanderous per se charges of whorehopping, dishonesty, and being a drunk were made with malice.2 8°
Although the charge of graft survived, the Court of Appeals held
that the trial court erred in disallowing the defendant's claim of qualified

numbers of national magazine to prove malice).
272.

See 42 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1931).

273. Weinstein v. Rhorer, 73 S.W.2d 25, 26 (Ky. 1934) (involving termination of rental
agreement); Weinstein, 42 S.W.2d at 893.
274. Weinstein, 42 S.W.2d at 892-93.

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.
Id.at 893.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 895.
Id. at 893.
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privilege. 281 The court stated that the qualified privilege of common
interest protected Weinstein's remarks in the context of the campaign,
where "discussion of a candidate's conduct and moral fitness, if made in
good faith, without actual malice and with good grounds for believing
them to be true, would be privileged communications. 2 82 On remand for
trial on the charge of graft, Rhorer needed to prove that the charge was
made with ill-will malice or with no grounds for believing its truth to
defeat the qualified privilege attached to a statement made by a
"considerable" landowner of Middlesboro property with an interest in
protecting the governance of the entity holding the election from graft.283
It is necessary not to overstate the importance of the privilege
applied in Weinstein. The good governance common interest privilege if
extended beyond Weinstein may well have lacked a limiting principle.284
The privilege recognized in Weinstein was simply that a current
landowner and one-time resident had an interest in the good governance
of a community where he retained properties, as well as business and
personal ties.
The common interest privilege protected some political speech
prior to 1964.285 The privilege among voters in an election protected
most bar room of coffee house conversations about politicians from civil
defamation suits. The Weinstein precedent could theoretically privilege
any speaker with property or business interests in that municipality.
Whether that privilege would extend to statements made by corporate
media entities or journalists acting as conduits for disseminating
information to the public is better addressed by the defense of
fair comment.

281. Id.at 892, 894-95.
282. Id. at 894-95. For a similar test, see infra Part Il.B.2.c (discussing the minority view of
the defense of fair comment).

283. See Weinstein, 42 S.W.2d at 894-95.
284.
285.

Cf Post Publ'g Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 540, 542 (6th Cir. 1893).
But see Upton v. Hume, 33 P. 810, 812 (Or. 1893) (disapproving Mott v. Dawson, 46

Iowa 533 (1877)).
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2 86
2. Fair Comment: 'Nattering Nabobs of Negativism'
This Subpart sketches out the defense of fair comment: 28 7 Subpart
A traces its origins; 288 Subpart B delves into the majority view of fair
comment; 289 Subpart C details the minority view; 290 Subpart D
concludes, noting that the applicable view of fair comment in a
jurisdiction may have impacted the content of political endorsements
by newspapers.291

a. A Brief History of Fair Comment
First articulated in England in 1808, the defense of fair comment
shielded comment on matters of public concern.29 2 In Carr v. Hood,
Lord Ellenborough dismissed a libel suit brought by author Sir John Carr
against a critic who panned his book. 293 The court held, "[i]f the
commentator does not step aside from the work, or introduce fiction for
294
the purpose of condemnation, he exercises a fair and legitimate right.
286. Robert Mitchell, 'Nattering Nabobs of Negativism': The Improbable Rise of Spiro T.
Agnew, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/
2018/08/08/nattering-nabobs-of-negativism-the-improbable-rise-of-spiro-t-agnew/?noredirect=on&
utmterm=.896aa4dd5200 (reporting on Vice President Agnew's use of the phrase 'Nattering
Nabobs of Negativism' to describe critics of the Nixon Administration. Agnew would resign the
vice presidency in 1973 after pleading no contest, "to a single charge of tax evasion stemming from
bribes he pocketed as governor.").
287. Fair comment is described as either a defense or a privilege; "defense of fair comment" is
used to distinguish it from the privilege of common interest.
288. See infra Part llI.B.2.a (tracing the development of the defense of fair comment).
289. See infra Part II.B.2.b (expounding the majority view of fair comment, as adopted by
prominent jurists such as Taft, that interpreted the defense narrowly in order not to preclude the best
men from running in public elections).
290. See infra Part III.B.2.c.
291. See infra Part ffI.B.2.d. Many newspapers were owned by persons whose money enabled
their politics to direct its editorial content if not reporting. Some politicians would purchase papers
to promote themselves while assailing political rivals.
292. The determination that the defense of fair comment applied to a given statement was a
question of law for judges, not a question of fact for a jury. See Noel, supra note 40, at 877 n.13.
293. Carrv. Hood (1808) 48 Geo. 355, 355, 356, 359 (Eng.).
294. Id.at 358 (emphasis added). In Carr, the defendant lampooned a series of books authored
by Carr. Id. at 355-56. The allegedly libelous publication was intended to bring Carr's work into
contempt and lower his reputation as an author by suggesting that Carr's work was overwrought. Id.
at 355-56, 357 (describing a picture from the allegedly libelous publication depicting Carr
collapsing under the weight of three of his books). A passage from one of Carr's books:
Our master of the house was both cook and waiter. At dinner, amongst several other
dishes, we had some stewed beef, I requested to be favoured with a little mustard, our
host very solemnly replied, "I am very sorry, citizen, but I have none, if you had been
fortunate enough to have been here about three weeks since, you might have had some."
It was more than I wished, so I ate my beef very contentedly without it. With our desert
we had a species of cake called brioche, composed of egg, flour, and water; it is inhigh
estimation in France.
JOHN CARR, THE STRANGER IN FRANCE: OR, A TOUR FROM DEVONSHIRE TO PARIS 36-37 (1803).
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This defense would be adopted by every American jurisdiction and
expanded beyond literary critiques.29 5
American fair comment developed to protect many areas of speech
including but not limited to the following: caustic commentary on and
criticism of newsworthy issues; the official acts of public officers; and
the qualifications, records, and physical and mental fitness of candidates
for public office. 296 By the turn of the twentieth century, fair comment
protected good-faith criticism of the true acts, ideas, statements, and
records of public men, thus fostering political debate, and informing the
community about persons interested in serving as repositories of the
public's trust.
The defense of fair comment was limited. First, the defense would
not protect comment on the private character of public men.297 Second,
the defense might not protect comment that was particularly harsh, as the
nastiness of the words used when commenting could be taken as
evidence of malice with which to defeat the defense.298 Finally, a factual
assertion could not be presented to a court as mere comment. 299 The
substance of the defense and its application to a particular case
were questions of law decided by the trial judge, subject to de novo
appellate review.
In the mid to late 1800s, a schism developed over whether
commentary formed in whole or in part on misstatements or false
statements of fact that a publisher honestly believed to be true could

Ellenborough noted that "[r]idicule is often the fittest weapon" for "exposing the follies and errors
of another." Car', 48 Geo. at 357; see, e.g., Alexandra Petri, How to Survive on $5 a Day and
Millions of Dollars of Inherited Wealth,
WASH.
POST
(July
18,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/compost/wp/2018/07/18/how-to-survive-on-5-a-day-andmillions-of-dollars-of-inherited-wealth/?utmterm=.ce2b0a7d6c52 (ridiculing You, A Week in New
York City on $25/Hour and $1k Monthly Allowance, REFINERY29 (July 15, 2018, 12:30 PM),
https://www.refinery29.corn/money-diary-new-york-city-marketing-intem-income
(journaling
expenses of a twenty-one year-old intern who babysits as a side hustle, while parents pay for her
rent, education, health insurance, etc.) by writing a money diary for Bruce Wayne as an intern at
Wayne Enterprises with a side hustle as Batman).
295. See Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1207-09 & nn.7-26 (1949) (listing
matters of public interest to which fair comment was applied).
296. First-time candidates for public office would often lack official acts to assess, raising
questions about how to report on or campaign against candidates without a record of public service.
297. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hungerford, 217 N.W. 83, 83-84 (Iowa 1927) (holding that publication
of an article charging that a "low-browed, ignorant, hard-boiled" town marshal was "the most
ungentlemanly specimen of white trash we have ever come across" and "a repulsive specim[e]n of
humanity" was not fair comment as the charges attacked the private character of the public official
rather than his official acts).
298. See, e.g., Putnam v. Browne, 155 N.W. 910, 913 (Wis. 1916) (holding the comparison of
the plaintiff to Judas Iscariot was "not fair criticism of any type; hence it is not privileged").
299. See FairComment, supra note 295, at 1213; see infra text accompanying note 329.
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remain privileged under fair comment. 00 While the defense of fair
comment and the qualified privilege for misstatements of fact were
distinct,3" 1 some courts synthesized the two.30

2

The mixture of the

privileges may have been caused by: the muddling of fact and comment,
common in the media and society generally;30 3 and/or the development
of a nascent national press corps reliant on new technologies, like radio
and wire services, which created faster and greater access to information
at the cost of an increased risk of errors in reporting.30 4
b. Majority View: The Best Men
The majority view of fair comment clung closely to Ellenborough's
rule that "[i]f the commentator does not ... introduce fiction for the
purpose of condemnation, he exercises a fair and legitimate right."30 5 If a
publication relied on a false statement or misstatement of fact, or a false
or unverified rumor, it introduced a fiction and the defense failed.30 6 This
narrow view was applied by a majority of American jurisdictions
through 1964.307 Reasons for adopting this view included the ease in
applying the rule and well-regarded jurists Oliver Wendell Holmes and
William Howard Taft adopting and developing the view.30 8
In Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., a New York City
customhouse official sued The Boston Daily Advertiser for libel for
printing articles accusing the official of participating in a fraud
300. Catherine Hancock, Origins of the Public Figure Doctrine in First Amendment
Defamation Law, 50 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 81, 92-94 (2005-2006).
301. Noel, supra note 40, at 878, 890-91, 896-900.
302. See, e.g., Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 116 A.2d 440, 445 (Conn. 1955).
303. Id. at 445-46 ("It is often impossible to differentiate between what is comment and what is
a statement of fact.").
304. See, e.g., Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 27 S.E.2d 837, 844 (W. Va. 1943) (discussing
the moral and social responsibilities of the modern media in attempting to ascertain the truth of
public acts on which they report). The concerns evinced by this decision were not unique to the
mid-Twentieth Century. See, e.g., FREEMAN, THE FELD OF BLOOD, supra note 29, at 184, 192, 198
(discussing technological developments, the growth of the independent press in the mid-Nineteenth
Century, and, anecdotally, false reports of a congressional duel); Matthew Ingram, Fake News is
Partof a Bigger Problem: Automated Propaganda,COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. (Feb. 22, 2018),
(discussing Twenty-First Century
https://www.cjr.org/analysis/algorithm-russia-facebook.php
journalistic and national security challenges posed by technological leaps at social media
companies, which allow disinformation campaigns to be run on their sites).
305. See Carr v. Hood (1808) 48 Geo. 355, 358 (Eng.).
306. If a plaintiff sued based on reporting that included an unverified rumor, the presumption
of falsity would work to presume that a fiction had been introduced. See Post Publ'g Co. v. Hallam,
59 F. 530, 540-41 (6th Cir. 1893).
307. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 n.30 (1964) (holding that "the
Fourteenth Amendment requires recognition of the conditional privilege for honest misstatements of
fact").
308. See infra notes 309-28 and accompanying text.
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scheme." 9 The articles, which contained factual errors, charged Burt and
other "sugar people" with undervaluing the commodity in the
customhouse, thus pilfering money from the public.3 10 In 1891, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, vacating a judgment for the
plaintiff, adopted a view of fair comment offering broad application but
311
narrow protection.
The court, per Holmes, held that the defense applied to commentary
on and critique of all public officials and "private persons affecting [the]
administration. 31 2 However, this defense did not extend to false
statements or misstatements of fact. Holmes cautioned, for remand, that
parts of the articles containing comment that relied on verified facts
should be protected, but a false statement would not be protected even if
the "defendant had reasonable cause to believe its charges to be
true.... A person publishes libelous matter at his peril" 313 because
"what the interest of private citizens in public matters requires is
314
freedom of discussion rather than of statement.In 1893, Circuit Judge Taft crafted the leading opinion adopting the
narrow view.3 15 In Hallam v. Post Publishing Co., Taft articulated a
philosophical justification behind the legal rules laid out in Burt and
applied that narrow view to the political arena.316
Post Publishing Company owned the CincinnatiPost and Kentucky
Post; both papers published versions of the article "Berry Paid Expenses
of Theo. Hallam in the Sixth (Ky.) District Contest for the Nomination
of a Democrat for Congress. 31 7 The article alleged that candidate
Theodore Hallam incurred debt by providing lavish boat transportation
for his supporters attending the local Democratic nominating
convention. 3 8 The article, based on seemingly unverified rumors,
309. Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 28 N.E. 1, 1, 4 (Mass. 1891).
310. Id. at 1-4.
311. See id. at 4.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 4-5. The newspaper proffered evidence that its writers had a good-faith reason to
believe the truth of the facts underlying their comment. See id. at 1-4. This evidence was likely
proffered in the hope that the court would adopt the minority view of fair comment and protect the
entirety of the series of articles.
314. Id. at4.
315. Post Publ'g Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 534 (6th Cir. 1893). The ruling by Judge Taft, who
had already served as Solicitor General of the United States, was given increasing notoriety due to
his service as President of the United States (1909 to 1913), and, of course, Chief Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court (1921 to 1930). See Starks v. Comer, 67 So. 440, 442 (Ala. 1914).
316. See Hallam, 59 F. at 539-42.
317. Hallam v. Post Publ'g Co., 55 F. 456, 457 (C.C.S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir.
1893); see Hallam, 59 F. at 534-35.
318. Hallam, 55 F. at 457-58 (quoting a delegate as saying: "Why, the champagne flowed off
the decks so much that even the Henrietta [boat] was swimming in it"). Hallam was known to have

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

47

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 16

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:153

reported that a rival candidate, Berry, earned Hallam's support by
promising to pay the costs of transporting Hallam's supporters to the
Convention via the champagne laden ship Henrietta.3 1 9
Hallam, possibly thinking, "My yacht may have sailed, but my ship
is comin' in, '320 sued Post Publishing for libel, winning a $2500
judgment in the Southern District of Ohio.3 2 1 Post Publishing appealed,
and a panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed.3 22 Taft viewed the insinuation
that Hallam sold his support to Berry as a "disgraceful" act of a public
man; and such an assertion could not be predicated on an unverified
rumor, despite a good faith belief in its truth.3 23 Taft argued that
privileging such mistakes on logical leaps would result in a more
licentious press, chilling the best men from running for elected or
serving in appointed office.324
Burt and Hallam held that if a publication is capable of a
defamatory meaning, fair comment would not privilege a misstatement
of fact or charge predicated on an unverified rumor.3 25 The rule tried to
temper the press,3 26 by imposing a judicial standard for journalism.
Future President Taft viewed this rule as a means by which to encourage
the best men to hold or run for public office. 327 A majority of
jurisdictions would adopt this narrow view of fair comment on
this logic.

3 28

financial problems, yet contracted with a company to provide a boat to transport him and his wellfed supporters to the convention. Id.As a deadlock loomed at the convention, Hallam spoke
privately with his rival candidate, multimillionaire Albert Berry. Id. at 458. After that conversation,
Hallam told his supporters to support Berry (who went on to win the nomination and general
election). Id.
319. Id.at 458.
320. The Real Housewives of New York: The B is Back (Bravo television broadcast Apr. 7,
2015) (spoken by Sonja Morgan).
321. Hallam, 55 F. at 457-58. Hallam filed two suits (one in the Southern District of Ohio
against CincinnatiPost; and one in the District Court of Kentucky against Kentucky Post,) against
one corporate defendant. See Hallam, 59 F. at 531, 534.
322. Hallam, 59 F. at 531, 542.
323. Id. at 540-41.
324. Id. at 541 ("[T]he danger that honorable and worthy men may be driven from politics and
public service by allowing too great latitude in attacks upon their characters outweighs any benefit
that might occasionally accrue to the public from charges of corruption that are true in fact, but are
incapable of legal proof.").
325. Id. at 539-41; Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 28 N.E. 1, 4-5 (Mass. 1891).
326. See Hallam, 59 F. at 541 (noting the rule adopted was the majority rule and arguing that
the press is not known for sheepishness).
327. See id.
328. See, e.g., Putnam v. Browne, 155 N.W. 910, 912 (Wis. 1916); Starks v. Comer, 67 So.
440, 441-42 (Ala. 1914). For a list of cases that adopted the majority view as of 1949, most of
which cite to or state an iteration of Hallam, see sources cited in Noel, supra note 40, at 896-97
n.102.
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Newspapers in majority view jurisdictions often wrote
endorsements based more on opinion than fact. This makes sense as
majority jurisdictions allowed the defense "only where the alleged libel
is an honest expression of opinion concerning a matter of public interest,
reasonably warranted by facts which must be truly stated.

3 29

These

restrictions on the defense allowed the charges of unfit and unqualified
to flourish as they were safe either as opinion or a non-defamatory per
se charge.330
For example, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch endorsed William
Connett for the Democratic nomination for Circuit Attorney.33 ' The
endorsement, in a four-way race, was less for Connett than it was against
Henry Walsh.332 The paper endorsed Connett to avoid a split in the vote
that could allow Walsh to eke out the nomination. The paper deemed
Walsh "manifestly unfit" for the office,333 continuing:
The mere candidacy of such a person as Walsh for such an office
should fill the city with alarm. He has no qualifications for the place.
His sponsors and his associates are survivors of the most degraded
rdgime that St. Louis ever knew. He can have no proper motive in
334
aspiring to the place.
Walsh sued the paper for libel claiming that the article damaged his
reputation as an attorney, his candidacy for office, and brought him into
"contempt and hatred of the public. 3 35 Walsh prayed for $25,000 in
general and punitive damages.336
The trial court granted the paper's motion to dismiss, and the
Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed. 37 The court considered whether
the article, in its entirety or in part, was libelous per se. 338 The assertion
that the city should be alarmed by Walsh's candidacy was not
defamatory as it was confined to Walsh's lack of qualifications for the
329.

Note, LibelActions Brought by Public Officials, 51 YALE L.J. 693;'697 (1942).

330. See supra Part Ill.A.2.b. One could be unqualified for an office by virtue of not meeting
professional, residency, or citizenship requirements, and in that sense unqualified could be a nondefamatory statement of fact. See, e.g., Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 6 A.3d 726, 740-43, 747 (Conn.
2010) (holding that then-Secretary of State had not met a statutory requirement of "ten years' active
practice at the bar of this state" to be qualified to run for Attorney General (quoting CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 3-124 (2017))).
331. Walsh v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 157 S.W. 326, 327-28 (Mo. 1913).
332. Id. at 328.

333.

Id.

334.

Id. at 327-28 (quoting Connettfor Circuit Attorney, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 22,

1908).
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 327, 330.
Id. at 329-30.
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position of Circuit Attorney. The charge that Walsh had the support of
"survivors of the most degraded r6gime" was not libelous per se as it did
not impute any criminality to Walsh.339 There the court used the
innocent construction rule to hold that charging that a lawyer who
defends unseemly clients does not make him "birds of a feather" with
those clients. 340 The court then held that the paper's comment that Walsh
had "no proper motive" to run for the position was an opinion for the
and the editorial
voters to judge.3 4 1 As Walsh alleged no special damages
342
affirmed.
was
dismissal
was not libelous per se,
As Walsh exemplifies, papers published in majority jurisdictions
did not run into problems when they maligned a candidate. Rather,
papers ran into legal problems when they laid out an intricate factual
predicate explaining the basis for their scorn for a candidacy. The Walsh
opinion shows that a safe space existed from libel, in electioneering and
the press, when stating an opinion light on or devoid of factual
predicate.3 43 This view paradoxically encouraged publishing political
opinions while it chilled providing the factual basis for those opinions.
c. Minority View: The Best Men?
The minority view of fair comment developed at the turn of the
twentieth century and was primarily adopted in the West. Western states
were politically, socially, and constitutionally more democratized than
eastern states; and as people migrated west, some had reason to try to
draft new backstories or even shed their sordid pasts.3" It is unsurprising
that these western and prairie states were receptive to a view of fair
comment that encouraged warnings about dangers posed by swamps and
339. Id. at 329.
340.

Id. at 329-30. But see TWENTY ONE PILOTS, HEATHENS (Atlantic Records 2016) ("It looks

like you might be one of us."). The innocent construction rule "holds that the article is to be read as
a whole and the words given their natural and obvious meaning, and requires that words allegedly
libelous that are capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a
matter of law." John v. Tribune Co., 181 N.E.2d 105, 108 (Il. 1962).
341. Walsh, 157 S.W. at 329.
342. Id. at 330. The court noted that special damages were not alleged, and had Walsh lost the
primary and felt that the article "contributed to his defeat" he could have pled that as a special
damage. Id. It is unclear if the court would have held that lost emoluments were special damages, or
that the court thought that Walsh could claim that the loss of the election could be proof of his
diminished reputation among the electorate.
343. If the reporting was accurate, or quotation correct, any criticism based on those facts was
fair comment.
344.

Cf Panic! at the Disco, High Hopes on PRAY FOR THE WICKED (Fueled by Ramen LLC

2018) ("Mama said... manifest destiny ... burn your biography, rewrite your history .. ");
see also infra notes 365-78 (discussing Egan v. Dotson, 155 N.W. 783, 785-86 (noting that a South
Dakota gubernatorial candidate moved to the state to avoid disbarment in Iowa after being accused
of raping two women)).
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strangers.
The most cited expression of the liberal view of fair comment is the
1908 opinion of the Supreme Court of Kansas in Coleman v.
MacLennan. 45 However, Coleman was not the first case to articulate a
conception of this view. Cases as early as the 1880s held that the defense
of fair comment applied where a false statement or misstatement of fact
occurred, so long as a publisher acted without malice and with a good
3 46
faith honest belief in the truth of the statement.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied a nascent form of the
minority view prior to Coleman.347 In 1886, in Briggs v. Garrett, the
court privileged the public reading of a letter opposing the reelection of
one judge based on a ruling written by a different judge.3 48 In Jackson v.
Pittsburg Times,349 the court held that an article reporting on the
conduct of a national guardsman that included misstatements of fact
was protected:
The plaintiff was at the time a public officer, actually on duty in
performing a very grave and serious public service. Such persons are
amenable to public criticism in the newspapers, without liability for
libel, if there was probable cause for their comments and no proof of
express malice, even though the statements are not strictly true in all
350
respects.
These pre-Coleman cases lacked the clarity and scholarship that came
with the later opinion by the Supreme Court of Kansas.35 '
Coleman became widely cited because the case involved press
coverage of a candidate for public office, serving as a foil for Taft's
opinion in Hallam. During Attorney General Coleman's reelection
campaign, The Topeka State News published an article that drew a
potentially false inference that Coleman mismanaged the state's school
funds.3 52 Coleman sued for libel, alleging that the article was false,
defamatory, and "the fruit of malice. 3 53 The jury was instructed that if
345. 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908); see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-82 (1964)
(discussing Coleman).
346. See infra notes 347-51 and accompanying text; cf infra note 361 and accompanying text.
347. See Briggs v. Garrett, 2 A. 513, 521 (Pa. 1886).
348. Id.at 516-17, 524 (privileging letter read at a meeting of Philadelphia's Committee of
One Hundred in opposition to the candidacy of Judge Briggs in a judicial election when the
misstatement of fact was that the official act complained of was not committed by Briggs, but by
Judge Fell).
349. 25 A. 613 (Pa. 1893).
350. Id.at 616.
351. The opinion in Briggs can be read as common interest in an election or the privileging of a
misstatement of fact
352. Coleman v. Maclennan, 98 P. 281,281 (Kan. 1908).
353. Id.
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they found that the article was published with the aim to inform voters
"and that the defendant made all reasonable effort to ascertain the facts
before publishing the [article], and that the whole thing was done in
good faith, and without malice toward [the] plaintiff," they should find
for the defendant.3 5 4 The jury found that the article was published
without malice, that Coleman sustained no damages, and found
generally for the defendant.35 5 Coleman objected to the jury instructions
at trial and appealed to the Supreme Court of Kansas.35 6
The court, affirming the trial court's instructions, acknowledged
that it was adopting a minority view.3 57 The court justified its divergence
on three main grounds: a state constitutional provision, state common
law, and public policy.3 58 The opinion cited protections in Kansas's Bill
of Rights for the liberties of speech and the press,3 5 9 as a reason to 3go
60
beyond the protection fair comment provided in majority jurisdictions.
The court extended a common law rule applied in criminal libel cases
privileging information believed in good faith to be true and shared for
the benefit of voters, to this civil case.3 6' The court then disputed the
policy rationales of the majority view, arguing that Kansas's common
law privilege protecting misstatements or false statements of fact when
commenting had not led to "yellow journalism" nor deprived Kansas of
fine men to run for office. The court defended the minority view, noting,
"[t]he liberal rule offers no protection to the unscrupulous defamer and
362
traducer of private character.,
Jurisdictions adopting the minority view of fair comment
354. Id. at 282.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 288. The opinion provided citation to other state and federal courts that privileged
publications where a defendant acted without malice and with a good faith belief in the truth of the
facts used to comment. Id. at 286-88 (citing decisions from Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and Maine).
358. Id. at 284-88, 291.
359. Id. at 283 ("The liberty of the press shall be inviolate; and all persons may freely speak,
write or publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right; and in
all civil or criminal actions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall
appear that the alleged libelous matter was published for justifiable ends, the accused party shall be
acquitted." (quoting KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 11)).
360. Coleman was decided decades before the incorporation of the First Amendment's
protections of speech and the press, only discussing that amendment in passing. Id. at 283; see supra
note 27. Other states based adoption of the minority view on state constitutional protections of
speech and press. E.g., Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 116 A.2d 440, 445 n.2 (Conn.
1955) (citing free speech provision (quoting CONN. CONST. art. I, § 5)).
361. Coleman, 98 P. at 287 (discussing State v. Balch, 2 P. 609 (Kan. 1884)); cf supra Part
III.B. 1 (discussing Weinstein v. Rhorer, 42 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1931) and the common interest in good
governance privilege).
362. Coleman, 98 P. at 291-92.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss1/16

52

Koffler: The Pre-Sullivan Common Law Web of Protection against Political D

2018]

THE PRE-SULLIVAN COMMON LAW WEB OF PROTECTION

recognized that honest mistakes happen in the course of good faith
efforts to report and/or comment on newsworthy topics including
politics.363 If a writer published a charge that he lacked an honest good
faith belief in its truth, he acted with reckless disregard for the
reputational rights of another. 3" This recklessness would prove
actual malice, defeating the defense of fair comment and justifying
punitive damages.
The minority view appears to have enabled newspapers to be more
detailed in their political endorsements. This is most clear when a
newspaper took a position against a candidate for public office. In
majority jurisdiction endorsements, opinions and non-defamatory
charges were routine; but in minority jurisdictions, a newspaper could
lay out the factual basis underlying its opinion with less fear of an
aggrieved candidate filing, much less winning, a libel suit.
For example, on May 31, 1912, The Sioux Falls Daily Press ran
"South Dakota Exchanges," republishing articles from other media
outlets covering the primary race for the Republican nomination for
365
Governor and including its own editorial "Compare the Two Men.5
The Daily Press's editorial used information from the republished
articles to help assess the qualifications, reputations, and fitness of the
candidates, Lieutenant Governor Frank Byrne and attorney George
Egan. 3" The paper endorsed Byrne while criticizing Egan. 367 The
editorial written in the waning days of the primary campaign contained
republished charges pertaining to Egan including allegations of rape and
lying about his wealth, closing with:
Never in the history of South Dakota, as state or territory, has there
ever been a man who has gone about the state vilifying citizens as
George W. Egan has done and is doing. He has abused people until he
has more enemies among men, women and children of South Dakota

363. See, e.g., Charles Parker Co., 116 A.2d at 444-45 ("Any political campaign is a process
of debate and appeal publicly conducted in a way to bring knowledge to the voters to assist them in
making a choice on election day. It is a time-honored American institution indispensable to our way
of life. Courts must be careful not to permit the law of libel and slander to encroach unwarrantably
upon the field of free public debate.").
364. Coleman, 98 P. at 292.
365. Egan v. Dotson, 155 N.W. 783, 785-86 (S.D. 1915); see Governor Frank M Byrne,
NAT'L
GOv.
ASS'N,
https://classic.nga.org/cms/home/govemors/past-govemors-

bios/page-south -dakota/col2-content/main-content-list/title byrne frank.default.htmil (last visited
Nov. 10, 2018) (noting that Frank Byrne took office as governor of South Dakota in 1913 as a
Republican).
366. Egan, 155 N.W. at 785-87.
367. Id. at 785-86.
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368
than any other man, a hundred times over.

Egan, representing himself, sued the publisher and editor of the Daily
Press for libel, praying for damages of $50,000.369
At trial, Egan: gave unsworn testimony in his opening statement;
disparaged two members of the Supreme Court of South Dakota;
suggested to the jury that he should club one of the defendants; and had
his associate counsel in closing remarks tell the jury that "[Egan] had
taken the depositions of two Catholic priests to be offered in evidence on
behalf

of

[Egan]; ...[but

defendants]

then

procured

an

order

suppressing the depositions."370 The jury awarded Egan $1000;
defendants appealed.37 1
The sprawling record of Egan v. Dotson required 795 printed pages
to contain the 478 assignments of error.3 72 The Supreme Court of South
Dakota reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial (the
proximate cause being newly discovered evidence that, if true, would
help the defendant's truth defense and indicate that Egan perjured
himself).3 73 Putting aside the errors that emanated from the trial's circuslike atmosphere, reversible errors were committed by the trial judge on
evidentiary rulings and in jury instructions.

368. Id. at 786 (quoting Compare the Two Men, SIOUX FALLS DAILYPRESS, May 31, 1912). It
also stated:
George W. Egan has been a resident of the state for five years. He came from Logan,
Iowa. The record is that two separate cases were brought against him charging him with
having committed rape. Disbarment proceedings were started against him shortly before
he left that place. He was disbarred by the Supreme Court of South Dakota. He went
before the court and asked to be reinstated. It was refused. He went again before the
court and asked to be reinstated, all this after he had gone about the state denouncing the
members of the court and writing matter in his paper denouncing them, and on this last
occasion apologized for what he had said and printed and begged to be forgiven, and
there acknowledged that he had been treated justly by the court and their charges against
him were true. He says he came to South Dakota with more than thirty thousand dollars.
The record shows that he paid $20.46 in taxes inIowa the year before he moved to South
Dakota. He says that he spent a fortune defending his character in Sioux Falls.
Id. (see quotation in text for remainder of published passage).
369. Id. at 785-86 (quoting articles republished by the defendant newspaper). Charges from
other articles republished in the editorial included: Faulkton Advocate, "George may be a good
show, but for Governor the people want a man of ability, sanity, and integrity, and not a vaudeville
performer"; Huronite, "He is willing to promise all things that he would be utterly unable to
deliver"; Bradley Globe, "A man must have a grudge against himself and every one else that would
for a moment consider this man's candidacy for the executive head of the state of South Dakota."
Id. at 785.
370. Id. at 790-91 (discussing "the misconduct of plaintiff as his own counsel in his argument
to the jury").
371. Id. at 785-86.
372. Id. at 786.
373. Id. at 792.
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South Dakota's Supreme Court noted that the State adopted the
minority view of fair comment in 1900, and so long as a charge against a
candidate for public office was made with "probable ground" and the
person making it "believes in [its] truth," the charge is privileged,
'
"regardless of the fact that the charge is a false statement of fact."374
The
trial judge had excluded the republished articles from evidence, a
reversible error as reliance on other papers' coverage of Egan and his
reputation was relevant to the claim of privilege as proof of reason to
believe the truth of the charges in the article and to rebut malice.3 75 The
court noted, "if a publication is not malicious, it is privileged under [the
'
The court added that the
minority] rule, whether true or false."376
candidacy because he was
plaintiff's
defendant's desire to defeat the
"unfit for the office" did not alone establish malice to overcome the
qualified privilege.3 77
In minority view jurisdictions, the ability of editorial writers to rely
on factual statements made about the candidate reported by other media
outlets or relayed by credible sources appears invaluable. In this respect,
the minority view's liberal interpretation appeared to create a common
interest (apart from having a vote in an election or property interest
impacted by the quality of a municipal government) in commenting on
newsworthy matters.3 78 The charge of Egan's unfitness was important,
but the weight of proof came from the factual predicate on which that
opinion was based. It cannot be proven whether the paper would have
published verbatim the same editorial passages about Egan if South
Dakota had been a majority view jurisdiction, but the potential for
liability and a larger damage award in a suit for libel would have
been greater.
d. How to Get Away with Murder (of a Political Candidacy)
Newspaper editorial endorsements were publications ripe for libel
suits. Some newspapers made an affirmative case for their endorsed
candidate, but rarely would publishing positive statements about one
candidate result in a libel suit filed by the non-endorsed candidate. Many
times, the endorsement of one candidate was a byproduct of pointing out
374. Id. at 787.
375. Id. at 787-88.
376. Id. at 787.
377. Id. at 788.
378. Just as The Topeka State Journalhad no vote in the election involving Coleman (although
the defendant's owner, publisher, and writers probably did), Weinstein had no vote in the election
where he called then-candidate Rhorer a drunk, whore-hopping grafter. See supra Part III.B.1
(discussing common interest privilege in good government).
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the faults of the other candidate. These anti-endorsements were the ripest
publications for libel suits as they usually contained negative and
possibly defamatory statements and were published in opposition to
candidates, some of whom were unfit for office and public life.379 Some
anti-endorsements escaped civil prosecution because they were deemed
not defamatory per se or per quod or because they stated pure opinion. 8 °
Opining that a candidate was unqualified or unfit for office was not
usually defamatory.3 8 This type of anti-endorsement would be safe in
majority and minority fair comment jurisdictions.3 82
If an anti-endorsement conveyed its predicate for why someone was
unqualified or unfit for office, it mattered which view of fair comment
applied in the jurisdiction. In a majority jurisdiction, a writer had to be
confident that any factual predicate was entirely accurate or not
defamatory. In a minority jurisdiction, the factual predicate needed to
have sufficient evidence that would allow a writer to prove that he had
an honest good faith belief that the charge was true.383
The opinion in Coleman cautioned newspapers that the majority
view courts were telling litigants and commentators: "You have full
liberty of free discussion, provided, however, that you say nothing that
counts.1 384 This statement applied to political endorsements. By chilling
the provision of a factual predicate for an opinion that a candidate was
unqualified or unfit for office, the weight of the opinion was less, as was
the public debate. 385 However, the ability to comment on and/or express
an opinion about political candidates under either view of fair comment
was a significant filament in the common law web constraining political
defamation suits.

379. See supra notes 368-69 and accompanying text (anti-endorsement of George Egan for
governor). For a scathing "endorsement" of a candidate, see P.J. O'Rourke, P.J. O'Rourke: I'm
Endorsing Hillary Clinton, the Devil We Know, DAILY BEAST (May 11, 2016, 1:00 AM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/pj-orourke-im-endorsing-hillary-cinton-the-devil-we-know ("[Did I
mention that s]he is the second-worst thing that could happen to America." (emphasis added)).
380. See, e.g., Walsh v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 157 S.W. 326, 327, 330 (Mo. 1913) (affirming
dismissal of suit by holding parts of endorsement non-defamatory and deeming parts as opinion).
381. See supra Part IH.A.2.b (discussing unfit and unqualified).
382. See, e.g., Knapp v. Post Printing & Publ'g Co., 144 P.2d 981, 983, 985 (Colo. 1943)
(holding not defamatory per se and privileged as fair comment the assessment that George J. Knapp
was "not qualified" for governor).
383. See, e.g., Egan v. Dotson, 155 N.W. 783, 787-88 (S.D. 1915).
384. Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281,291 (Kan. 1908).
385. Compare Egan, 155 N.W. at 785-86 (quoting Compare the Two Men, SIOUX FALLS
DAILY PRESS, May 31, 1912), with Walsh, 157 S.W. at 327-28 (quoting Connett for Circuit
Attorney, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 22, 1908); see also Noel, supra note 40, at 896-97 n. 10203 (identifying Missouri as majority view and South Dakota as minority view).
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3. Conclusion
The privilege of common interest and defense of fair comment were
critical strands of the common law web confining political defamation
suits, allowing defendants to fight off successfully pled complaints.
While jurisdictions were less uniform in the strength of their privileges
and defenses than in the trend of limiting what was defamatory and
narrowing what was a special damage; the qualified privileges did
prevent many political plaintiffs from cashing in on potentially
defamatory statements that may have been false. However, even if a
plaintiff stated a claim for defamation and defeated the defendant's
successful invocation of a qualified privilege by showing malice in fact
or a lack of an honest good faith belief in the truth of the charge (actual
malice), trial and appellate courts could still monitor and modify any
judgment awarded.
C. Modification of Damages:
"Don'tGet Comfortable" Courts "Make Money Moves

3 86

Trial and appellate judges had broad powers to review and modify
damage awards from 1870-1964. Remittitur was available in most cases
where damages were awarded.3 87 Strong reasons existed to remit
386. CARDI B, Bodak Yellow, on INVASION of PRIVACY (Atlantic Records 2018).
387. Consistent with the Seventh Amendment, federal courts had (and have) the power of
remittitur, although, unlike State courts, see infra note 388, they did not have the power of additur
as held by the Court in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935).
Dimick was a personal injury suit for damages sustained in a car accident, filed in federal
court under diversity jurisdiction. See 293 U.S. at 475. The jury awarded the plaintiff $500 in
damages. Id. The district judge denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial after being informed that
the defendant would pay the plaintiff $1500. Id. at 475-76. The plaintiff did not consent to the
increase in damages and appealed. Id. at 476. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed, holding that additur violated the Seventh Amendment. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 54 decision, affirmed the First Circuit. Id at 488. In dicta, the Court unanimously agreed that
remittitur was constitutional. Id. at 484. The majority relied on stare decisis giving particular weight
to Justice Story's 1822 opinion on circuit in Blunt v. Little. Id. at 482-85 (discussing Blunt v. Little,
3 F. Cas. 760, 761-62 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822), remitting damages in malicious prosecution suit)). The
Dimick holding, barring additur but allowing remittitur, applies in federal diversity suits because it
is a procedural rule under the Erie doctrine. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356
U.S. 525, 537-39 (1958).
The Dimick line between additur and remittitur is not universally accepted. See, e.g.,
Dimick, 293 U.S. at 491, 496-97 (Stone, J., dissenting) (arguing remittitur and addittur are
consistent with the Seventh Amendment); Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionalityof
Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 739-46 (2003) (arguing that the
choice to remit damages or face a new trial operates, in effect, as a denial of a jury trial on the issue
of damages in violation of the Seventh Amendment). See generally Joseph B. Kadane, Mr. Justice
Story Invents American Remittiturs: "The Very Limits of the Law," 3 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD.
313 (2014) (arguing that Justice Story's 1822 decision in Blunt was wrong as to remittitur's use in
pre-1791 British courts and misled subsequent American courts).
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damages in political defamation cases: damage awards were speculative;
and the parties to the suit, the substance of the alleged defamation,
and/or the context in which the allegedly defamatory statements were
made tended to invoke the passions and prejudices of factfmders. In
political defamation suits, trial or appellate courts would usually have
some legal ground to modify part or all of the damage award. 388 The
cases reviewed for, cited, and discussed in this Part provide good
evidence that remittitur became an important strand in the common law
web constraining political defamation in the twentieth century.
Remittitur was employed by judges, in part, as a tool of judicial
efficiency. Trial judges considered remittitur at the end of a trial when
presented with a verdict and damages awarded for the winning party,
coupled with a motion for a new trial by the losing party if not motions
by both parties. To avoid a new trial on all issues or the sole issue of
damages, a judge could deny the motion for a new trial conditioned upon
the consent of the winning party to a reduction in damages. If the
winning party declined to remit, the judge could grant a new trial; and
the winner would incur further legal fees and face the prospect of losing
the new trial. As remitting damages was a loss for the winning party,
many jurisdictions only required the consent of the party receiving the
abated damage award.38 9

388. The Seventh Amendment was not (and has never been) incorporated against the states.
See, e.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis. R.R- Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (holding that
"the 7th Amendment applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States and does not in any
manner whatever govern or regulate trials by jury in state courts or the standards which must be
applied concerning the same"). Thus, a State court could employ additur as well as remittitur;
however, my research gleans that additur had little usage in correcting inadequate damage awards
for defamation. Judges and other scholars have noted that employing additur in cases where
damages were not easily calculable was (and is) not the correct remedy. Comment, Correction of
Damage Verdicts by Remittitur and Additur, 44 YALE L.J. 318, 323-25 (1934). Rather, judges
would grant a motion for a new trial on the issue of damages. See, e.g., id. at 322 ("Where the
verdict is inadequate rather than excessive, the scope of judicial interference has been more limited.
The usual remedy is the setting aside of the verdict and the ordering of a new trial.") (emphasis
added)); see also Coats v. News Corp., 197 S.W.2d 958, 962 (Mo. 1946) ("In libel cases, as in other
tort actions, 'a verdict will be set aside as inadequate for the same reasons that will justify the
setting aside of a verdict for excessive damages.' However, the verdict of the jury will not be set
aside merely because of being greater or less than the court might deem proper, since 'there is no
fixed measure of damages applicable to actions for defamation."') (internal citations omitted));
Blackwell v. Landreth, 19 S.E. 791, 792 (Va. 1894) (reversing five dollar judgment for plaintiff in
slander suit, brought by woman alleged by the defendant to have been the mother of a bastard child
fathered by the defendant's political rival, on grounds that the award was "so obviously inadequate
and unjust as to call for the interference of an appellate court"). But see Kennedy v. Item Co., 34 So.
2d 886, 888, 896 (La. 1948) (awarding plaintiff $7500 on plaintiff's appeal from the trial court's
grant of defendant's motion to dismiss).
389. See, e.g., Henderson v. Dreyfus, 191 P. 442, 444 (N.M. 1919) (noting remittitur was filed
by the plaintiff).
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An unhappy party could appeal the denial of the motion for a new
trial. However, appellate review of denials of motions for a new trial was
limited; similarly, review of the application of remittitur was limited.
Narrow review in both instances was premised on the belief that the
trial judge was in the best position to judge the merits of the trial
he oversaw.3' 9
Professor Brad Snyder placed the timing of the extension of
remittitur to defamation suits at the turn of the twentieth century;
arguing that remitting damages was part of a larger response to the
growth of personal injury suits of all kinds.39 My research confirms that
the extension of remittitur occurred around 1900, as judges branched
remittitur out from contract cases to tort suits and finally to the
intentional tort of defamation.3 92 My research also suggests that
remittitur in defamation suits was not simply part of a broader
commitment to protect corporations from damage awards;3 93 rather,
remittitur was used in political defamation cases due to their innate
judges and
tendency to arouse passions and prejudices of juries and
3 94
press.
and
speech
of
freedoms
about
background concerns
Use of remittitur in political defamation cases was discussed at
length in a 1919 case of first impression for the Supreme Court of New
Mexico.3 95 On October 7, 1916, The Santa Fe New Mexican published
an article alleging that in 1906, Henry Dreyfus "tore down the American
flag and stamped and spat upon it and got off with it."'3 96 Dreyfus sued,
39 7
claiming that the article was libelous, seeking damages of $50,000.
The defendants pled truth and claimed that the story was common
knowledge among the community, as the Albuquerque Morning Journal
published a similar article in 1911 during the plaintiff's failed run
for sheriff.398

390. Johnson Publ'g Co. v. Davis, 124 So. 2d 441, 449 (Ala. 1960) ("[T]he favorable
presumption which attends the correctness of the verdict of the jury is strengthened when the
presiding judge refuses to grant a new trial.").
391. Brad Snyder, Protecting the Media from Excessive Damages: The Nineteenth-Century
Origins of Remittitur and its Modern Application in Food Lion, 24 VT. L. REV. 299, 302-23 (2000).

392. See id. at 307-11 (discussing the extension ofjudicial application ofremittitur).
393. See, e.g., id. at 313-19 (discussing the vision of some legal historians of remittitur as a
corporate tool with which to chip away at verdicts won by plaintiffs in personal injury suits).
394. Id. at 311-13.
395. Henderson v. Dreyfus, 191 P. 442, 445-49 (N.M. 1919). This was a case of first
impression for the newly formed State Supreme Court, though the territorial Supreme Court had
ruled on a similar issue prior to statehood.
396. Id. at 444.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 444, 449. At trial, Dreyfus, over objection, claimed sending a denial of these facts to
the publisher of the 1911 article. Id.at 453.
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After the jury returned a verdict for Dreyfus, awarding $35,000, the
defendants moved for a new trial.399 Considering the trial, the verdict,
the award, and the motion for a new trial, the trial judge ordered a
new trial unless Dreyfus consented to remit damages to $10,000.400
After Dreyfus filed a consent to remit the award by $25,000, the
defendants appealed.40 1
The main question before New Mexico's Supreme Court was
whether the trial court deprived the defendant of due process and trial by
jury by offering the plaintiff the option to remit damages in lieu of
granting the motion for a new trial.40 2 The court, adopting the majority
rule, held that "remittitur will not cure a verdict tainted by prejudice and
passion[;]" therefore, if the court found the "verdict was excessive by
reason of passion and prejudice[,]" it was their duty to grant the
motion for a new trial so as to grant a trial by a jury free of such passion
and prejudice.40 3
Though the plaintiff was no longer a public official nor candidate
for public office when the 1916 article was published, the case was
immersed in political passion. The story was first reported during the
plaintiff's 1911 campaign for political office;' testimony was provided
by political figures,40 5 and witnesses were asked on the stand about their
political views.40 6 The Supreme Court noted: "The case was tried by the
jury just a few days before the declaration of war by the United States
against Germany, and at a time when the patriotic impulses of the people
had been aroused, and increased love and devotion for the flag was
' 40 7
everywhere in evidence.
The court viewed the trial judge as being in a better position to
assess whether the jury's verdict was a product of passion and
prejudice.40 8 The most persuasive evidence to the court that the verdict
was not the product of passion and prejudice was that the trial judge
offered to remit damages in lieu of granting the defendant's motion for a
new trial.40 9 According to the logic of the court, had there been passion
399. Id. at 444.
400. Id.
401.

Id.

402. Id. at 444-45.
403. Id. at 445-46; cf Snyder, supra note 391, at 307-08 (discussing nineteenth century use of
remittitur generally). A minority ofjurisdictions allowed remittitur when the verdict was "the result
of passion and prejudice." Henderson, 191 P. at 445.
404. Henderson, 191 P. at 449,451-52.
405. Id. at 454 (noting the testimony of a former Governor of New Mexico).
406. Id. at 452-53.
407. Id at 449 (emphasis added).
408. Id.
409. Id.
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or prejudice the trial judge would have ordered a new trial and not
offered the compromise on damages.4 1 This logic enabled the court to
view the trial judge's actions as curing an excessive jury verdict, while
simultaneously arguing that not all excessive damage awards indicate
passion or prejudice. 4 11 Dreyfus's agreement to remit damages to
$10,000 also put the award in line with other libel judgments
affirmed on appeal, allowing the Supreme Court to more easily affirm
the judgment.412
In 1962, the Supreme Court of Minnesota decided Hammersten v.
Reiling, an appeal from a libel case in which the defendant had
published "approximately 1,600 to 2,000" pamphlets opposing the
plaintiffs candidacy for reelection as clerk of Roseville, Minnesota.4 13
Defendant's pamphlet accused the plaintiff of supporting "racketeers"
and accepting bribes to impact zoning ordinances while serving on the
village council (a felony under Minnesota law).414 The jury found for
the plaintiff, awarding $12,500 in general damages and $7500 in
4 15
punitive damages.
On appeal, the defendant argued inter alia that the general and
punitive damage awards were excessive, indicating passion and
prejudice.416 While the court did not rule that the awards were produced
by passion and prejudice, the court held the general damage award
excessive.417 The court ordered a new trial on the issue of general
410. Id.This logic evinces why appellate review of how trial courts decide motions for new
trials was and is limited. Cf Johnson Publ'g Co. v. Davis, 124 So. 2d 441, 450 (Ala. 1960) ('The
trial court in this case refused to grant a motion for a new trial based, among other grounds, on the
ground that the verdict was excessive. When the trial court refuses to grant a new trial because it
does not think the verdict to be excessive, the favorable presumption attending the verdict of the
jury is thereby strengthened.").
411. Henderson, 191 P. at 445.
412. See id.at 451 (discussing verdicts larger than $10,000 affirmed by appellate courts as not
excessive).
413. Hammersten v. Reiling, 115 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Minn. 1962).
414. Id.at 261-62, 264 & n.1 (noting that the statute criminalizing the conduct described in
defendant's pamphlet called for fines, jail time, and disqualification from holding public office in
the State). The court held that the pamphlet was libelous per se, but privileged as a communication
about a candidate for public office. Id.at 264. The burden thus shifted to the plaintiff to prove
malice, which was proved by the defendant's history of publishing negative pamphlets about the
plaintiff and allegedly calling the plaintiff a "son of a bitch." Id.at 264-65. The court also found that
the defendant made no effort to try to ascertain the truth of his charges. Id.at 265.
415. Id. at 261. The trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff could not recover for the
emoluments of office that he would have received had he been elected to office. Id. at 264.
416. Id.at 261. In closing remarks plaintiff's counsel remarked that defense counsel asked
questions that he hoped the jury would punish the defense for "not in any of the damages, but hold it
against him for it." Id.at 263.
417. Id.at 265-66 (reasoning that the $7500 punitive damage award was reasonable in light of
the defendant's conduct and his admitted net worth of $100,000).
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damages unless the plaintiff agreed to remit general damages from
$12,500 to $5000.418
Not all judicial modification of damage awards furthered the
interests of public debate or advanced a coherent formula for assessing
damages in political defamation cases. In 1948, in Kennedy v. Item Co.,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in a 2-1 decision, reversed a dismissal
ordered by the trial court, gratuitously critiqued the trial judge,4 1 9 and
remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to award the
plaintiff $75 00.420
The New Orleans Item published an editorial critical of attorney
Kemble Kennedy (then viewed as harboring political ambitions) who
was challenging the State Civil Service Act.4 2 1 The editorial charged that
Kennedy's suit was the product of either a "professional incompetent," a
"pettifogger," or one hoping to "'get a verdict' motivated by political
bias on the part of the judiciary. 4 22 Kennedy sued the newspaper for
libeling his professional skills as an attorney, seeking $30,000 in
damages for lost business, diminished personal and professional
reputation, and for "humiliation and mental suffering. 4 23 The trial court
dismissed the suit on the grounds that the publication was privileged24
4
as fair comment upon the acts of a "quasi-public person[;]
Kennedy appealed.
A majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court held the publication
was not privileged as fair comment because it stated as fact that
Kennedy was either "professionally incompetent, a pettifogger, one who
expected to get a verdict because of personal influence with the court
rather than by expounding sound legal considerations, or one who
brought such suits as devices of political bushwhackery[;]" the majority
found any of those options to be a false statement of fact about a private
individual devoid of any proof.4 25 Rather than remand the case for trial,
418. Id.at266.
419. Kennedy v. Item Co., 34 So. 2d 886, 892, 896 (La. 1948). The majority opinion cited an
article written by the trial judge in 1916 critical of courts failing to distinguish between the defense
of fair comment and a privileged communication. Id. at 892. This appeared to criticize the trial
judge for applying what he thought was the applicable case law of Louisiana rather than what the
trial judge wrote approvingly of in an academic pursuit three decades prior.
420. Id. at 896.
421. Id. at 888-89.
422. Id.at 888.
423. Id. at 889 (noting that the plaintiff prayed for $10,000 in injury to personal and
professional reputation, $5000 for humiliation and mental suffering, and $15,000 for loss of
potential legal clients and loss of public confidence).
424. Id. at 892; id.at 896 (Hamiter, J., dissenting).
425. Id. at 892-94.
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the majority reversed the trial court, assessed damages, and entered

426
judgment for the plaintiff.

After taking the remarkable step of reversing a dismissal to award a
judgment for the plaintiff, neither of the two justices in the majority
agreed as to the amount of the plaintiffs damage award.42 7 Justice
Fournet, writing for the majority, thought $7500 seemed correct "in light
of the awards that have heretofore been given" in the State.428 Justice
Bond, concurring, would have awarded $25,000.429 Neither the majority
nor the concurring opinion stated on what proof the damage award lie
nor whether the award was for general and/or punitive damages.4 3 °
The decisions in Henderson and Hammersten, showed that trial and
appellate courts possessed the power to remit damages in defamation
cases. 43 1 This was an important judicial failsafe and an integral part of
the common law web. However, Kennedy showed the potential peril of
judicial power to modify damages, with the majority of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana not remanding a case for trial on the issue of
damages, but settling on a number from the ether and ordering the trial
court to enforce that award.432 These decisions show that vast judicial
powers to alter damage awards in political defamation cases were
exercised prior to 1964.
D. Conclusion: The Common Law Web
The common law web delineated in this Part provided a great deal
426. Id. at 896.
427. See id.; id (Bond, J., concurring).
428. Id.at 896.
429. Id. at 896 ("Bond, J., concurs, but believes the award should be in the amount of
$25,000."). Justice Hamiter would have affirmed the trial court's dismissal awarding the plaintiff
nothing. Id. (Hamiter, J., dissenting).
430. See id.
431. For other instances of remitting damage awards in defamation cases, see, for example,
Johnson Publ'g Co. v. Davis, 124 So. 2d 441, 461 (Ala. 1960) (reversing libel judgment unless
plaintiff agreed to remit damage from $67,500 to $45,000 within thirty days); Taylor v. Hungerford,
217 N.W. 83, 85 (Iowa 1927) (affirming trial court's remittance of a libel award from $3000 to
$1000); Smith v. Lyons, 77 So. 896, 904 (La. 1918) (reducing damage award on rehearing in
political libel case from $2500 to $500); Cook v. Globe Printing Co., 127 S.W. 332, 341, 356 (Mo.
1910) (reversing libel judgment unless plaintiff remitted damages from $150,000 to $50,000 within
twenty days); see also Johnson v. Gerasimos, 225 N.W. 636, 636, 638 (Mich. 1929) (remitting
damages in cause of action for slander at trial court level by $1000 as excessive; Michigan Supreme
Court conditionally affirming verdict for malicious prosecution contingent on the discontinuance of
the slander claims); Steinbuchel v. Wright, 23 P. 560, 560 (Kan. 1890) (reversing and remanding for
new trial a slander judgment for $4000 where the trial judge had already remitted damages by
$3500 due to passion and prejudice).
432. SeeKennedy, 34 So. 2d at 896.
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of protection for political speech through 1964, evincing an anti-political
plaintiff trend in defamation suits. Courts nationwide limited what was
defamatory and narrowed what would be accepted as proof of special
damages. If a plaintiff sufficiently pled a cause of action for defamation,
the defendant could plead the qualified privilege of common interest or
fair comment; thus, suspending the legal presumption of malice, and
shifting the burden to the plaintiff to prove ill-will or actual malice.
Ultimately, trial and appellate courts could remit any damages awarded
where the amount of the verdict was excessive and/or indicated passion
or prejudice. Some form of these three strands of the common law web
existed in jurisdictions nationwide. Webs existed in the common law of
the state courts of the Deep South that would decide weaponized libel
.suits in the 1960s. As Part IV details, the state courts of Alabama
disregarded the common law web and its own precedents, facilitating
political plaintiffs to civilly prosecute weaponized libel suits
against reporters and press outlets covering and activists in the Civil
Rights Movement.4 33
IV.

4 34

: DISARMING POLITICAL PLAINTIFFS IN
WEAPONIZED LIBEL SUITS

EXPELLIARMUS!

In the early 1960s, The New York Times and other press outlets
found their corporate persons and employees hauled before all-white
juries in courts across the South. 35 Members of the national press faced
numerous massive libel suits filed by public officials4 36 and public

433. See infra PartIV.
434. Expelliarmus, POTTERMORE, https://www.pottermore.corn/explore-the-story/disarmingcharm (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) ("[Defined as:] A handy (even life-saving) spell for removing an
object from an enemy's grasp.").
435. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 51 (Ala. 1962) (discussing N.Y
Times Co. v. Conner and finding the Fifth Circuit's construction of Alabama law on jurisdiction and
venue "erroneous" and the "opinion faulty" (citing 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1961)), rev'd, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). The federal litigation involving Harrison Salisbury's 1960 article for The New York
Times would linger until 1966. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 568 (5th Cir. 1966)
("This case now makes its third appearance before this Court. It originated as a libel action against
The New York Times and Mr. Harrison Salisbury, a staff member of The Times, arising out of the
publication of Salisbury's article on Alabama racial conditions in the April 12, 1960, issue of The
Times."). As of 1964, at least $288 million in libel suits had been filed by southern public officials
from three states. ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 29, at 357.
436. Connor, 365 F.2d at 568 (filing by Birmingham City Commissioner); Sullivan, 144 So. 2d
at 28-29 (filing by Montgomery City Commissioner).
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men,43 7 for allegedly defamatory articles,43 8 television reports,439 and a

paid advertisement."4
The primary purpose of these suits was not to compensate plaintiffs
for damage to their political, professional, or personal reputationformer U.S. Senator from Alabama and then-Justice Hugo Black would
later note, such plaintiffs' reputations were likely enhanced by fights
with the national press." 1 Rather, these suits were used as weapons by
which to attempt to shutter national press outlets and chill, if not
eliminate, coverage of the race beat in the Deep South. To those ends,
weaponized libel suits were effective; for example, The New York Times,
fearful of its financial ability to withstand scores of six-figure libel suits,
curtailed its own coverage of Alabama in the early 1960s. 442
Weaponized libel suits posed a mortal threat to a national press

437. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671, 672, 674-75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)
(affirming $500,000 compensatory damage award in a libel suit brought by former General Edwin
Walker for his role in stoking deadly riots at Ole Miss (the University of Mississippi) over
integration), rev'd, Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 140-42, 155 (1967) (holding that the
actual malice standard applies to public men and public figures). The trial judge in Ft. Worth, Texas
stated that in awarding Walker $800,000: 'The jury has reflected the attitude of the entire country
with respect to false and one-sided reporting of the news." ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 29,
at 357-58; cf sources cited supra note 187 (discussing modem developments regarding the phrase
"fake news"); Gold, supra note 6 (discussing candidate Donald Trump's promise/threat at a
campaign rally to loosen up libel laws to be able to sue the press and win a lot of money).
438. Connor, 365 F.2d at 568 (New York Times article); Walker, 393 S.W.2d at 672
(AssociatedPress article).
439. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 295 (Black, J., concurring) (noting $1,700,000 sought from CBS
in five libel suits); see also ROBERTS & KLBANOFF, supra note 29, at 251 (noting $1,500,000
sought in libel suits against CBS and Howard K. Smith for the television broadcast Who Speaks for
Birmingham?).
440. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256 (alleging libel in Heed Their Rising Voices advertisement).
441. Id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring) ("Viewed realistically, this record lends support to an
inference that instead of being damaged Commissioner Sullivan's political, social, and financial
prestige has likely been enhanced by the Times' publication."). As an ancillary benefit, weaponized
libel plaintiffs would be content to accept any financial gains that came from monetary judgements
for non-existent harms or possible boosts to their reputations, while the weaponized plaintiff's bar
would enjoy the attorney's fees.
442. The Times would choose not to cover many newsworthy events in Alabama-such as legs
of Freedom Rides that passed through the State and the election of George Wallace as governor in
1963-out of fear that its reporter Claude Sitton would be personally served in Alabama. ROBERTS
& KLEBANOFF, supra note 29, at 234-35, 242-43, 301-02; see N.Y. Times Co. v. Conner, 291 F.2d
492, 493-94 (5th Cir. 1961) (assuming personal jurisdiction over reporters served in Alabama would
exist in Alabama state court); cf N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 29 (Ala. 1962)
(discussing the work of Claude Sitton to support a finding that The Times had a presence in
Alabama).
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corps 443 and posed many legal questions for federal courts. As we have
seen, federal courts played only a modest role in forming American
common laws of defamation. 4 " Once the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari in New York Times v. Sullivan, the question became not simply
whether the Court would disarm southern courts and plaintiffs of
5
weaponized libel suits, but how and on what constitutional basis?"
A narrow procedural ruling on jurisdiction was unlikely to help
current or potential political libel defendants facing weaponized libel
suits. For example, holding that Alabama lacked personal jurisdiction
over The New York Times Co.," 6 would not have helped Times
reporters, like Claude Sitton, personally served within Alabama's
borders." 7 With personal jurisdiction over a corporation of limited use to
8
potential defendants, including out-of-state corporations," a substantive
443. See ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 29, at 235 ("But [Claude Sitton's] job was to
cover the South, and now it was the South minus Alabama.").
444. See supra Part 11.
445. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264-65. By 1964, the Court had heard no shortage of cases on
desegregation, civil rights, and Alabama's efforts to hinder the organization and mobilization of
political and social justice groups involved in the civil rights movement. See, e.g., Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 536-37, 540, 583-84, 587 (1964) (argued November 13, 1963) (Alabama
legislative reapportionment cases) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause demanded a "one
person, one vote" principle when drawing state legislative districts); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 451-54, 466-67 (1958) (holding that Alabama could not compel the Alabama NAACP to
hand over its membership list to the State under the free association clause incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 711, 717 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (holding
Alabama state statutes and Montgomery city ordinances segregating buses unconstitutional), aff'd,
352 U.S. 903 (1956); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4, 19-20 (1958) (reordering racial
desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 493-95 (1954) ("We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.").
446. This argument, which The New York Times placed great stock in, was dispensed with in a
footnote. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264 n.4 (fimding against The Times on the jurisdictional question in
dicta based on the failure to enter a special rather than a general appearance to contest personal
jurisdiction in state court); see also Sullivan, 144 So. 2d at 36 ("The Times, by questioning the
jurisdiction of the lower court over the subject matter of this suit, made a general appearance, and
thereby submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the lower court.").
447. It would have been possible for Bull Connor to schedule a cause for a race riot in
Birmingham to draw the press out and then miraculously have persons at the scene ready to serve
reporters personally. Cf ROBERTS & KLiBANOFF, supra note 29, at 246-49 (detailing how Connor
gave the Klan a fifteen-minute head start, to do what they had to do when a Freedom Ride bus
reached a specific Birmingham bus terminal, before the police would respond).
448. Such a ruling might have helped press defendants without minimal contacts in Alabama,
such as out-of-state newspapers printing syndicated columns or wire reports and opinion journalists
opining on Alabama who were not to be found in the state. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Conner, 291 F.2d
492, 493-95 (5th Cir. 1961); see also supra Part ffl.A.2.c (discussing Syndicate cases). It is unclear
if a holding in Sullivan altering the constitutional framework of personal jurisdiction over a
corporation would have deterred southern state courts from disregarding or evading such a ruling.
Judge Jones asserted jurisdiction over The New York Times by disregarding the instructions on
pleading that Jones wrote in his own book on Alabama civil procedure. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 24-
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ruling was defensible.
The broad substantive rulings of Sullivan are further supported by
two factors. First, explored in Subpart A, Alabama courts disregarded
their own common law precedents. 449 Second, explored in Subpart B, the
Warren Court followed its own precedent of looking to state
constitutional, common, and statutory laws to inform the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ° Subpart C concludes that
Sullivan was justifiable.4 51
45 2
A. Not-So-Sweet Home Alabama

The problem in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was not that the
common law of defamation in Alabama was an outlier among states.
While restrictive, Alabama was in the mainstream on libel laws in the
1960s. 453 The problem was not that Alabama adhered to the majority
view of fair comment. A plurality (if not a majority) of states did.454 The
problem with Alabama's courts, particularly in Sullivan, was that they
strayed from Alabama precedent.
Alabama in 1963, had plaintiff-friendly laws on libel. In 1914, the
Alabama Supreme Court adopted the majority view of fair comment,
which did not protect misstatements of fact when making comment.45 5 In
1957, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed that though a state statute
required a libel to be both false and defamatory, if a trial judge ruled a
publication libelous per se, falsity and malice would be presumed.4 56 If
not ruled libelous per se, plaintiffs could proceed on a libel per quod
26.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
LYNYRD SKYNYRD, Sweet Home Alabama, on SECOND HELPING (MCA Records 1974).
In Respondent's brief in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, counsel placed outsized reliance

on a large libel verdict awarded in a case from the Supreme Court of New York that was reversed
for being grossly excessive by the Appellate Division two months after Respondent's brief was
submitted and one month prior to oral argument of Sullivan in the U.S. Supreme Court. Brief for
Respondent at 41, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39) (citing Faulk v.
Aware, Inc., 231 N.Y.S.2d 270, 281 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1962)), rev'd, 244 N.Y.S.2d 259, 266-67 (App.

Div. 1st Dep't. 1963) (reversing judgment unless plaintiff consented to remitting damages from
$2,250,000 to $450,000). This was in line with the in-State precedents that Alabama had been
ignoring.
454. See Noel, supra note 40, at 896-97 & nn.102-06 (identifying majority and minority view
jurisdictions as of 1949).
455. Starks v. Comer, 67 So. 440, 441-42 (Ala. 1914).
456. McGraw v. Thomason, 93 So. 2d 741, 742 (Ala. 1957). Whether "malice" justifying
punitive damages in libel suits was malice in-fact, or legally presumed, it was a widely discussed
problem. See, e.g., Cooper v. Romney, 141 P. 289, 291 (Mont. 1914) (criticizing presumptions of
malice and falsity).
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action without presumed falsity and malice.4 57
The courts of Alabama also had a precedent of patrolling damage
awards in libel cases. In Tidmore v. Mills, Alabama's Court of Appeals
affirmed a $900 verdict in a libel case where the defendant placed a
458
placard for public view comparing the plaintiff to Adolf Hitler. The
court justified the award by comparing $900 to other libel awards
affirmed by appellate courts.459
In 1960, the Supreme Court of Alabama decided Johnson
Publishing Co. v. Davis.46 0 This appeal stemmed from an article
published in Jet that included charges that Edward Davis was reported to
have assaulted Reverend Ralph Abernathy with a hatchet and a pistol,
and that Davis, a teacher, resigned from a prior teaching position due to
46
charges that he had sexual relations with students. ' Davis sued for
463
libel.46 2 Judge Walter Jones ruled the publication libelous per se. The
jury found for the plaintiff and awarded $67,500. 46
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court held: "Because damages
are presumed from the circulation of a publication which is libelous per
se, it is not necessary that there be any correlation between the actual
and punitive damages[,]" and that the scope of circulation of a libelous
per se publication is "proper" for the jury to consider when ascertaining
malice and assessing damages.4 65 The court noted: "The matter of
damages must be left to the discretion of the jury, whose judgment
ordinarily should not be interfered with unless the amount is so

457. See White v. Birmingham Post Co., 172 So. 649, 652 (Ala. 1937) ("The published words
may be actionable in themselves, or per se; or they may be actionable only on allegation and proof
of special damage or per quod .... Words libelous per se import damage, while words actionable
only per quod are those whose injurious effect must be established by allegation and proof.").
458. Tidmore v. Mills, 32 So. 2d 769, 772, 778-82 (Ala. Ct. App. 1947).
459. Id. at 781-82 (citing larger awards affirmed by appellate courts in Alabama, Illinois, New
York, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
460. 124 So. 2d 441 (Ala. 1960). This case may have been one of weaponized libel, though the
plaintiff was black. Id. at 445. The defendant was the holding corporation of a Negro Press outlet.
Id. at 446-47. This case can be viewed as the onset of a trend culminating with Sullivan in that
jurisdiction was extended over a foreign corporation, removal was not allowed, and damages were
large; yet the Alabama Supreme Court applied its own precedent in this case when remitting
damages. See id. at 454, 456, 461.
461. Id. at 444. Davis was charged with and acquitted of assaulting Abernathy with a pistol and
a hatchet. Id.at 446. Davis was perceived by many in the black community as being used by the
white community to try to discredit leaders of the civil rights movement. Id Abernathy was a
lieutenant of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and would go on to be the New York Times's named codefendant in Sullivan. Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
462. Davis, 124 So. 2d at 445.
463. Id.at441.
464. Id.at 445.
465. Id.at 450.
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excessive as to show passion or prejudice, or other improper motive. ' 466
The court justified a large award because Jet was a national
magazine, with 1500 copies of the edition at issue sold in the
Montgomery area.467 However, the court viewed the $67,500 award as
excessive because "facts 'tending but failing to prove the truth' of the
libel's charge" existed as to the alleged assault. 468 The court affirmed the
judgment for the plaintiff contingent upon Davis's agreement to remit
the award by one-third from $67,500 to $45,000.469
At issue in Sullivan v. New York Times Co. was a $4800 paid
advertisement in The New York Times placed by the "Committee to
Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South"
entitled Heed Their Rising Voices. 470 The ad never mentioned a "Mr.
Sullivan" nor the City Commissioners of Montgomery; the ad did name
the "police," "southern violators of the Constitution," and made sloppy
use of the word "they. "471
Ray Jenkins of the Montgomery Advertiser wrote an article
detailing the ad; he noted that the solicitation for donations to Dr. King's
legal defense fund was signed by prominent liberals and contained
factual errors.4 72 After Jenkins' story ran, Sullivan demanded a retraction
from The Times.473 In response, The Times wrote to Sullivan asking what
in the ad Sullivan thought referred to him. 474 Sullivan replied not by
answering The Times's letter, but by suing for $500,000; alleging that by
publishing the ad, The Times falsely and maliciously damaged his
reputation as a city commissioner and held him up to ridicule and

466. Id.
467. Id. at 449 (noting that 10,500 copies were sold statewide).
468. Id. at 453 (quoting Crane v. N.Y. World Telegram Corp., 126 N.E.2d 753, 757 (N.Y.
1955)).
469. Compare id. at 461 ("We conclude that the ground of the motion for new trial charging
excessiveness of the verdict was well taken. Accordingly a judgment will be entered here that unless
the appellee files with the clerk of this court a remittitur within thirty days reducing the judgment to
$45,000, the judgment of the trial court will stand reversed. If such remittitur is duly filed the
judgment for $45,000 with interest from the date of the judgment in the circuit court will stand
affirmed."), with Hammersten v. Reiling, 115 N.W.2d 259, 266 (Minn. 1962) ("Accordingly, a new
trial on the issue of general damages must be ordered, unless within 10 days after the filing of this
opinion plaintiff shall file in supreme court a written consent to a reduction of the total verdict to the
sum of $12,500. In the event of compliance with this condition, the order appealed from shall be
and is affirmed.").
470. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 37, 46,48 (Ala. 1962).
471. See Advertisement, "Heed Their Rising Voices, "N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 29, 1960, at 25.
472. ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 29, at 229-32 (detailing how Ray Jenkins came to
write his article). Grover Hall, editor of the Montgomery Advertiser, testified for Sullivan. See
Sullivan, 144 So. 2d at 47.
473. ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 29, at 230.
474. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d at 46.
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contempt in Montgomery, Alabama.4 75
Judge Jones could have read the ad not to be libelous per se, thus
476

requiring Sullivan to plead special damages, innuendo, and/or falsity.
However, Jones, who opened the trial by praising "white man's
justice[,]" ruled the ad libelous per se.477 Jones' oral jury charge

instructed that because the article was libelous per se, if the ad was
4 78
These
"aimed at the plaintiff," punitive damages may be awarded.

rulings set in motion the legal presumptions that carried the jury to its
$500,000 damage award.479

The Supreme Court of Alabama, did not try to wrestle with the size
of the $500,000 award,48 0 other than to suggest that the U.S. Dollar was

not worth what it used to be.48 1 Instead, the court justified the theories
behind presumed and punitive damages in libel cases, rather than the
48 2
The court stressed The
application of those theories to Sullivan.
Times's malice in failing to retract the ad and failing to fact check
the ad, and strongly implied that having a wide circulation proved
excessive publication.48 3

These points did not address whether the $500,000 award was
excessive. The court had two routes of Alabamian precedent to follow to

scrutinize the damage award. First, compare amounts of libel awards

affirmed on appeal with the award in Sullivan.48 4 Second, apply

the rule that evidence tending to prove truth of the charge mitigates

475. Id. at 28, 37 (discussing plaintiff's complaint).
476. One example of a libelous per se publication under the decisions of the Alabama Supreme
Court is to be found in White v. Birmingham Post Co., 172 So. 649, 650-52 (Ala. 1937). That case
involved an article "Arabian Sheik asks Friend Here to Buy him an American Girl" alleging that
Sheik Fareed Iman asked his friend, Lytle White, to find and purchase a "chief-wife" for his harem
in Jerusalem. Id.at 650. The court, reversed a demurral for the defendant granted in the trial court,
found the article libelous per se and reversed and remanded for trial. Id. at 652-53 ("The very idea
of a harem is repulsive to our American conception of morality and virtue. The purchase of a girl
from her parents here in America, to be carried to some distant country, to complete an Arab's
harem of four wives is abhorrent to our American institutions and our conceptions of morality.").
477. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 26.
478. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d at 43.
479. Id.at 43-44. The part of the jury charge regarding colloquium using the phrase "aimed at
the plaintiff' was excepted to, but the Alabama Supreme Court found it inconsequential in full
context of the instructions on appeal. Id.
480. See id. at 50.
481. Id. at 51 ("It is common knowledge that as of today the dollar is worth only 50 cents or
less of its former value.").
482. Id. at 49-50.
483. Id. at 50-51. Malice was found in the lack of a retraction for Sullivan, in part because
Alabama's Governor asked for and received a retraction and because The Times ad department did
not fact check the ad against information housed in The Times's archive. Id.
484. Id.at49-51.
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punitive damages.485
In Tidmore, the Alabama Court of Appeals compared prior libel
awards affirmed by appellate courts to the award in the case on
appeal.486 Had the Alabama Supreme Court engaged in a similar inquiry
in Sullivan, the court would have conceded that the largest libel award in
Alabama history was out of line with prior libel awards affirmed by that
court. Most relevant would have been Davis decided two years prior to
Sullivan. In Davis, the court conditionally affirmed a remitted damage
award of $45,000 where the circulation of that publication within
Alabama was much greater than the edition of The Times at issue in
Sullivan which led to a $500,000 award.487 Comparing the size of the
awards in Sullivan and Davis should have led the court to view the
Sullivan award with more skepticism.
In Davis, the Supreme Court of Alabama remitted damages because
evidence tended to prove the truth of the charge that Davis, at least in the
colloquial sense, assaulted Reverend Abernathy.4 88 While the Sullivan
court stated that no such truth existed in the ad that would allow for a
similar application of remittitur, this was an assertion separated from the
analysis of the misstatements in the ad.489 Some facts in the ad tended to
prove truth, 4 ° other misstatements of fact were clearly wrong but not
defamatory, 491 and to the extent that misstatements of fact accompanied
violent and possibly defamatory charges, such as the bombing of Dr.
King's home, it was unclear how those charges could have been "of and
concerning" Sullivan.4 92
The problem in Sullivan was that Alabama courts disregarded or
misapplied Alabama common law precedents to allow plaintiffs to swing

485. See Johnson Publ'g Co. v. Davis, 124 So. 2d 441,453 (Ala. 1960).
486. Tidmore v. Mills, 32 So. 2d 769, 780-82 (Ala. Ct. App. 1947).
487. Compare Davis, 124 So. 2d at 449, 461 (noting that 10,500 copies of the issue of Jet with
the libelous article were sold statewide), with N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 260 n.3
(1964) (noting that 394 copies of The New York Times containing Heed Their Rising Voices were
circulated in Alabama).
488. Davis, 124 So. 2dat453.
489. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d. at 51 (inferring bad faith from testimony from a Times employee that
the ad was substantially true stating, "In the face of this cavalier ignoring of the falsity of the
advertisement, the jury could not have but been impressed with the bad faith of The Times, and its
maliciousness inferable therefrom").
490. The police did not "ring" the campus but were "near the campus in large numbers[,]" and
Dr. King was arrested only twice by the Montgomery police. Id. at 47 (quoting report for The New
York Times prepared by Claude Sitton).
491. The error that protesters sang "My Country Tis of Thee" instead of the National Anthem
was harmless. See id. at 37, 47.
492. Id. at 37, 43, 47-48. It is on the charge of bombing Dr. King's home that the ad made
messy use of "they."
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a nightstick at the national press.493 Though the Alabama Supreme Court
could have justified some largish verdict in Sullivan based on the wide
circulation of The Times, the court did not engage in whether the award
was in line with other libel awards affirmed on appeal, nor whether
evidence of truth should mitigate damages.494
Alabama's law of libel was plaintiff-friendly, perhaps primed to be
weaponized, yet Alabama's courts could have disarmed weaponized
libel plaintiffs. The failure to at least neutralize plaintiffs, like Sullivan,
justified the U.S. Supreme Court disarming those plaintiffs.495
B. The Failing(Up) New York Times v. Sullivan
When the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether and how under
496
the U.S. Constitution to disarm plaintiffs filing weaponized libel suits,
the Court was on firm ground looking to state constitutional and
common law precedents to inform the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 497 The Court routinely weighed the precedents

493. See id.at 49-52.
494. See id.at 49-51.
495. The U.S. Supreme Court crafting a common law opinion on a state tort claim with a
constitutional dimension was as unusual as the Louisiana Supreme Court reversing a judgment for
the defendant and ordering a $7500 award for the plaintiff in a suit for libel. Compare Kennedy v.
Item Co., 34 So. 2d 886, 896 (La. 1948), with sources cited supra note 431 (citing cases employing
remittitur).
496. Counsel for The Times excepted to the suit and verdict upon the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See Sullivan, 144 So. 2d at 40 (dismissing constitutional
objections as "without merit").
497. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 & n.30 (1964) ("Since the Fourteenth
Amendment requires recognition of the conditional privilege for honest misstatements of
fact .. "). The Court had a long practice of citing to state law to inform its reading of the U.S.
Constitution. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337-38, 344-45 (1963) (holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment demands provision of counsel for indigents in state criminal cases),
overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 464-65 (1942) (holding that a study of state laws and
practices did not require states to provide assistance of counsel to indigent criminal defendants);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-53 (1961) (noting a trend toward states adopting versions of the
exclusionary rule from 1949 through 1961 when incorporating said rule), overruling Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1949) (holding that the existence of state alternatives did not require
the incorporation of the exclusionary rule into the Fourteenth Amendment). The Court has
continued to cite state laws and choose between majority and minority views on constitutional
questions since 1964. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-65, 568 (2005) (discussing
the existence of a "national consensus" when holding that "[a] majority of States have rejected the
imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is required by
the Eighth Amendment"); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570-71, 578 (2003) (noting that only a
minority of states adopted or enforced laws banning consensual same-sex sodomy while holding
those laws unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of "the sodomy laws of some 25 States");
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6, 12 (1967) (invalidating anti-miscegenation laws in sixteen states).
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and practices of one group of states against those of another.4 98 Usually,

the Court adopted a majority rule as a national standard, but not always.
The Warren Court decided at least two cases in the three years preceding
Sullivan relying, in part, on state constitutional and legal practices to

inform the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 99
In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court incorporated the Exclusionary
Rule as "an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments[,] '5" 0 though only a plurality of states adhered to it. 01 In
1949, in Wolf v. Colorado, the Court declined to incorporate the
Exclusionary Rule due, in part, to the wide variety of rules that the states
developed that dealt with illegally obtained evidence in criminal
prosecutions. 2 Mapp noted a national trend of states adopting the
Exclusionary Rule, and the Court hastened that trend by incorporating
the rule, thus binding all states to one way of dealing with illegally
obtained evidence--exclude it.503
The ruling in Sullivan is akin to the ruling in Mapp in that states
had many options for dealing with political defamation suits other than
adopting the minority view of fair comment.5 0 4 That each jurisdiction
designed its own civil defamation framework balancing protection for
political speech against an individual's reputation is well-documented.5 5
That the Court in Sullivan chose to incorporate into the Fourteenth

Amendment a particular framework was defensible under Mapp and
generally as a matter of common law constitutional practice.5 6

498. One factor in granting certiorari is whether a conflict exists among federal "courts of'
" SUP. CT. R.
appeals" and/or "state court[s] of last resort" on "an important federal question ....
10.
499. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 ("Florida, supported by two other States, has asked that Betts
v. Brady be left intact. Twenty-Two States, as friends of the Court, argue that Betts was 'an
anachronism when handed down' and that it should now be overruled."); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651
("While in 1949, prior to the Wolf case, almost two-thirds of the States were opposed to the use of
the exclusionary rule, now, despite the Wo/fcase, more than half of those since passing upon it, by
their own legislative or judicial decision, have wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks
rule." (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, app. at 224-32 tbls.1 & 2 (1960) (charting the
admissibility of illegally seized evidence in state courts and the representative cases in each state))).
500. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657.
501. See Elkins, 364 U.S. app. at 225 tbl.1 (reporting that as of 1960, twenty-six states
excluded illegally seized evidence).
502. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-32 (discussing the "contrariety of views of the States").
503. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 653, 658-60.
504. See supra Part III (describing state courts limiting what was defamatory and what could
be claimed as special damage, applying the common interest privilege, and patrolling damage
awards in defamation cases).
505. See supra Parts U-11; see, e.g., Noel, supra note 40, at 896-97 & nn.102-06 (discussing
fair comment variations among states).
506. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657-60.
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C. Actual Malice in Wonderland50 7
In Sullivan, the Court adopted the minority view of fair comment
and imposed the actual malice standard as a constitutional predicate for
plaintiffs to prove prior to the imposition of damages in defamation suits
filed by public officers regarding their official acts.5" 8 The Court then
applied that standard to the facts of Sullivan," 9 holding that the evidence
presented did not establish that The Times's ad department published
Heed Their Rising Voices with knowledge of or with reckless disregard
5 10
as to its falsity and that the ad was not "of and concerning" Sullivan.
By incorporating a variant of existing state constitutionally backed
common law protections into the Fourteenth Amendment,5 11 the Court
disarmed weaponized political libel plaintiffs, chilled political libel suits
filed by public officials, and gave for posterity (or the life of Sullivan)
federal limitations on political defamation suits. 12
Soon after the Court's decision in Sullivan, it became clear that
U.S. laws of defamation were substantially changed and changing. All
state and federal courts were bound to follow the constitutional rules laid
down by Sullivan and its progeny. This new form of the actual malice
standard would change how courts decided political defamation cases
and come to influence what the national and local press would print. The
(ongoing) transition into the Sullivan era has taken decades and
scores of U.S. Supreme Court cases; while not universally acclaimed,5 13
the actual malice standard has taken root as a fundamental tenet of
5 14
constitutional law and American discourse.
507. Cf TAYLOR SWIFT, Wonderland, on 1989 D.LX. (Big Machine Records 2015) ("We
found wonderland; You and I got lost in it; ... And in the end in wonderland we both went mad.").
508. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) ("The constitutional guarantees
require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not."); see also id at 292 n.30 ("Since the Fourteenth Amendment requires
recognition of the conditional privilege for honest misstatements of fact .... ").
509. Id. at 284-92 (applying the facts of Sullivan to the adopted framework in the opinion in
"considerations of effective judicial administration").
510. Id.at287-88.
511. See, e.g., Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 116 A.2d 440, 445 n.2 (Conn.
1955) (quoting CONN. CONST. art. I, § 5); Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 283 (Kan. 1908)
(quoting KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 11).
512. See infra notes 521-22 and accompanying text. If Sullivan were overruled, federal courts
could continue reviewing punitive damage awards in weaponized libel cases. See BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562, 585-86 (1996) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause bars states from imposing excessive punitive damages, though declining to adopt a
bright-line rule).
513. Seesupranote5.
514. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 270-72 (1971) (holding actual malice
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5 15
V. CONCLUSION: DELICATE

Reputations are delicate. A person who has a special concern with
maintaining a good reputation, might want to (but should not) refrain
from volunteering as tribute in the political Hunger Games. The rough
and tumble of politics and public life can diminish the glow of the
brightest of halos. This is less about the failings of U.S. defamation laws
than it is the difficulty for most people (myself included) to be charitable
with words, open with minds and hearts, and kind in acts no matter the
context or circumstances. 1 6
Lawyers involved in political defamation suits would do well to
revive the overshadowed arguments and precedents forming the
common law web rather than placing continued reliance on Sullivan. If
517
Sullivan is curtailed or overruled in the near future, a current revival
of old state precedents that formed the filaments of the common law web
would strengthen those precedents.5 18 Prior to Sullivan, states had a rich
applies to charges about candidates for public office as public figures); see also Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (extending applicability of the actual malice standard to suits
filed by public officials and figures for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress).
515. TAYLOR SWIFT, Delicate, on REPUTATION (Big Machine Records 2017) ("This ain't for
the best; My reputation's never been worse .. "). But see Eliana Dockterman, 'I Was Angry.'
Taylor Swift on What Powered Her Sexual Assault Testimony, TIME (Dec. 6, 2017),
2
http://time.com/5049659/taylor-swift-interview-person-of-the-year- 017 (interviewing Taylor Swift
for Time's Person of the Year for 2017 as a "Silence Breaker" for her one dollar jury award for
assault in a counter-suit to a Disc Jockey suing Swift for defamation).
516. TAYLOR SWIFT, THIS IS WHY WE CAN'T HAVE NICE THINGS (Big Machine Records
2017) ("Did you think I wouldn't hear all the things you said about me? This is why we can't have
nice things."); cf KATY TUR, UNBELIEVABLE: MY FRONT-ROW SEAT TO THE CRAZIEST CAMPAIGN

IN AMERICAN HISTORY 240 (2017) ("Trump is crude, and in his halo of crudeness other people get
to be crude as well."); see also Anna North, Man Accused of Groping Woman on PlaneArgues that
https://www.vox.com/policy-andTrump Says it's Okay, Vox (Oct. 23, 2018),
politics/2018/10/23/18013854/trump-airplane-access-hollywood-tape.
517. In the political realm, President Donald Trump has campaigned at rallies and in the press
against current defamation laws. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (calling libel laws a
"sham" and a "disgrace"). In the legal realm, Sullivan might be under threat from two defamation
cases that could be granted certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court; if granted for any reason, the
Court could take the opportunity to ask the parties to brief the issue of whether Sullivan should be
overruled. McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding female accuser of Bill
Cosby a limited purpose public figure), petitionfor cert. filed, No. 17-1542 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2018);
Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442, 444-46, 449 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 2018) (denying current President
Donald Trump's motion to dismiss defamation suit stemming from his campaign promise to sue all
the women that accused him of sexual misconduct).
518. Legal scholars have long called for utilizing state constitutions to safeguard federal rights
at times when the possibility of a federal retreat looms over the nation. See, e.g., William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503
(1977) (arguing for states to safeguard federal rights under state constitutions as a means to force
federal courts to respect those rights); Michael C. Dorf, Can State Supreme Courts ProtectLiberal
Constitutionalism in the Coming Era of Reactionary SCOTUS Jurisprudence?, VERDICT (July 11,
https://verdict.justia.com/2018/07/11 /can-state-supreme-courts-protect-liberal-constitution
2018),

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

75

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 16

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:153

history of (imperfectly) protecting political speech in civil defamation
suits.519 Balancing the values of reputation against the need for political
speech is a delicate task that states have performed for centuries, and can
perform to a greater extent again. 2 °
The common law web developed mostly as products of common
tort law, with occasional use of state common law constitutionalism
through the invocation of state protections for the freedoms and liberties
of speech and press.52 Lawyers and judges shifting reliance from the
majestic music of the federal protections under Sullivan and its progeny
to the subtle lyrics of state constitutional and common law protections
under the common law web could result in more workmanlike judicial
opinions in political defamation cases and would guard against the
impoverishment of a national press corps and public discourse that could
522
occur if Sullivan were curtailed or overruled.
Herbert Wechsler, counsel for The New York Times Co. in
Sullivan, warned that "the sort of difficulty now dramatically presented
in the South is one that is likely to arise anywhere in the country. ' 523 In
truth, weaponized tort suits may arise anywhere and at any time. 524 It is
alism-in-the-coming-era-of-reactionary-scotus-jurisprudence (discussing state constitutions as a
vehicle by which to safeguard federal rights under threat including abortion and affirmative action).
519. See supra Part 11.
520. See sources cited supra note 505. Throughout the history of the American Republic,
personal reputation has been one of the key factors (along with party affiliation and membership) as
to whether a politician is elected to office, reelected, or elevated or appointed to a higher office. See
FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR, supra note 29, at 24, 59, 198, 284 ("[P]ersonal reputation was the
currency of national politics.").
521. See supra Parts H.A, U.B.3, III.B.2.b.
522. See, e.g., Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm'n, 669 F.3d 50, 55-56 (1st Cir.
2012) ("After argument, the judge wrote a thoughtful opinion granting the RSLC's motion. Even
assuming that the RSLC's statements were false and smacked of .'gotcha" politics' of a 'juvenile'
sort, the judge still had 'serious doubts' about whether they were defamatory under Maine lawdoubts that he did not resolve because he concluded that Schatz 's complaintdid not plausibly allege
that the RSLC had acted with actual malice.... Like the district judge, we skip over whether
Schatz's complaintplausibly alleges defamation andfocus on whether it plausibly alleges actual
malice-given that this is the simplest way to pinpoint Schatz's problem." (emphasis added)). Prior
to Sullivan, most courts would have to decide whether a statement was defamatory, and courts
should do so again. See supra Parts H-HI.
523. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 210-20 (quoting Herbert Wechsler).
524. See, e.g., Callum Borchers, Peter Thiel, Gawker and Why All of This Could Matter
During
a
Trump
Presidency,
WASH.
POST
(May
25,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/therfix/wp/201 6/O5/25/peter-thiel-gawker-and-why-all-ofthis-could-matter-during-a-trump-presidency/?utmterm=.5692c9c3ddda
(discussing rich people
financing tort litigation at a time when dissatisfaction with the media is rising); Candace Owens
(@RealCandaceO),
TWIrTER
(May
9,
2018,
3:33
PM),
https://twitter.com/RealCandaceO/status/994299770192760832 ("One email, one phone call, and I
am putting together a legal fund to go after publications that think that they can smear and libel
black conservatives who dare to think for themselves. Do you guys remember Gawker? Yeah, me
neither. Stay tuned") (emphasis added).
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important that some institution, federal or state, have the power to
disarm those litigants.525 Americans returning to existing and/or spinning
new filaments of the common law web may be one important way of
protecting one of the world's oldest constitutional republics and messiest
democratic societies from pernicious weaponized political defamation
suits today and in years to come.526

525. Institutions other than the U.S. Supreme Court could protect a Sullivan-like standard.
Many state courts of last resort have based protections similar to or building on Sullivan based on
their own state constitutions or common law. See, e.g., Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc.,
341 N.E.2d 569, 570-71 (1975) (adopting as New York common law a version of the U.S. Supreme
Court's abandoned Rosenbloom test (applying Sullivan to persons suing for libel on a matter of
public concern)). Legislatures can pass statutes (if they have not already) that redefine what libel
and slander are and put the burden of proving "actual malice" or outright falsity on plaintiffs. Even
if Sullivan were overruled by the Court, any decisions based exclusively on state constitutional
grounds that went further than Sullivan in protecting speech would likely be untouchable by the
U.S. Supreme Court based on independent and adequate state grounds. Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 729 (1991) ("This Court will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court
if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question
and adequate to support the judgment."); see also Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp.
778, 782 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (discussing independent and adequate state grounds as applied to
protections of statements of opinion under New York State constitutional law).
526. See Sarah Haner, Paul Ryan Claims the US is the 'Oldest Democracy' in the World. Is he
Right?, POLITIFACT (July 11, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2016/jul/1l/
paul-ryan/paul-ryan-claims-us-oldest-democracy-world-he-righ (rating the claim "true").
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